

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Past, Present, Future

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African-Asian Relations:

Past, Present, Future

Patrick Ziltener and Christian Suter
(Eds. for the World Society Foundation)

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About the World Society Foundation

The World Society Foundation (WSF) was established in 1982 by Peter Heintz with the aim of encouraging and supporting research on world society, that is, its emergence and historical evolution, its structure, its dynamics, and current transformation. Until 2003, the main purpose of the Foundation's sponsoring activities was to finance entire research projects focusing on the various processes of social integration and disintegration within worldwide systems—world culture, world economy, world politics, and intergovernmental systems—and on how global processes affect the perceptions and actions of individual and collective actors worldwide. Its current sponsoring policy is to provide award programs for research papers and to support international conferences on world society topics. In accordance with this new policy, the Foundation has introduced its WSF Award Program for Research Papers on World Society and held a series of international conferences (2007, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021) in order to maintain a network of excellent scholars interested in transnational and global research topics. The World Society Foundation Award honors outstanding research papers on world society that address a specific topic announced by the Foundation in its Award Program. The World Society Foundation also publishes the book series "World Society Studies." The World Society Foundation is domiciled in Zurich, Switzerland. The current members of the Board are: Mark Herkenrath, Hans-Peter Meier, and Christian Suter (President). Former members of the Board included: Peter Heintz, Karl W. Deutsch, Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, Bruno Fritsch, and Volker Bornschier. More detailed information on past research projects sponsored, the topics and recipients of the 2007–2018 WSF Awards, the WSF book series "World Society Studies," and the call for papers of the current WSF conferences (2022–2023) can be found on the Foundation's website at www.worldsociety.ch.

Preface

In April 2019, the Institute of Sociology of the University of Neuchâtel and the World Society Foundation (WSF) organized an international conference on "The Past, Present and Future of African-Asian Relations" within the framework of the WSF program for research papers on world society. The conference took place in Neuchâtel and was supported by the Swiss Society for African Studies, the Swiss Sociological Association, the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences, the Swiss National Science Foundation, and the Carl Schlettwein Foundation. This volume contains a selection of thirteen contributions presented and discussed at the 2019 conference.[1]

With this conference, the organizers encouraged researchers to investigate sociological theories and conceptual tools for the analysis of the relationships between Asia and Africa, welcomed analyses on the economic, political and social changes triggered by African-Asian relationships, both on the African continent but also in China and in other Asian countries, and the driving forces behind these developments, again on both continents. The conference and this volume, therefore, contribute to improving our knowledge on the past and current dynamics in the economic, social and political structure of world society.

The conference brought together more than fifty researchers and participants from all over the world to the shores of Lake Neuchâtel. About 30% of the participants came from Switzerland, 15% from other European countries, 25% from the United States and Canada, 20% from Asia and the Middle East, and 10% from Africa. A majority of the participants were doctoral students (30%) or postdoctoral and advanced researchers (40%). Regarding gender, female and male speakers and participants were quite equally represented (speakers: 47% females and 53% males; participants: 42% females and 58% males).

1 More details on the 2019 conference, the World Society Foundation, and the WSF conference and research paper sponsoring program are available on the WSF website at http://www.worldsociety.ch.

The conference included five keynote lectures, 28 workshop presentations, and a concluding panel discussion. The summaries of all presentations can be found on the website of the World Society Foundation (at https://www.worldsociety.ch/doku.php?id=conferences:2019:abstracts). In addition, most speakers agreed to share their powerpoint presentations (available at the WSF website). The five keynote speakers included Ching Kwan Lee (University of California at Los Angeles) with a lecture on "The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor and Foreign Investment in Africa," Philippe Beaujard (Institut des mondes africains IMAF, Paris) with a lecture on "Exchanges Between East Africa and Asia Between the 1st and the 15th Century," Andreas Fuchs (Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg and Kiel Institute for the World Economy) with a lecture on "China's Development Aid to Africa and its Consequences," Christopher Alden (London School of Economics and Political Sciences) with a lecture on "China and Africa: A World After its Own Image?" and Scarlett Cornelissen (University of Stellenbosch, South Africa) with a lecture on "Industrial Entanglements and their Political Outflows in the Japan-South Africa Relationship in the Mid-Twentieth Century."

Many people have contributed to the realization of this volume and of the 2019 conference. First and foremost, the World Society Foundation and the editors would like to thank the authors for their stimulating contributions and their patience during the reviewing and copyediting process. A big thank-you is due to the staff and the students at the University of Neuchâtel and to our colleagues of the organizing conference committee, notably to Andrei Sofronie, Christelle Chittani, Marilyn Grell-Brisk, Daniel Künzler, and Sabrina Tabares. We should also like to thank Joël Roth for the cover image and the conference poster. Finally, we are very grateful to the Swiss Society for African Studies, the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Swiss Sociological Association, the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences, the Carl Schlettwein Stiftung, and the Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines at the University of Neuchâtel for providing generous financial support for the organization of the 2019 conference and the publication of this volume.

Neuchâtel and Zurich, January 2021

Christian Suter, President of the World Society Foundation Zurich and
Director of the Institute of Sociology, University of Neuchâtel
Patrick Ziltener, Associated Professor of Sociology, University of Zurich

1

African–Asian Relations: 2000 Years of History and the New Dynamism in the 21st Century

Patrick Ziltener and Christian Suter

Introduction

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the relations between Africa and Asia. This is mainly due to what is perceived as increasing Chinese influence and presence in Africa. Initially hardly noticed in Western Europe and Northern America, a key moment in this gradual process was the "Five Points Proposal" presented by then-President Jiang Zemin during his tour of Africa in 1996. What was termed a "new relationship with Africa" included catchwords such as non-intervention, reliable friendship and mutually beneficial development. Among the earlier scholars to analyze these developments, Alden (2005, 2007) described China's need for energy (especially oil), strategic minerals, and arguably stable sources of key foodstuffs. As one of the Conference's key speakers in Neuchâtel *Chris Alden* reported that, meanwhile

> Nowhere in the world is China's rapid rise to power more evident than in Africa. From multi-billion dollar investments in oil and minerals to the influx of tens of thousands of merchants, labors and a raft of consumer goods, China's economic influence is redefining Africa's traditional ties with the international community. This growing exposure of Chinese firms and citizens to localised risks—seen in cases as diverse as Libya, South Sudan, Kenya and Zimbabwe—has over time compelled Beijing to adopt a more proactive role in continental peacekeeping as well as establish a permanent military base in Djibouti. And, as its debt-driven infrastructure projects and investment-led special economic zones proliferate across Africa, the depth and growing complexity of China's presence in Africa is all the more evident.[1]

He pointed to China's drive for new markets, especially for low-value consumer goods sold through a growing network of Chinese merchants. Africa is also a con-

1 Conference Keynote "China and Africa: A World After its Own Image?".

siderable market for Chinese construction firms using contracted Chinese labor, especially in the domains of infrastructure and housing. Finally, there is growing Chinese direct investment in land and businesses. Not only Africa's ties with the world economy are redefined, but also its ties with the international community, as Brautigam's (2009) widely known analysis of Chinese development aid shows. While unrivalled in its scope, the Chinese relations with Africa is only one example of growing ties between Asian and African countries. Among the other examples are Japan and India, not least with their joint Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)[2] efforts. The initiative is based on a convergence of bottom-up and top-down processes—"Japanese business interest in using India as a springboard to Africa crossed over with Tokyo and New Delhi's desire to provide a geopolitical alternative" to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Pajon and Saint-Mézard, 2018).

In this project that led to the 2019 Conference in Neuchâtel, we focussed on the changing relations of Africa with four Asian countries, namely China, India, South Korea, and Japan[3]. It needs to be pointed out that also maritime Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia or Indonesia have intensified their relationship with Africa in trade, direct investment (FDI) and beyond. Additionally, various oil states in the Persian Gulf (Iran, UAE, Oman, Qatar) have turned their gaze to Africa. Both Asian and African countries frequently describe their relations as being different to relations with European or North American countries. In the rapidly growing body of scientific literature on the topic, but also in media reports, the influence of China and other Asian countries is the source of controversial debates. Particularly the Chinese are seen as "the new colonialists" (*Economist*, March 13, 2008), and in the *Foreign Policy* magazine called "rogue aid" donors like China to "collectively represent a threat to healthy, sustainable development."[4] Chinese loans are seen as part of a "debt-trap diplomacy," where a country loans money with the intention of political or economic concessions if the loan cannot be repaid.[5] More benevolent perspectives on Asian relations with African countries see Asian countries as healthy economic competitors, as development partners that help African countries pave a pathway out of poverty or even as liberators that help end the postcolonial dependence of African countries. Prudent voices such as Chaponnière

2 The AAGC was announced on May 23, 2017, at the 52nd African Development Bank (ADB) meeting in Gujarat, India.

3 Japan joined the African Development Fund as early as June 1973, and 1982 the African Development Bank. Japan's relations with Africa were a theme at the Conference in Neuchâtel, especially the topic of Japan's role in the industrialization of South Africa in the 1960/70s (Scarlett Cornelissen, Keynote "Industrial Entanglements and their Political Outflows in the Japan-South Africa Relationship in the Mid-Twentieth Century"), but this volume does not contain a specific chapter on Japan.

4 Naím (2009, 95); see Chapter 8.

5 "Many Countries at Risk of Defaulting on Debt to China," *Newsweek*, October 21, 2020.

(2008) remind us that quite similar debates were abundant in the 1960s, when revolutionary China became increasingly active in Africa. After extensive field research in Africa, *Ching Kwan Lee* concluded at the Conference in Neuchâtel:

> China has recently emerged as one of Africa's top business partners, aggressively pursuing its raw materials and establishing a mighty presence in the continent's booming construction market. Among major foreign investors in Africa, China has stirred the most fear, hope, and controversy about labor rights and national development.[6]

In her recent book, she analyzed the peculiarity of outbound Chinese state capital by comparing it with global private capital in copper and construction in Zambia. Refuting the rhetorical narratives of "Chinese colonialism" and "South-South cooperation," she draw on ethnographic data collected over a six-year period to chronicle the multi-faceted struggles that confront and differentiate these two varieties of capital, and discussed their uneven potentials for post-colonial African development (Lee, 2017). Indeed her study serves, as Evan Ryser wrote in the *Asian Review of Books* (May 21, 2018), "as a valuable check on sloppy thinking about China in Africa."

The Motivation for this Book

To go beyond "sloppy thinking" about African-Asian relations—this is also the motivation for this book, based on the presentation and discussion of various findings by mostly younger researchers in Neuchâtel. Beyond public announcements and short-lived media hypes—is the impression of a new dynamism in African-Asian relations correct? Can it be confirmed and empirically valididated, and if so, is it significant enough to mark a new *signum*, a sign of our time, that stands for a profound reconfiguration of the world-system? Is it a process that will once be accepted as one of the fundamental transformations of this century?

As *new dynamism* we understand a significant increase in direct interactions between Africa and Asia in this century, as compared to the level of interactions in 20th century and during the Cold War. *Direct* means interactions not mediated through Western-led institutions such as World Bank and IMF, but based on new bilateral and/or multilateral institutions, more or less regular and fomalized. While we analyze institutions such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)—the 20th anniversary of which has been celebrated in October 2020[7]—from different

6 Conference Keynote "The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor and Foreign Investment in Africa."

7 "Two Decades of A Shared Journey toward New Heights in the New Era— Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation". http://www.focac.org/eng/ttxxsy/t1824129.htm (accessed January 26, 2021).

perspectives, we nevertheless see a core characteristic of the new African-Asian dynamism in the lesser degree of formalization and a lower level of institutionalization, compared to the Western-led post-World War II world order.

In the following section, we discuss some key indicators in regard of this new African-Asian dynamism, we then look back to 2000 years of history and analyze the roots of the new dynamism by summarizing key arguments and findings by the authors of the other 13 chapters. A map and an index of African countries, places, and institutions on p. 278–279 assists to make the book more accessible.

Key Indicators

It is not a surprising research insight that not all initiatives lead to tangible impacts and effects, and not all institutions mark a significant progress in interactions. E.g., for the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), there seems to be "no outstanding achievement" based on this initiative (Taniguchi, 2020)—in contrast to projects in the BRI context. Chinese engineering and construction projects in Africa have developed dramatically in this century, especially in the years from 2003 on. They reached a peak in 2015, with 54.74 billion USD gross annual revenues of Chinese companies in Africa. The top 5 countries are Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. These top 5 countries account for 50% of all Chinese companies' 2018 construction project gross annual revenues in Africa; Algeria alone accounts for 15%.[8] Currently are more than 200,000 Chinese workers active in Africa, most of them (58%) in Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The number reached a peak in 2015 with 263,659 and has declined slightly since then.[9] According to the latest figures (Table 1), three Asian contries are among the 10 biggest investors (FDI) in Africa. While several Western economies (France, UK, USA) de-invested in Africa in recent years, China, Hong Kong as well as Singapore have been significant sources of FDI inflows for Africa. China (without Hong Kong) has increased its FDI in Africa by about 44%, while the US has reduced it in the same time by 44%.

Meanwhile, China is the fifth biggest investor in Africa, with a total FDI stock in the range of the UK or the US. The top five African destinations of Chinese FDI are South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Zambia, and Ethiopia.

8 Data source: China's National Bureau of Statistics 2020, China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University, www.sais-cari.org.

9 Data source: Official Chinese sources, 2018, These figures include Chinese workers sent to work on Chinese companies' construction contracts in Africa ("workers on contracted projects") and Chinese workers sent to work for non-Chinese companies in Africa ("workers doing labor services"); they are reported by Chinese contractors and do not include informal migrants such as traders and shopkeepers. China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University, www.sais-cari.org.

Table 1: Africa's top 10 investor economies by FDI stock, 2014 and 2018 (USD billions)

Country	*2014*	*2018*	*Change (in %)*
Netherlands	59	79	+33.9
France	60	53	-13.2
United Kingdom	67	49	-36.7
United States	69	48	-43.8
China	32	46	+43.8
South Africa	25	35	+40.0
Italy	19	29	+52.7
Hong Kong, China	9	21	+233.3
Singapore	17	20	+17.7
Germany	11	14	+27.2

Data source: UNCTAD 2020, *World Investment Report 2020*, p. 28.

However, many Chinese projects in Africa are not covered by these figures since they are based on loans and do not meet the criteria of FDI. An important tool for the Chinese are the so-called Resources-for-infrastructure (R4I) swaps (Konijn and van Tulder, 2015). Interestingly, China's ability to engage in R4I swaps is rooted in its own historical experiences, when the basic concepts developed in the framework of Sino-Japanese trade relations in the 1970s. At that time, China was a poor, but resource-rich country lacking technology for industrialization and modern infrastructure. China was keen to import Japanese know-how, machinery and complete plants, and it paid this with resources such as coal and crude oil.[10] Nowadays, the Chinese state strongly supports this kind of swaps through diplomacy and its influence over the policy banks that finance the globalization strategies of Chinese

10 In February 1978, the governments of Japan and China concluded a long-term trade agreement with the aim to facilitate the barter of coal and crude oil for industrial technology, machinery and plants (Panda, 1983).

transnational corporations, especially but not exclusively in the extractive and construction industries in Africa. An example is the deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), struck in 2007:

> In 2007 a $9 billion R4I swap was struck between the DRC and China. It was the largest of its kind and the deal was worth more than the DRC's state budget in that year. A Sino-Congolese mining joint venture, Sino-Congolais des Mines (Sicomines), was created and awarded mining concessions for 10 million tonnes of copper and 600,000 tonnes of cobalt. The Chinese parties to the joint venture Sicomines are two of the world's largest construction companies, China Railway Engineering Corporation (railways) and Sinohydro (dams), and a smaller mining company Zhejiang Huayou (cobalt). The Chinese stake in Sicomines is 68%. DRC state-owned mining company Gécamines holds the other 32%. In return for the mining concessions, Exim pledged to provide $9 billion in finance for the construction of roads, railways, hospitals, dams and mining operations. Exim loans are tied to the procurement of at least 88% of Chinese goods and service. (Source: Konijn 2014)

Regarding these R4I swaps, Konijn (2014, 24f) reached the following conclusion: They "do not inherently exacerbate the resource curse nor are they a panacea for its ills," they rather offer opportunities and are accompanied by risks, but as successful cases show, these risks can be mananged. Several chapters of this book critically analyze projects based on deals like the one mentioned above.

The new dynamism is, of course, reflected in African-Asian trade. Japanese exports to Africa reached a peak in 2007 and have declined since then.[11] Imports from Africa, however, increased significantly, and in this century, Japan has had a considerable trade deficit with Africa almost every year. Chinese exports to Africa grew from 1992 (1.26 billion USD) to 2019 (113.05 billion USD), this is a multiplication by 90.[12] Biggest importers of Chinese goods are Nigeria and South Africa, with around 17 billion USD each, followed by Egypt (12 billion) and Algeria (7 billion). Against common wisdom, China is not the biggest trading partner for every African country. E.g. in 2005 Nigeria's biggest trading partner in Asia (in terms of exports) was Japan, accounting for 31% of total Nigerian exports to Asia. Japan's contribution as a destination market dropped to 18% in 2015, and India replaced Japan as the top destination in 2015 (Tang et al., 2020). Another example is Kenya—this country's top export destination in Asia is Pakistan: In 2005, Pakistan accounted for 42% of Kenya's exports to Asia, and its share increased to 43% by 2015 (ibid.). The findings by Tang et al. (2020) show that although overall exports from Sub-Saharan Africa to Asia are still highly concentrated in resource-intensive sectors, so far only a few

11 "Data on Japan-Africa cooperation". www.jica.go.jp (accessed January 26, 2021).

12 Data source UNCOMTRADE 2020, calculation by author.

countries have leveraged the export booms to Asia to diversify their export portfolios.

2000 Years of History

Taking a broader and more long-term view of the relationship between Asia and Africa, the current intensification of interactions is seen as a shift of the center of the world economy to the East or as (cyclical) re-emergence of the centers of the early world economies as described, for example, by Abu-Lughod (1991), Chaudhuri (1985/1990), and Frank (1998). These early world economies did not originate in Europe, but in Asia, reaching, as expressed by Sheriff (1987, 2010), the Indian Ocean to the littoral Southeast of Africa. In yet another perspective, not least taken by Chinese sources, the current developments are described as the advent of a multipolar world.

Philippe Beaujard, having just published his two volumes opus *The Worlds of the Indian Ocean*, described in his keynote in Neuchâtel the formation of the Afro-Eurasian world-system 2000 years ago, with the Indian Ocean holding a central position (Chapter 2). A second cycle, from 7th through 10th century was shaped by the powerful Muslim and Tang empires. After the second Islamic expansion, the Swahili coast was fully transformed into an active semi-periphery, leading to increased social differentiation and an exploitation of the African interior by both coastal and foreign groups. New practices in architecture, body care, clothing and food were adopted, along with an increased consumption of rice. He documents that, by the 11th century, the Chinese possessed some knowledge about the East African coast. It was, however, only after the reunification of the Chinese empire under the Ming that a pro-active search for contact and exchange took place, the famous expeditions under admiral Zheng He (early 15th century). The period was shaped by the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, large states on the Indian subcontinent, and city-states such as Malacca in Southeast Asia. The four maps in Chapter 2 provide an illustrative insight into this complex world, especially valuable for the non-historians. Europe exerted an increasing influence from the end of the fifteenth century onward, but Beaujard concludes, along with others, that until the beginning of the 19th century, Asian economies still largely dominated the global system including the world of the Indian Ocean.

The Origins of the New Dynamism

Starting with observations in the daily markets of Ouagadougou, *Guive Khan-Mohammad* reconstructs the different stages of goods *made in China* penetrating the economy of Burkina Faso, a landlocked country of almost 20 Mio people in Western Africa (Chapter 3, see Map p. 278). Important prerequisites for the "massive arrival of Chinese goods" were the devaluation of the currency and the implementation of structural adjustment programs. The intensification of the imports of Chinese goods were less a consequence of inter-state cooperation, as it has been the case in the years from 1973 to 1994, but the effects of the liberalization of Burkina Faso's economic regime. Windows of opportunity were opened "for the development of various trading accumulation itineraries autonomous from the state." Khan-Mohammad shows how African traders' networks, e.g. in textiles, re-oriented away from Europe, via the Gulf states towards India, Indonesia, Thailand, and finally China. The growing African networks ensured that *China competence* was built up and shared. In this century, not only for Burkina Faso but for many African countries, China became "a closer, opener and more profitable trading destination than ever."

In Chapter 4, *W. Travis Selmier II* analyzes the trajectories of the four countries Ethiopia, Angola, Guinea, and Tanzania, with the intention to compare smaller and larger countries in different regions, with different historical backgrounds, and differing resource endowments, in their relation to China. Tanzania and Guinea share a background of long-lasting *friendship* with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Ethiopia and Angola do not, in part because China funded rebels either within and adjacent to their respective country. Angola and Guinea are "prototypic resource states" where the Chinese government and private enterpreneurs, sometimes with dubious methods, seek to ensure access to natural resources such as oil and bauxite. Tanzania's economy is more diversified, resource-rich as well as both agriculturally and industrially productive. The Tanzania-Zambia railway (TAZARA) was constructed in the 1970s, predominantly with Chinese labor, and in this century a series of large infrastructure projects were done by the Chinese. The author of Chapter 6 of this volume, Veda Vaidyanathan, has recently published a collection of detailed analyses of infrastructure projects realized by the Chinese in Tanzania (and Kenya; Vaidyanathan, 2019).[13]

Of all the four countries, Selmier notes, Ethiopia has most similarities with China, especially as far as historical factors are concerned. Both countries re-emerged in the last decades as "hubs of political and economic activity." Recently, Ethiopia has become "the hub of African political and economic discussion," home to the UNDP-Africa. the UN Economic Commission for Africa. and the African Union (AU), whose headquarter is the AU Conference Center and Office Complex (AUCC), a vast building complex in Addis Ababa, funded as gift by the Chinese

13 In analyzing the Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway Project (DMGP), the authors came to "interesting insights into the assumptions underpinning the operations of the contractor, China Merchants Holding International (CMHI). Being a project funded by the World Bank stringent environmental standards and social safeguards were laid down, raising costs substantially for the contractor involved. In a bid to boost the company's reputation and establish the *China brand*, the contractor was willing to forego its usual profit margin to secure the project. It was observed that tacit support of the state was instrumental in enabling the contractor to operate in this fashion." (Vaidyanathan, 2019, 12).

government.[14] On economic ground, Selmier finds that the Chinese government has options in all four countries for commercially-viable Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) projects "which advance those goals China has pursued in Africa in modern times: respect, influence, joint economic growth, and access to the vast resources with which Africa is blessed."

The New Dynamism at Regional Level

The regional dimension of Sino-African development cooperation is the topic of the contribution by *Georg Lammich* (Chapter 5). His findings confirm that the relations and interactions between China and the African Union (AU) have intensified and become more institutionalized, since the founding of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the year 2000 in Beijing. In the context of China's stepping up its engagement with Africa at regional level, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) plays a key role. Lammich, however, finds persisting institutional weaknesses: "While there are infrequent talks between representatives of both sides tackling various topics, NEPAD has no follow-up mechanism to develop concrete initiatives or specify priority areas for China's regional activities." For the AU, the cooperation with China is not only an opportunity to finance development frameworks such as the NEPAD, but also a chance to implement new regional development schemes. Lacking expertise and an institutionally developed structure, the AU itself remains a rather weak actor, not being capable of actively incorporate China's diverse activities in its regional framing. A recent success story is the project of Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), for which the AU won extensive Chinese financial and technical support. China, on the other side, is using the NEPAD agenda as "a compass and legitimating factor for its development strategy but does not give much credit to its organizational capacities." As a consequence, Sino-African development cooperation at regional level remains, beyond sporadic support for individual projects, an additional institution in the toolbox of bilateral development promotion by China in Africa.

FOCAC is also a topic in Chapter 6, in which *Veda Vaidyanathan* (see also Fn. 13) is contrasting Indian and Chinese approaches to Africa. India's Africa policy, so Vaidyanathan, "has oscillated between passive and reluctantly reactive at best," she even uses the notion of "strategic apathy," despite a long history of trade, migration, and cooperation between nationalist movements. At regional level, the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) is held once in every three years, for the first time in April 2008 in New Delhi. While China focusses very much on building infrastruc-

14 "African Union opens Chinese-funded HQ in Ethiopia" (*BBC*, January 28, 2012). A Chinese political adviser is quoted as: "The towering complex speaks volumes about our friendship to the African people, and testifies to our strong resolve to support African development." (www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16770932).

ture projects and increasing connectivity in Africa, India sees the health sector as a core area of cooperation. India's "health diplomacy" in Africa is described as "a confluence of both State led initiatives ... to provide aid and technical assistance, as well as sub-national actors who are actively exporting low cost generics, building health infrastructure, and hosting African medical tourists in India." There is an India-Africa health fund, research cooperation, capacity building, and 50,000 scholarships are given to African students to attend Indian universities. A contrast also in the last section of Chapter 6, the experiences of a floriculture businessman from India in Ethiopia with the life and work situation of a Chinese company's contractors in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. What they share—they all see Africa as "land of opportunities" and are successful with their ventures.

What's in it for Africa?

In Chapter 7, *Naaborle Sackeyfio* asks, what are the costs of Chinese partnerships for the African side, with a focus on Africa's *lions*, such as Ethiopia or Ghana. Their trajectory is obviously depending on trade with and FDI from China, with corresponding developmental, social, and also political implications for a *Pax Africana*. The Chapter has a special focus on sustainability and the changing conditions of knowledge production, especially for the younger and coming generations. As African states "barter away resource rights and relegate indigenous development to the margins while engaged in a calculus that privileges outsourcing knowledge production, the consequences for a population that will be powered by youth suggests a collision course." Sackeyfio discusses the conditions under which African can reap the benefits of the Chinese initiatives: "The manner in which African youth stand to benefit from a looming industrial and increasingly urban landscape will likely determine the scope of a silk road that either confirms purported win-win scenarios or the opposite."

In Chapter 8, *Andreas Fuchs* and *Elena Quante* evaluate the evidence whether China can be qualified as a "rougue aid donor," summarizing an ongoing debate that was mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter. The starting point is that Chinese motives for aid allocation do not differ much from those of Western countries in the sense that both are guided by commercial and political motives. States that do align with China in the UN, however, receive significantly more aid than countries with a looser voting alignment (Dreher et al., 2018). However, China does not systematicelly give more aid to autocratic states than to democracies. China adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. But it changes the "aid game" for the countries and international institutions involved: Since China does not have any conditionality attached to loans and grants (except adherence to the One China policy), the "bargaining power" of the Western-led institutions is weakened. Furthermore, Chinese aid is seen as less bureaucratic and being disbursed more quickly. The authors conclude, this "makes China a serious

contender as a donor for developing countries," but the "rogue donor" argument cannot be sustained. But, based on empricial evidence, it can be said that Chinese development aid comes along with some side effects that might increase local corruption and lead to nepotistic aid allocation.

In Chapter 9, we are back in West Africa. Author *Ebi N'godo Filomène* is analyzing the revitalization of China-Côte d'Ivoire cooperation in the years after 1994. The first Sino-Ivorian cooperation agreement from 1983 laid the groundwork for diplomatic relations, but did not trigger major cooperation projects yet. Only after 1993, with a new political leadership in Côte d'Ivoire, a new dynamic developed: The official number of joint development projects grows from 2 to 49, starting with the two key projects, the hydroagricultural development of Guiguidou (442 hectares for rice cultivation) and the Palace of Culture of Abidjan, followed by several large infrastructure projects such as the Maison des Députés (parliamentarians' hotel) of Yamoussoukro, the Gagnoa General Hospital, the Abidjan–Grand-Bassam expressway, the drinking water supply of the city of Abidjan, the Soubré hydraulic dam, the extension of the autonomous port of Abidjan, and also resource projects such as the exploitation of the manganese field of Lauzoua. The Chapter documents these projects in detail, including the financial side, and some also with photos by the author. The implementation of theses projects in Côte d'Ivoire was linked to an intensification of bilateral diplomacy with the People's Republic of China. The West African country, rather a latecomer in its relations' buildup with China, is a revealing and illuminating case for the new dynamism.

The focus of Chapter 10 by *Yorbana Seign-Goura* is also the Chinese financed and built infrastructure, this time in the Central African countries of Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Niger, Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo (in the annex of the Chapter also some documentary photos). He finds that Chinese infrastructure development is based on "economic diplomacy in which China has more interests than African countries." The push and pull factors for investing in Central Africa are not different from those having linked traditional Western donors to Africa for decades, and in African countries "infrastructure swap deals are used as tools and symbols of state power" rather than "as real tools of local development promotion." In many regards, there is no true compliance with the principles of South-South cooperation. He comes, therefore, to the concerning conclusion that "all ingredients are present in China-Central African countries infrastructure investments with outcomes of white elephants in the future, those failed infrastructure projects that have paved the history of African countries cooperation with old donors in the 1960s seem to come back."

The New Entanglement

In Chapter 11, *Sooa Lee* presents the result of her case study of an Official Development Aid (ODA) project of the South Korean government in Tanzania. Based on participant observation and in-depth interviews, she analyzed the challenges of cross-national knowledge sharing in a joint research center of a Korean mechanical engineering laboratory with a government funded university in Tanzania. The center aims at developing, educating, and commercializing innovative appropriate technologies that are suitable for Tanzanian environment. Apart from the financing (economic capital), social capital proved to be of essence for the development of the center's activities. As for cultural capital, she describes specific barriers between Korean and Tanzanian participants, such as differences concerning working speed or payment systems, while the construction of a shared historical experience, namely the of way out of poverty, helped to generate a good collaborative atmosphere.

Another kind of cultural construction in African-Asian relations is analyzed in Chapter 12 by *Kudus Oluwatoyin Adebayo*, the othering of Nigerians in the Southern Chinese city and economic hub Guangzhou, the city with Asia's largest African community. The categorical model of identification is the Chinese notion *mafan*, which is best translated as *troublemaker*. Since the second wave of immigration in the 2000s—with economic activities by Africans moving from Hong Kong and other East Asian cities to Shenzhen, then increasingly in Guangzhou—, Nigerians have encountered targeting and policing, illegalization and discrimination, after increasing social problems in the community and cases of civil disobedience and public disturbances. As a consequence, Nigerians were increasingly singled out of the population of Africans by Chinese media, but also by other African groups, distancing themselves from the *mafan*. Today, the author finds Nigerian-Chinese relations subsisting in Guangzhou "within a strategically self-imposed interactional barrier"—a strategy "to stay out of trouble." As the case of Guangzhou shows, the increasing presence of Africans in Asian cities is definitely a significant part of the new Africa-Asia dynamism, with all the social implications.

In Chapter 13 we are back to an East African country with a centuries-long history of interaction with Asia, namely Zimbabwe. *Eve Zvichanzi Nyemba, Prolific Mataruse*, and *Donald Peter Chimanikire* describe how Zimbabwe, even though the PRC had supported the armed struggle of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) which was to become the ruling party, focused after independence more on the relations with the West than on its friendship with China. This changed when the EU and other Western states imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe in 2002. Then president Mugabe announced to "return back to the days when our greatest friends were the Chinese," and he initiated a *Look East* policy. During the ensuing economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe, China made significant contributions to

the economy which helped to avoid a total collapse. However, outside government circles, the Chinese remain unpopular in the general populace. The authors analyze the reasons for that finding: the opacity of Chinese activity in Zimbabwe, the prevalence of conspiracy theories like the one that the Chinese are "colluding with political leaders to loot Africa and siphon resources in a neo-colonial arrangement," and possibly also the link between desperation and friendship—the close relationship with China has not been Zimbabwe's first option or choice. The new government after Mugabe undertook from 2018 on considerable efforts at re-engaging with the West. This seems not to negatively affect the relations with the China: Many Chinese-built mega-projects like the new parliamentary building, power stations, airports and universities have been constructed or are under way in Zimbabwe. In 2018 a "comprehensive strategic co-operative partnership" between the countries was announced. The Chapter ends with policy recommendations that are definitely worth to be discussed, beyond the Zimbabwean case, on how to devise sound relations with China.

In Chapter 14, *Kevin J.A. Thomas* exmines inequalities in employment among different groups of immigrants to South Africa. Compared to other African countries, South Africa has a longer history of Chinese immigration, now the oldest Chinese diaspora in Africa, as well as a substantial presence of other Asian immigrant groups. Mass migration from the Indian subcontinent began in the mid-1800s with unskilled labor for the sugar and cotton plantations owned by European settlers. More recently, after the removal of apartheid restrictions to immigration, South Africa became the most important destination of migrants moving within the continent. Therefore, this case study is suitable to answer broader questions of how different groups of immigrants fare on the (same) labor market. Based on South African Population Census data, the Author uses logistic regression models to describe the association between current employment status and immigrant/native-born status. The results show that Chinese immigrants have higher odds of being employed compared to immigrants from major Asian sending countries such as India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Moreover, Thomas finds that Chinese immigrants have much higher odds of employment than African-born immigrants and local natives in South Africa. Actually, Chinese immigrants have employment outcomes that match those of White South Africans, who are found at the top of South Africa's racial hierarchy. These findings do have political implications, not necessarily because of latent or acute social tensions, but because politicians in several African countries already have instrumentalized these kind of inequalitites in political or electoral campaigns.

Conclusion and Outlook

The evidence presented in this volume allows us to answer the question. There is a new dynamism in Africa-Asian relations, at bilateral and multilateral, local and regional levels, both in formal, institutional contexts and as informal practices. Asian and African countries have never, since the end of the colonial empires, been economically as highly integrated as nowadays. From trade to direct investment and resource-based infrastructure deals, we observe very dynamic processes that transform the core-semiperiphery-periphery structure that we knew from the second half of the 20th century. The new African-Asian dynamism marks a *signum* of our century. Unnecessary to emphasize that core economic areas such as North America or Europe remain important economic sources and cooperation partners for Africa, with high trade and investment volumes. But especially the advent of the new China in Africa has definitely changed opportunity structures for actors in Africa, as many cases and stories in the following chapters prove.

The political consequences are not really visible yet. The new level of African-Asian economic integration seems to have also a positive impact on political cooperation in Africa (1), but how deep this impact will be remains to be seen. We will definitely see more attempts by China to translate its new weight in Africa into political support at global level (2).

(1) The negotiations of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) have involved China as a major broker. 52 out of 55 African countries have joined the initiative, the three others being Benin, Eritrea, and economic heavy-weight Nigeria. It is supposed to boost not only China's African continental trade ties, but also political cooperation.[15] China has used the new year 2021 already for a diplomatic offensive in Africa, with high-ranking state visits and topics on the agenda such as Covid-19 vaccines, economic recovery, new BRI memoranda for the implementation of "transformative development."[16] We are looking forward to this year's Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in Senegal.

(2) We got a first impression in 2019 how this could look like when a group of 22 Western states issued a joint letter to the 41st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which condemned China's mass detention of Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang region of Northwest China.[17] As a reaction, the People's Republic made strong efforts to rally its *friends* to sign a *counter-letter* that expressed "firm opposition to relevant countries' practice of politicizing human rights issues, by naming and shaming, and publicly exerting pressures on other countries." This was quite a success for China, since not only countries from the China-supported *like-minded group* such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Cuba, and Egypt signed this second letter, but also many other Muslim states—and in total almost half of all African states.[18] These events clearly prove that China has significant diplomatic influence on the continent and is able to translate its economic weight into political mobilization at global level.

15 "African ambassadors expect more cooperation with China under new FTA" (*CGTN*, December 9, 2020; news.cgtn.com).

16 "China seeks to shore up friendships in Africa" (*MERICS*, January 14, 2021; merics.org).

17 The signatories to the July 8, 2019 letter were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. "The '22 vs. 50' Diplomatic Split Between the West and China Over Xinjiang and Human Rights" (*jamestown.org/*, January 14, 2021).

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18 Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Source as in Fn. 17.

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2

Ancient Connections Between Asia and East Africa (1st through 15th Centuries)

Philippe Beaujard

Connections between Asia and East Africa have a long history. This chapter focuses on a period between the beginning of the Common Era (CE) and the 15th century. It shows that contacts developed within the context of an Afro-Eurasian world-system in which the Indian Ocean held a central position. East Africa played an active role in these expanding connections. Europe exerted an increasing influence from the end of the 15th century onward, but until the beginning of the 19th century, Asian economies still largely dominated the global system.

Introduction

At the beginning of the Common Era (CE), expanding exchange networks led to the formation of what can be viewed as a world-system, or a world-economy if we use the Braudelian term. I speak of a world-system when exchanges between regions lead to a transregional division of labor, with a hierarchy between dominant regions (cores) and dominated regions (peripheries), and with semi-peripheries holding an intermediary position. The existence of cycles is characteristic of a world-system.[1] In the Afro-Eurasian world-system formed at the beginning of the Common Era, the Indian Ocean held a central position (see Beaujard, 2012, vol. I). As early as the first cycle of this system, from the 1st to the 6th century, East Africa built itself as an interface linking dominant cores and African continental peripheries (Beaujard, 2017, 2018).

In fact, contacts between East Africa and South Asia go back to the second millennium BCE, since plants domesticated in Africa were transported to India during this period. Some examples of these plants are *Pennisetum glaucum*, sorghum, and hyacinth bean *Lablab purpureus* (Fuller, 2008). East Africa also received plants from India and Southeast Asia very early on, although farmers—speaking Bantu

1 And of any system; see Morin (1990, 1999).



Map 1: The World-System, 1st through 6th century CE

languages—did not arrive on the East African coast until the 1st century CE. Among the plants imported on the African coast were banana plants, taro, water yam, and pigeon pea *Cajanus cajan*. Note that there were contacts between India and Egypt, probably through the Red Sea: pepper has been found in the stomach of Pharaoh Ramses II, who died ca. 1213 BCE (Germer, 1985).

First Cycle: 1st through 6th Century CE

The Roman-Indian trade has been well studied. Romans and Greeks sailed to India, and Indians went to the Red Sea, in Egypt and along the Axumite coasts.[2] Kushan gold coins have been recovered in the interior of Ethiopia, in a sixth-century context. Axumite coins have been discovered in Sri Lanka and India. Yemen was occupied by the Axumites and then by the Sassanids from Persia. All these powers may have traded along the East African coast.

For the first cycle of the Afro-Eurasian world-system, thanks to the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (a Greek text written around 30 CE), we know that the Greco-Roman world had some knowledge of the East African coast, and that Yemeni merchants settled at a place called Rhapta, which may have been located at the mouth of the Rufiji River (Casson, 1989). Moreover, Pliny has described what seems to be the importation of cinnamon into Arabia by seafarers arriving from Southeast Asia.[3] It is possible that the "island of Menuthias" mentioned in the 2nd century CE by Ptolemy in his *Geography* refers to Madagascar. Shards of Greco-Roman pottery of a similar type have been found at Ras Hafun (Opōnē in the Periplus) and at Arikamedu (near Pondicherry) in India. The Opōnē region has also yielded Parthian ceramics, ceramics from Gujarat and, in a second phase, mainly Sassanian pottery (Smith and Wright, 1988). We learn from the *Periplus* that Opōnē was a port of export for slaves and turtle shells from the south.

Ancient coins have been found on the East African coast. The Museum of Zanzibar owns Parthian and Sassanid coins dated between 41 and 241. A gold coin of Ptolemy IX (116–107 BCE) was sold to a tourist at Dar-es-Salaam in 1901. Other discoveries of Ptolemaic, Roman, Axumite, and Byzantine coins have been made in Kenya and Tanzania. Some of them have been discovered in the interior: a sesterce in the name of Severus Alexander in Uganda; an antoninianus of Victorinus at Nairobi; a coin of Antoninus Pius at Umtali in Zimbabwe; an Indian Kushan coin of the king Huvishka (around 130–150 CE) at Inyanga in Zimbabwe; a coin of Claudius II (268–270) (minted at Alexandria) at Bindura, in Zimbabwe, and so

2 The empire of Axum developed as of approximately 100 CE in what is now Eritrea and northern Ethiopia. It became a mandatory intermediary between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Axum occupied the port of Adulis, and dominated trade in southern Arabia.

3 Pliny, Book XII, ed. Ernout, 1949, paragr. XLII–XLIII, 47–50, 92–94.

forth. Even though the circumstances of the discoveries raise doubts, their number and their location (especially in Zimbabwe) seem to be significant.

Neologisms in the Proto-North-East Coast (PNEC) languages and in the Proto-Sabaki (between 350 and 650 CE) of Tanzania and Kenya point to early contacts with Arabo-Persian and Indian networks.[4]

Prior to the Islamic period, the Lamu archipelago and Zanzibar were prominent places for contacts with oceanic networks. Chinese stoneware has been found at Unguja Ukuu, on Zanzibar. The archaeologist Juma (2004) has dated this stoneware from the 6th century: this may reflect a Sassanid trade with China and East Africa, but the dating of this material remains to be confirmed. Juma has also excavated Roman ceramics from Egypt dated to the 5th or 6th century, as well as glass of the same provenance, in the form of vessels and beads.

We do not know of any African products arriving in China at that time. However, the guinea fowl may have been introduced (this species is of African origin). A ceramic piece in Boston's Museum of Fine Arts, dated to the Han period, is catalogued as portraying this bird, certainly brought via the Silk Roads.

Between the Muslim and the Tang Empires (Second Cycle: 7th through 10th Century)

After a period of division between the 3rd and 6th centuries, China was reunified by the Sui and then the Tang. China experienced a period of strong economic growth and showed interest in long-distance trade, via the Silk Roads and the southern seas. At the same time an immense Muslim Empire was formed. The interconnection of these two empires by land and sea was crucial to the second phase of the world-system, which began during the 7th century and lasted until the 10th century. During that period, the arrival of Arabo-Persian Muslims on the African coast contributed to the elaboration of an incipient Swahili culture, which may have extended as far as Mozambique in the south, and to the Comoros and Madagascar between the 8th and 10th centuries.

Contacts were established with the Persian Gulf. During the 10th century, the Arab geographer Mas'ūdī wrote:

> The sailors of Oman cross this gulf [Arabian Sea], then go on to the sea of the Zanj to reach the island of Qanbalu [Pemba]. It has a mixed population of Muslims and Zanj idolaters (1962, I, 93–94).

"Zanj" is the name given to East African Bantus. Mas'ūdī was the first author to mention gold exploitation; he notes: "The sea of the Zanj ends with the land of

4 Nurse and Hinnebusch, 1993, 288–289 ; Beaujard, 2019, I, 585–586.

Map 2: The World-System, 7th through 10th century CE



Sofala and the Waqwaq, which produces gold and many other wonderful things." In fact, gold exploitation must have begun earlier, during the 8th or 9th century. Mas'ūdī also mentions the export of ivory. Moreover, the slave trade was highly significant, at least until the Zanj revolt in Iraq during the 9th century. Muslim networks transported African slaves as far as Indonesia and China. Chinese sources have recorded offerings of *sengki* (Persian *zangi*) or *sengzhi* (Arabic *zanji*) slaves at the Chinese court by the kingdom of Shilifoshi (Palembang, kingdom of Srīwijaya) in 724. As early as 614, "Java" sent two *sengzhi* women to China, and in 813, an embassy from the kingdom of Heling (western Java) presented four *sengzhi* slaves at the Chinese court. It is possible that some of the *sengzhi/sengki* slaves were "black people" from the Pacific Ocean. However, various terracotta figurines dated to the Tang period appear to feature Africans (and not Papuans). Wood was another African export: Istakhrī (10th century) writes of houses built from African timber at Sīrāf. According to Mas'ūdī and Idrīsī, iron was another product for export: it was even bought by Indians.

The main imports at this time in East Africa came from the Persian Gulf. One finds Sassano-Islamic green pottery as far as Mozambique (and even further south, on the coast of Natal) and on the northeastern coast of Madagascar. Glass beads also came from the Persian Gulf, as did Chinese ceramics. The significance of the exportations of Chinese ceramics toward the Persian Gulf has been confirmed by the discovery of an Arabo-Persian shipwreck near Belitung Island (see Krahl 2010). While the Chinese chronicles do not mention direct relations between China and Africa under the Tang, except for the "accidental" journey of Du Huan (one of a few Chinese captured in the Battle of Talas in 751), various African products were known in China as products from the country of the black Zanj: ivory, rhinoceros horn, incense, and ambergris. The search for ambergris in the Indian Ocean was probably stimulated by the Chinese demand. Moreover, the oldest Chinese coins found on the eastern African coast are dated to 620. Duan Chengshi (9th century), the son of a high Tang official, describes the activity of Persian merchants along the coast of Bobali (Berbera). His book, the *Yuyang zazu*, contains one of the earliest-known descriptions of the Somali coast. It mentions the practice of blood brotherhood between Africans and foreign traders and that of the slave trade.[5]

Indian pottery has also been found at Manda (Lamu archipelago) and Unguja Ukuu (Zanzibar); in all probability, Indians visited the East African coast. Possible evidence includes oral traditions related to the Wadebuli, which suggest that the region of Daybul (Pakistan) was involved in the slave trade in ancient times. At Shanga, tiny silver coins have been recovered dated to the ninth century; these would later be imitated in coins from Pemba, Zanzibar, Mafia, and Kilwa. According to Horton and Middleton (2000), they are somewhat similar to Zaydi coins from Yemen from

5 Hirth and Rockhill, 1911, 128–129. Duyvendak, 1949, 13–14.

this period. However, the link to coins from Sind appears to be more convincing (Hawkes and Wynne-Jones, 2015). Most of the beads found at Unguja Ukuu and Fukuchani (Zanzibar) came from southern India and Sri Lanka (Wood et al., 2016).[6] Arabo-Persian contributions on the East African coast have received much attention from researchers. But during these early periods, Indians also played a role, one that remains underevaluated, in my opinion.[7]

Moreover, Austronesians arrived on the coast and on the islands (Comoros and Madagascar) at various times.[8] Austronesian arrivals are well documented for the 8th and 10th centuries, on the Comoros and Madagascar (Beaujard, 2019, I, 610ss.), and on Pemba, respectively. According to al-Sīrāfī—in a book that was known as *The Book of the Marvels of India* (it is actually entitled *The Authentic Book of Stories of the Sea and its Marvels*, see Ducène 2010)—, in 945, the "Waqwaq people" (the name given to the Austronesians) unsuccessfully attacked the city of Qanbalu (a site on Pemba Island) with a thousand boats.

> The people [of Qanbalu] asked them why they had come there and not elsewhere. They said it was because the land had trade goods useful in their country and for China, such as ivory, tortoiseshell, panther skins and ambergris, and because they wanted to obtain Zanj, for they were strong and easily endured slavery.[9]

The elites of the East African coast converted to the religion of the foreigners, here Islam. Brought in by Arabo-Persian merchants, Islam slowly pervaded the Couchitic and/or Bantu worlds, following trade networks ; it helped build the Swahili culture. According to Horton and Middleton (2000, 89–90), the Swahili—in order to highlight their difference from the "barbarians" of the hinterland—later "actively kept Islam as a coastal monopoly."

Toward the end of the first millennium CE, the new importance of the Red Sea, in addition to that of the Persian Gulf, sheds light on rising trade in East Africa and on the Arabo-Swahili advance toward the Comoros and Madagascar, where métissages occurred between the Austronesians and the new migrants, as revealed by the Dembeni culture, which developed on the Comoros from the late 8th century to the 13h century (Wright, 1984 ; Allibert, 1992). On the northwestern coast of Madagascar, the town of Mahilaka was founded during the 9th century. Its first levels already show ceramics imported from the Persian Gulf and Chinese pottery.

6 Similar beads are present at the Red Sea port of Berenice in contexts dated between the fourth and sixth centuries. Beads found in southeastern Africa (Zhizho beads) originated in the Persian Gulf.

7 For early Indian influences on the East African coast, see Hawkes and Wynne-Jones 2015.

8 See Blench, 2008, 2010, and Walsh, 2019. For recent genetic data, Brucato et al., 2019.

9 Sauvaget, 1954, 301; Freeman-Grenville, 1980, 103.



Map 3: The World-System, 11th through 12th century CE

The introduction of building techniques using coral along the East African coast at this time shows influences from the Red Sea (Horton 1996), and perhaps also from Bahrain and Sīrāf, in the Persian Gulf.

The Third Cycle (10th through 14th Century): The Song Impetus and the Second Period of Islamic Expansion

After a period of decline, trade in the Indian Ocean became reorganized during the late 10th century: the Fatimid caliphate secured the routes of the Red Sea; the Chola were asserting themselves as a maritime power in southern India; and more importantly, China, reunified by the Song between 960 and 980, was experiencing spectacular internal development that would trigger economic and commercial growth in the Indian Ocean and in the entire world-system. Improvements to ships (rudder, sails, the use of the compass, that was present on Chinese junks by the close of the eleventh century at the latest) shortened travel time and increased the quantities carried. Expansion of the system was bolstered by climatic amelioration during the 11th and 12th centuries (some researchers give c. 950 to c. 1250). For Europe, this period is called "the Medieval Climatic Optimum." Global warming was accompanied by a strengthening of the monsoon system of the Indian Ocean. During the early 13th century, the emergence of the Mongolian semi-periphery as a major political power led to a drastic reshuffling of exchange networks. This spurred a second period of Islamic expansion, in India with the Delhi sultanate, and also in Southeast Asia and East Africa.

During the third cycle of the world-system (from the 10th to the 14th century), the Swahili coast was fully transformed into an active semi-periphery, especially from the thirteenth century onward. The expansion of the Swahili coast was the result of a trade boom in the Indian Ocean and of African internal developments. The growing integration of the East African coast within the world-system was accompanied by increased social differentiation and by an exploitation of the African interior by both coastal and foreign groups. By this time, Islam was present along the coast in settlements of various sizes. Merchants and men of religion from the Persian Gulf, South Arabia and the Red Sea contributed to the spread of Islam, as did Swahili groups such as the Shirazi. As in other regions of the world, the Islamic religion brought with it changes in apparel, thus stimulating both the textile and dye industries. The insertion of the Swahili coast into a world-system dominated by Muslim networks led to an adoption of—and adaptation to—new practices in architecture, body care, clothing and food, along with an increased consumption of rice.

A slave trade continued toward various regions of the Indian Ocean. The Iranian scholar al-Bīrūnī (eleventh century) alludes to the export of East African slaves to Sind and other regions of India during the 11th century (Sachau, 1962, 263). The Arab geographer Idrīsī speaks of slaves leaving for Yemen and the Persian Gulf, and of raids carried out by Qays on the Zanjian coast during the 12th century (Qays was located in the Persian Gulf).[10] The scholar 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn al-Jawzī (1116–1201) writes of black slaves at Baghdad (Sheriff, 2005, 20). Texts mention the presence of African slaves in South Asia and China during the 13th and 14th centuries. Al-Bīrūnī has pointed out the importance of Sōmanāt (Somanath) as a port of transit for sailors plying the seas between Africa and the Orient:

> The port of Somanāth has become so successful because it is ... a stopping point for people traveling between Sofala and the Zanj country and China. (Ferrand, 1907, 552).

By the 11th century, the Chinese possessed some knowledge about the East African coast: "the *Xintangshu*, written in 1060, contains a chapter on Malindi and on the northern coast of Kenya" (Lombard, 1990, vol. II, 321 n.149). Two Chinese chronicles of the 12th and 13th centuries contain descriptions of some of the places along the East African coast. One of these chronicles, the *Lingwaidaida*, which translates as "Representative answers from the region beyond the mountains [in the south]," was written ca. 1178 by Zhou Qufei, an official who lived at Guilin (Guangxi). The other is entitled *Zhufanzhi*, or "Records of Foreign People." It was written in 1225 by Zhao Rugua, who served as superintendent of maritime trade at Quanzhou (in Fujian). Zhao Rugua lists Zhongli (northern Somalia)[11], Bipalo (the coast of Berbera)[12], Cengba (Zanzibar), and Kunlun cengki, "Kunlun of the Zanj," probably Madagascar (see below). The book by Zhao Rugua says this about Zanzibar:

> [The inhabitants] of this island, located south of Huchala [Gujarat], are of Dashi origin [Arabs] and follow the Dashi religion [Islam]. They wear imported blue cotton cloths and red leather sandals [...] Each year, Huchala and the ports of the Dashi coast [Arabia] send ships with white cotton, porcelain, copper, [and] red cotton. The products of the country consist of elephants' tusks, native gold, ambergris and yellow sandal-wood. (Hirth and Rockhill, 1911, 126).

Zhu Qufei and Zhao Rugua show an awareness of the existence of two areas called "Kunlun": one in Southeast Asia and one Kunlun *cengki*, in the west, where one could find elephant tusks, rhino horns, the *peng* bird and black people who were captured to be sold as slaves (Ferrand, 1919, 253). The mention of Madagascar in

10 Idrīsī, eighth section, p. 61, Viré 1984, 20.

11 The country produced frankincense, ambergris, tortoiseshell, and "dragon's blood" (Hirth and Rockhill, 1911, 130–132).

12 Zhao Rugua describes ostrich, giraffe and zebra there. He indicates the existence of four cities (without naming them). He mentions the products of the country (Hirth and Rockhill, 1911, 128).

Chinese texts reveals the integration—still limited—of this island into international networks. Zhao Rugua here repeats Zhou Qufei as well as well-known legends from the Muslim world:

> There are [there] great peng birds which so mask the sun in their flight that the shade of the sun-dial is shifted. If the great peng finds a wild camel, it swallows it; and if one should chance to find a peng feather, he can make water-butt of it, after cutting off the hollow quill. The products of the country are big elephants' tusks and rhinoceros horns. (Hirth and Rockhill, 1911, 149).

The peng bird seems to be the *rokh* of the Arabs, which is the giant ostrich Aepyornis from Madagascar. It is likely that the Chinese chroniclers obtained their knowledge from Arab and Persian merchants. The association with the camel probably comes from the name "camel-bird" for the ostrich in Persian (*uštarmurgh*) and in Arabic (*teir al-jamal*). One also finds the name "camel-bird" in Chinese in the *Tangshu*.

The first Chinese maps of Africa show that precise information was systematically collected from Arab, Persian and Indian ship captains. These maps are thus surprisingly accurate. A map dated to the 14h century, in the *Yutu* of Zhu Siben (1320, later published ca. 1555 in the *Guang Yutu*) shows the African continent's southern orientation and triangular shape.[13] According to a "modern reconstruction of East Africa as possibly envisaged by a Chinese official of the Song or Yuan dynasty," an island off the East African coast appears to be Madagascar (Wheatley, 1975, 84).

The texts by Zhou Qufei and Zhao Rugua give us interesting data on African products reaching China at this time as well as on Indian Ocean trade. Ivory (already mentioned during the 9th century) came from Mirbāt, in the Hadramawt, a port which seems to have been a thriving market for ivory. It also indicates the prominent place South Arabian merchants held in East African trade.[14] Aromatic resins such as myrrh and incense were also carried from the Horn of Africa toward ports of the Hadramawt (Mirbāt, Shihr and Zafār, called Maloba, or Malomo, Shiho and Nufa by Zhao Rugua). Zhao Rugua mentions other products from East Africa

13 The Korean Kangnido "maps" drawn and written in 1402 by Yi Hoe and Kwon Kun (in fact a collection of maps) used other maps (since lost) composed by Li Zemin around 1330, and Qingjun around 1370. The Korean "Kangnido map" contains not only information from Zhu Siben's map, but also shows approximately thirty-five unidentified sites along the East African coast (Needham, 1959, vol. III, 555). According to Digby (1982, 131), "there is evidence in Chinese cartography that Chinese vessels had reached the Cape of Good Hope." This cartography, however, also benefited from Arabo-Persian and Indian knowledge.

14 "When ten tusks or more have been collected, they are brought to the Dashi, who ship them to Sanfoqi and Jiloting [possibly in the Jambi region] for barter" (Hirth and Rockhill, 1911, 232).



Map 4: The World-System, 13th through 14th century CE

that were imported into China: "dragon's blood;" aloes[15]; an unidentified "aromatic wood" (from Zanzibar); and turtle shells.[16] At the start of the 12th century, according to the *Pingzhou ketan* written by Zhu Yu, most rich Cantonese owned black slaves, called "devil slaves."

> The historical context suggests that the *kunlun* or 'devil slaves' described by Zhu Yu were probably the Arabs' East African slaves and not the Southeast Asian *kunlun* of the Tang […] Chinese sources from the Song dynasty create a more definite link than do Tang sources between *kunlun* slaves and the Arabs […] The *Songshi* reports that *kunlun* slaves accompanied Arab envoys to the Chinese court in 977: 'The Arabs (*da shi*) sent the ambassador Pusina […] to present items from their country, as tribute. Their servants had deep eyes and black bodies and were called *kunlun* slaves.' (Wilensky, 2002, 17, 20).[17]

Zhao Rugua notes that African men-at-arms were employed on Chinese junks. A shipwreck near Quanzhou dated to around 1277 was excavated during the 1970s. Spices, perfumes, and remedies were among the imports; some of the products came from Somalia (Tampoe, 1989, 131–134). For the early 14th century, Ibn Battūta mentions that African slaves were employed as gatekeepers in China's largest cities. Ibn Battūta also mentions Habashī employed as men-at-arms on Chinese junks leaving the port of Calicut.

Swahili cities developed, foremost among them Kilwa, which controlled the gold and ivory trade with Sofala. Kilwa became preeminent from the 12th century onward. Its expansion was linked to that of the state of Mapungubwe (in southern Africa) and later of Great Zimbabwe, as well as to exchanges in the Indian Ocean: Kilwa's golden age during the first part of the 14th century coincided precisely with the peak growth of the world-system during its third phase. The founding of a new dynasty from southwestern Arabia in Kilwa during the 13th century reflects the heightened importance of Yemen, which had become independent in 1235 under the rule of the Rasūlids. Indian merchants or craftsmen also settled along the East African coast, where they probably contributed to transfers of technology in the textile industry for example (this has been emphasized by the archaeologist Mark

15 The Chinese name *luwei* derives from the Persian *alwā* (Hirth and Rockhill, 1911).

16 Incense and myrrh: these resins are produced by *Boswellia* and *Commiphera* (Burseraceae family), respectively. According to Wheatley (1975, 106), the term "dragon's blood" refers to the resins of *Dracaena cinnabari* and *D. schizantha* (*D. ombet* Kotschy and Peyritsch). Miquel (1980, vol. III, 422 n1) also mentions the resin of *Calamus draco* Willd. (*Daemonorops draco* [Willd.] Blume, Arecaceae family) as "dragon's blood;" this plant is of South Asian or Southeast Asian origin. Cf. also Hirth and Rockhill, 1911, 128, 193sq.

17 In the 978 compendium of fiction entitled *Taiping guangji*, myths often mention *kunlun* slaves (Wilensky, 2002, 12sq.).

Horton at Shanga [Horton, 1996]). Glass beads found along the coast were imported from India (the Great Zimbabwe site has yielded tens of thousands of Indian glass beads).[18] Swahili ships, notably from Kilwa, also traded with the Comoros and Madagascar. In northwestern Madagascar, Mahilaka was a city of importance during this period (Radimilahy, 1998).

Increasing quantities of Chinese ceramics were imported into the main Swahili sites from the 13th century onward, as can be seen along the Kenyan coast[19], in Kilwa, and also on the Comoros (Mro Dewa on Moheli), and at Mahilaka, in Madagascar; these imports included celadons, "Martaban" jars, *qingbai* porcelain, and blue-and-white porcelain. Southeastern Africa has also yielded some celadon shards and blue-and-white porcelain (Mapungbuwe for example, as well as the trading post of Manyikeni). Chinese celadons and porcelains were reputed to have protective and beneficial power. The importation of luxury products such as Chinese bronze mirrors was sometimes related to physical appearance and body care.

Before the middle of the 14th century, Wang Dayuan, from Quanzhou, traveled over the Indian Ocean aboard Chinese ships, from Southeast Asia to the Arabian Sea and East Africa; in 1349, he wrote an account in which he described the Comoros and Madagascar.[20] The question of an ancient Chinese presence on the East African coast is still debated.[21] Some archaeologists have argued for a Chinese presence at Vohemary, a port in northeastern Madagascar, between the 13th and 15th centuries (Schreurs et al., 2011). New Austronesian arrivals occurred in Vohemary and along the east coast of Madagascar from the 13th century onward; during this time, they contributed to the introduction of new concepts of kingship and of intensive rice cultivation on the island (Beaujard, 2019, II, 402sq.). It may be that some were Chinese métis. These Austronesians probably played a role in the ascent of Vohemary.

During the years 1320–1330, the world-system experienced a period of sharp decline, initiated by major climatic deterioration. And in 1346, a bubonic plague epidemic swept through Asia and the Indian Ocean region, from China to Egypt and onward to Europe. Kilwa seems to have experienced a population loss during this period. Reconstruction of the Great Mosque of Kilwa, which collapsed sometime during the 14th century, was delayed until the following century. Some scholars conjecture that the plague may have reached Kilwa, but, in any case, Kilwa's downfall

18 Wood (2015) has identified various trade networks which brought different types of glass beads to the East African coast.

19 See here Kusimba, 2018 , 91–93.

20 *Records of Overseas Countries and Peoples* (*Daoyi zhilue*), based on the notes taken during his many voyages in Southeast Asia (Devisse, 1985, 717; Deng, 1997, 15).

21 "Chinese geneticists have reportedly successfully identified Swahili residents who bear direct Chinese ancestry in the village of Siyu on Pate Island" (Kusimba, 2018, 96).

had begun before that date. In Madagascar, the city of Mahilaka and the southern region (Androy) experienced drops in population during the same period. This phenomenon was related to the trade downturn and climatic changes noted in other regions of the Indian Ocean.

From Zheng He's Expeditions to the Gujarati Preeminence (Fourth Cycle: 15th Century–[17th Century])[22]

Production and exchange once again took an upswing at the end of the 14th century and during the 15th century. This period was marked by the reunification of China by the Ming dynasty, the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, the rapid development of large Indian states and Asian city-states such as Malacca, Calicut and Hormuz, and the rise to power of Europe. The fourth cycle of the world-system was not merely an extension of previous cycles; the deployment of capitalist practices in Europe prefigured the modern period, although China was still the main power.

Chinese Emperor Yongle sent six large maritime expeditions to the Indian Ocean, led by Muslim Admiral Zheng He between 1405 and 1422. Emperor Xuande sent a seventh and last expedition in 1431. Two Chinese fleets visited Mogadiscio, Barawa and Malindi in 1417 and 1422. Some accounts were written on East Africa.[23] And then, in 1433, China withdrew from the international scene for various reasons, notably the Mongol threat and the great cost of the expeditions.

For this period, Indians were active in the Indian Ocean networks. The disintegration of the Sultanate of Delhi gave rise to cosmopolitan merchant sultanates, first of all Gujarat and Bengal. Large states such as the Bahmani sultanate and Vijayanagara also rose to prominence. Gujaratis now played a significant role on the East African coast, where they exported cotton fabrics and beads[24], and imported gold from Zimbabwe as well as slaves. African slaves became a prominent element in the military and administrative machines of the sultanates of the Deccan, Bengal, and Gujarat (Digby, 1982, 150). The presence of a population of African origin, the Sidi, in the district of Ratanpor, may have been linked to the exploitation and trade

22 This chapter describes the connections between Asia and East Africa until the early 16th century, however.

23 See Feixing's account quoted by Kusimba (2018, 96). It appears to describe a region of the northeastern coast.

24 Portuguese texts reveal the significance of these lucrative imports. According to a Portuguese text from 1525, "a quantity of small yellow and blue beads that cost 1.05 maticals in Cambay would sell for 21.28 maticals in Sofala. In the same markets, cloth sold for five times its cost price" (Pearson, 1998, 113). In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese mentioned bead imports from Cambay (Gujarat) and Nāgapattinam (Coromandel coast). In 1530, textiles "bought for 100 in Gujarat sold for 220 in Malindi and 780 in Sofala" (ibid.).



Map 5: The World-System, 15th century CE

of carnelian.[25] The Portuguese mentioned Gujarati ships in the main ports of the East African coast during the early 16th century. In 1504, Mombasa was home to an Indian community, in particular Bohra Ismailis. At the time the Portuguese arrived, the city possessed bombard cannons that had probably originated in Gujarat

At Malindi, Mombasa's rival city, merchants from Cambay also arrived each year. Various architectural features of the Great Mosque at Kilwa are characteristic of India (Garlake, 1966, 115). A piece of marble on a tomb at Kilwa may have come from a Hindu temple in Gujarat (Sutton, 1998, 146).

Trade recovery during the first part of the 15th century was also significant along the East African coast. The Persian Abd al-Razzāq, writing in 1441, mentions the "Land of the Zanj" among the countries sending traders and products to Hormuz.[26] Pilgrims and students of religion also sailed to Arabia. New merchant elites linked with Hadramawt, western Arabia, and Egypt progressively imposed "Arab-*wangwana* [from a term referring to "nobles"] regimes" within the northern Swahili cities.[27] Among the "master navigators of the Indian Sea," Ibn Mājid listed Arabs, people from Hormuz, Indians (of the west coast), the Chola (southeastern India) and the Zanj. Some Swahili ships and merchants crossed the ocean: Chinese chronicles note that in 1415 a Malindi embassy gifted the emperor with a giraffe. The account given in the ***Mingshi*** writes that "during the fourteenth year of Yongle's reign [1416], Mogadishu sent an embassy, along with the countries of Barawa and Malindi." Among the foreign merchants in Malacca, the Portuguese Tome Pires mentioned in 1515 "people from Kilwa, Malindi, Mogadiscio and Mombasa." Moreover, East Africa maintained links with both western Arabia and Egypt, and with Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.

The Swahili and Comorian cities imported textiles, indigo, glass, agricultural products[28] and ceramics, notably Chinese: these were brought in by Zheng He's expeditions[29]—which visited the East African coast as far as the city of Malindi—as well as by Persian, Arab and Indian merchants. The two key elements underpinning the Swahili cities' power—long-distance trade, and Islam—were both given visual expression when imported bowls and plates were inserted into the walls of mosques and tombs. Chinese imports increased even more during the late fifteenth century (Zhao, 2015). Vietnamese blue-and-white ware and green-glazed stoneware from Thailand were also imported. The ostentatious use of these prestige goods was part

25 Khalidi 1988; Insoll, 2003, 151.

26 Alam and Subrahmanyam, 2007, 59.

27 Merchants from the Persian Gulf, however, were also active along the African coast.

28 Pires also mentions the export of significant amounts of opium from Aden and Cambay. See Pires, ed. Cortesâo, 1944, i: 8–9, 13, 16–17, 43, 93, ii: 269–270.

29 The fleets' crews appear to have been authorized to sell ceramics and silk privately (Zhao, 2015).

of the process of competition and pursuit of wealth in Swahili cities: wealth was indicative of the power acquired by a group or an individual. Porcelain items in mosques and tombs were also meant as gifts to attract divine favors, in the same manner as the clothes placed inside the tombs.

The state of Great Zimbabwe went into decline for ecological and internal reasons. The crumbling of this kingdom coincided with the decline of the sultanate of Kilwa, while at the same time the rival cities of Mombasa, Pate and Mogadishu grew stronger. Gold extraction continued in the states that succeeded Great Zimbabwe (Mutapa, Butua, and Manica). Shards of Chinese pottery (celadon and blue-and-white porcelain) have been discovered at Khami, the capital of Butua. Ivory remained a major export of the African coast that was coveted by the Gujaratis. Slaves from the African interior were also sold.

The development of the Swahili coast spurred a growing integration of the peripheries of the African coast into the world-system. New settlements appeared in Madagascar and the Comoros, in connection with the Swahili coast, India and maritime Southeast Asia. In Madagascar, Mahilaka was in decline, but Vohemar (on the northeastern coast) and Langany (in the northwest) were significant ports. They are mentioned in Arabic nautical charts written by Ibn Mājid and Sulaymān al-Mahrī. These settlements exported slaves to Yemen, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, India and probably insular Southeast Asia. A text written by the Turkish admiral Piri Re'is (1521) reveals the great scale of the slave trade, for which the Comoros were a stopping point:

> [Foreign merchants] take away [from Madagascar] all its merchandise … sandalwood … slaves who are black … I have mentioned five islands [Comoros and Madagascar]. They breed slaves as lambs and sheep. Sea people arrive and take them in ships and carry them away. Know that they sell them in Yemen, O friend, [and] they reach the port of Jeddah (Piri Reis, in Allibert 1988).

The number of Chinese imports found in the cemetery of Vohemary shows the flourishing of this city, probable evidence of prolonged contacts with Southeast Asia via the Maldives. These imports consisted notably of celadons, blue-and-white porcelain, and bronze mirrors (see Vernier and Millot, 1971, 19sq.).

Above all, during the 15th century, Europe was changing. It is probably significant that the Ming state discouraged long-distance private trade precisely at the time when in Europe merchants were exerting an increasing influence on emerging nation-states. A capitalist system thus developed in the West, with a rivalry developing among Genoese, Venetians, Portuguese, and Spaniards in their quest for gold and spices. The Genoese, and later the Iberians, were seeking a way to circumvent the dual obstacles represented by Ottoman power and Venetian control over trade routes with the Indian Ocean. At last, at the end of the 15th century, the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean. They would eventually attack and in some cases occupy key ports located at network nodes such as Goa in 1510, Malacca in 1511 and Hormuz in 1515. In East Africa, Sofala was occupied in 1503 and Kilwa in 1505. However, the irruption of the Portuguese into the Indian Ocean sphere had only limited effects; along the East African coast, it did not contribute to a weakening of the Swahili culture, but it did lead to a network reconfiguration that benefited the Lamu archipelago and especially the city of Pate. And in the world-system, until the beginning of the 19th century, Asian economies still largely dominated the economies of Europe.

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3

The Arrival of "Made in China" in Burkina Faso: An African Transnational Traders' History

Guive Khan-Mohammad

The author of this chapter supports the idea that the massive arrival of Chinese goods in Burkina Faso is historically rooted in internal economic transformations notably resulting from the devaluation of the CFA franc and the implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAP). These internal economic transformations have then been fed by numerous global transformations, which have progressively participated to make China a closer, opener, and more profitable trading destination. All these changes have contributed to open new windows of opportunity for many Burkinabe transnational traders, who have risen taking advantage of and developing the Burkinabe-Chinese trade. This chapter is divided into two sections. Focusing on the period between 1973 to 1994, the first section presents the initial arrival of Chinese goods in Burkina Faso in the framework of Burkinabe-Chinese cooperation. The second period, which began in 1994, is characterized by the Burkina Faso's diplomatic shift from China to Taiwan, by the devaluation of the CFA franc as well as by many other economic and political transformations, which have jointly led to a massive increase of Chinese goods import in Burkina Faso.

Introduction[1]

It is 10am in the capital of Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou, and the Central market is in full effervescence. A young Burkinabe comes out of a Chinese trader's shop. His two arms are loaded with many plastic flowers and toys, that he will sell, as soon as this afternoon, in his own shop, situated in some peripheral area of the city. In going away, this merchant walks along a truck, which is waiting to be loaded, while a Burkinabe trader is concluding a deal with his Lebanese supplier of Chinese-origin textiles. As they finally reach an agreement and make their way through the crowd,

1 This chapter is based on data collected during four fieldworks conducted in Burkina Faso and neighborhood countries between January 2010 and October 2013. This research was a part of two Swiss National Scientific Fund project on the Chinese presence in Africa (2009–2012) and on the Chinese goods in Africa (2013–2016), supervised by Dr. Antoine Kernen of the University of Lausanne, Switzerland.

they cross an itinerant merchant. This merchant carries a wooden plate on which are tied a dozen of China-imported sunglasses. Calmly walking, he tried to sell them to everybody around, giving inventive arguments in favour of their "fashionable" design. While this petty trader lingers for a couple of minutes in front of the window of a Chinese mobile phones repairer, a woman wearing a colourful fabric walks behind him. In her hands are two plastic bags containing many pairs of Chinese-origin high-heeled shoes, which she just bought from a Central market store. Quickly, she moves towards a motorbike parking, where she meets an acquaintance whose bags are also ready to crack under the weight of many "Made in China" jeans. Once they both have retrieved their bikes, they start riding side by side at a slow speed, in a "chatty position", and go away, under the watchful eye of a Chinese motorcycles reseller seated on a saddle.

Such a scene, which can, to a certain extent, be observed in all urban and rural markets of Burkina Faso, illustrates the central place now occupied by Chinese products in the daily life of many Burkinabe. In many respects, the pervasiveness of these goods in Burkinabe public spaces reflects the gradual reorientation of Burkina Faso's supply chains to China, which has occured since the late 1990s. This reorientation has accompanied a significant increase in imports of manufactured goods from China, making this Asian country one of Burkina Faso's main import partners (Khan-Mohammad, 2018). As such, this small West African country, among the poorest on the continent, is far from being an atypical case, while in recent decades, China has become the main supplier of manufactured products of a large part of African countries (Chaponnière and Gabas, 2012).

However, despite the importance of this economic and social phenomenon, there is still very little research conducted on the massive arrival of Chinese products in Africa. One of the main reasons for this lack of interest is linked to the fact that, while China was becoming the main trading partner of the African continent in 2009, commodities were at the centre of these exchanges (Chaponnière and Gabas, 2012), position they have since preserved (Busse et al., 2016). In some respects, the geostrategic dimension of African exports to China has thus largely contributed to the relegation of imports of manufactured goods to the background of African-Chinese trade studies (Khan-Mohammad, 2016). Added to this is the fact that these products have often been essentialized around their "low price" and their "low quality" (Ngoie Tshibambe, 2013). This particularly reductive approach to the phenomenon has also largely contributed to reducing the scientific interest of such an object (Khan Mohammad, 2016), whereas Chinese products were finally considered only as "cheap substitutes for real things" (Dobler, 2008). In this respect, African imports from China have so far been mainly succinctly analyzed, often on the margins of studies on other research topics, such as the deindustrialization of Africa (Okoro and Oyewole, 2010; Jenkins, 2012) or competition between Chinese and African traders (Ikhuoria, 2010; Roschenthaler, 2016). In my opinion, much remains to be

done to lift the veil on the multi-dimensional revolution that the massive arrival of these cheap goods has accompanied in many African societies (Kernen and Khan-Mohammad, 2016; Khan Mohammad, 2018).

This chapter thus intends to contribute to this effort by proposing to trace the historicity of the arrival of Chinese products in African spaces, with particular emphasis on identifying the political, economic and social determinants of this arrival. Because, in my opinion, like many other dimensions of African-Chinese relations, the study of the arrival of Chinese products in Africa requires a serious "myth-busting" (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014), and this mainly as regards its alleged causal relationship with the recent development of cooperation between China and the African continent. Indeed, the significant increase in African-Chinese trade coincides with a dramatic deepening of interstate relations between China and African countries.[2] In the perspective of many scholars, such growing involvement of China in Africa would be essentially justified by its capacity to diplomatically pave the way towards an increase of African-Chinese trading exchanges, which are considered as particularly strategic for China (Richer, 2008; Rotberg, 2008)[3]. According to these scholars, the arrival of Chinese products in Africa would therefore be intimately linked to African-Chinese cooperation as a part of China's new political and economic "strategy" in Africa (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008). In my opinion, however, the recent increase in African-Chinese relations and the interest of scholars for the strategic dimension of diplomatic ties between China and Africa has led to an over-interpretation of the link between interstate cooperation and trade exchanges, and this especially with regard to African imports from China.

Such an overinterpretation of the role of African-Chinese inter-state cooperation, and consequently of the strength of the Chinese state and its ability to implement a unitary and centralized strategy in Africa, has long dominated the field of studies carried out on different dimensions of China in Africa. Recently, however, an epistemological turning point has been reached, as the idea of a Chinese strategy in Africa gradually gave way to the study of Chinese strategies in Africa, thus allowing the gaze to be decentred from a purely state-centric approach (Kernen, 2007; Khan Mohammad, 2016). This turning point was particularly visible in the study of the growing internationalization of Chinese companies in Africa. While these com-

2 On the multilateral level, this rapprochement is illustrated by the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, which constitutes an institutionalized process for cooperation that unites representatives from over 50 African countries with Chinese state officials every three years (Taylor, 2010). On the bilateral level, many diplomatic visits have been organized between African countries and China over the last 15 years, which have resulted in the signing of numerous cooperation agreements over a wide range of domains, from loans, guarantees, and technical assistance to cultural exchanges and academic scholarships (Grimm, 2014).

3 African exports indeed provide the raw materials that are essential to the continuity of Chinese growth, while the importing of Chinese products offers new market opportunities to Chinese industry (Okoro and Oyewole, 2010).

panies were so far considered by a majority of authors as the privileged instruments of the policy of conquest of African markets orchestrated by the Chinese state under the FOCAC (Gu et al., 2016, 25), new work has questioned this interpretation, in underlining in particular the growing number of Chinese private companies penetrating African markets (Khan-Mohammad, 2014), the diversity of Chinese state-owned enterprises' (SOEs) nature and strategies in Africa (Kernen and Lam, 2014), the autonomy of their decision-making process from Chinese State (Pairault, 2013; Xu, 2014), as well as the absence of any Chinese State's support on the African ground (Buys and Hallick, 2010). An additional step in the direction of deconstruction of the link between deepening inter-state cooperation and intensification of African-Chinese relations was also achieved when the central role played by certain non-state actors in these international dynamics was taken into account. The work carried out on Chinese traders in Africa (Kernen and Vulliet, 2008; Bourdarias, 2010; Giese, 2013) and on African traders going to China (Bodomo, 2012; Marfaing and Thiel, 2014; Mathews, 2015), thus highlighted the diversity of individual strategies and rationales on which, in the end, African-Chinese relations are based. These various works have thus revealed the idea that, while African-Chinese cooperation has contributed, to a certain extent, to providing an institutional framework conducive to the growth of Afro-Chinese relations, it should not be considered as unique explanatory factor.

As such, the case study of Burkina Faso offers a unique ground for fuelling this ongoing debate, in making a deep questioning of the link between deepening of Afro-Chinese cooperation and increasing of African imports from China possible for the first time. Because, if the Chinese-origin goods first appeared in Burkina Faso in the 1970s—within the framework of the Burkinabe-Chinese cooperation—, their proliferation has only started during the second half of the 1990s, growing even more during the first half of 2000s—at a time where Burkina Faso did not have diplomatic relationship with China anymore. Thus, apart from possible diffusion effects related to the participation of Burkina Faso's neighboring countries to FOCAC and to the porosity of West African borders, the case of Burkina Faso thus forces new explanatory factors to be explored, foremost among which are more inward-oriented factors, which unveil the historicity of African economies as well as the crucial role played by African agency in the building process of the continent's contemporary economic ties with China.

The Initial Arrival of Chinese Goods in Burkina Faso (1973–1994): The Seminal Role of Interstate Cooperation and Burkinabe State-owned Company

In September 1973, the Haute-Volta—the former name of Burkina Faso—put an end to its diplomatic cooperation with Taiwan—which had been active since the Voltaic independence in the 1960s—in favour of a new partnership with China.[4] However, it was necessary to await the coup of Captain Thomas Sankara in 1983 and the establishment of a revolutionary regime before a significant rapprochement could take place between the two governments.[5] Indeed, at that time, "China conditions its aid, either to communist countries or to countries whose tendency to socialism deserves support" (Ouedraogo, 2004, 40).

Chinese goods as a means of financing Burkinabe-Chinese cooperation projects (1983–1994)

During the 1980s, beside health and agricultural projects, China has supported numerous infrastructures projects in Burkina Faso (Aurégan 2011, Khan-Mohammad 2014). According to many interviewees, these Chinese infrastructure projects were intrinsically linked to the initial arrival of Chinese products in Burkina Faso. Indeed, as one representative of the Directorate General of Industry explained: "The first entry of Chinese products, it is in 1982 or 1980... At the time when the Chinese came to build the Stade du 4 août. It was a Chinese financing, but it was a financial arrangement that was based on the principle that one does not give money, but merchandise. (...) China gave us merchandise, we sold it and, with the profits, we did things within the framework of the state."[6]

During the revolutionary period, all the Chinese goods imported in the framework of the Burkinabe-Chinese cooperation were sold by a single state enterprise: the Faso Yaar. This company was created on April 4, 1967, under the name of the Société Voltaïque de Commercialisation (SOVOLCOM). Its creation occurred in a context marked by a major political change, bringing a military regime, led by

4 For more information on the struggle between China and Taiwan in their cooperation with Africa, see Yu and Longenecker (1994), and more recently Taylor (2002).

5 For more information on the Captain Thomas Sankara and on the revolutionary regime in Burkina Faso, see in particular Jaffré (1989).

6 Interview, Ouagadougou, November 29, 2010. According to a former minister, who participated in a diplomatic visit to China in 1973, such a mechanism would have already been discussed during the first round of negotiation accompanying Burkina Faso's diplomatic shift towards China as a central dimension of the emerging relations (Interview, Ouagadougou, September 20, 2013). However, it was only with the advent of the revolutionary regime of the 1980s that the Chinese goods import in Burkina Faso reached a significant scale.

S. Lamizana, to the power. While the military intended "to restore the economic conditions of the social order" (Labazée, 1988, 26), SOVOLCOM's main objective was to make a wide range of everyday goods available to Voltaic consumers at lower prices.[7] To that end, a network of 50 stores, selling crops and supplying rural areas, was set up throughout the Voltaic territory.

Such a social role of SOVOLCOM—renamed Faso Yaar in 1984—was reasserted after the revolution of 1983. Faced with the devastating consequences of the drought of the years 1983–84, revolutionary leaders indeed undertook to contain the impact of merchants speculative practices, especially in small towns and rural areas. To this end, they strengthened the Faso Yaar's presence on the Burkinabe territory, up to 69 towns and villages.[8] In addition to the creation of these new stores, distribution network was expanded, until involving hundreds of retailers. All the Faso Yaar's retailers were expected to respect the resale prices edicted by the state.[9] As a consequence, Faso Yaar achieved to offer a full commercial coverage of Burkina Faso territory[10], which, more importantly, provided products at a same affordable price everywhere.[11]

The Faso Yaar's expansion thus opened a new access to a wide range of goods for an unprecedented amount of Burkinabe consumers. Indeed, if the core of its business consisted in essentials, such as rice, oil or sugar—which were sold at a cheaper price than market prices[12]—, a lot of other food products, but also manufactured goods, were also in the offer, such as textiles, leather goods, biscuits, beverages, tobacco, perfumery, hardware, building materials, agricultural equipment, water supply, etc. Originally imported by SOVOLCOM from Europe and United States, a part of these products have started to progressively be replaced by Chinese-origin products since the mid 1980s.[13] At that time, the most popular Chinese goods were notably, fans, watches, alarm clocks, pots, bicycles, lamps, hardware, enamelware, childrens' toys, etc. According to a former Faso Yaar salesman, the cheap price of these goods led to an astonishing commercial success.[14] In short, at this time, sale of

7 Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, Ouagadougou, January 5, 2011.

8 Interview with a former employee, Ouagadougou, January 21, 2011.

9 Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, Ouagadougou, January 5, 2011.

10 Interview, Ouagadougou, November 20, 2011.

11 Interview with a former director of a motorcycles industry, Bobo-Dioulasso, December 7, 2010.

12 Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, Ouagadougou, January 5, 2011.

13 Interview with former head of the Faso Yaar, Ouagadougou, December 1, 2011.

14 Interview, Ouagadougou, January 21, 2011.

Chinese goods by Faso Yaar allowed the Burkina Faso's state both to finance development projects in the framework of the Chinese cooperation and to provide an expanding range of affordable manufactured goods to a growing part of its population.

By the end of the 1980s, acknowledging the success of Chinese goods, in addition to the products imported in the framework of the cooperation, Faso Yaar independently carried out orders in China. This was not only justified by the price competitiveness of Chinese products but also by the conditions for granting credits, as one Faso Yaar's former representative pointed out:

> Chinese gave us credits easily. (…) When we ordered, it took three months to reach us, and when the merchandise arrived, they let us [have] three more months before paying down the order. So we had six months. After six months, a large part of the order had already been sold. It was very advantageous (...) While with the Europeans, (…) even before the merchandise was on the boat, we had to fill documentary credits in the bank and [make sure] that the Mister was certain that the bank had endorsed our operation. At that moment only, the goods were shipped. On delivery, we had to pay the rest.[15]

As a consequence, between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s, Chinese products became more and more important to the Faso Yaar business, thereby constituting a growing share of manufactured goods sold through its network in the whole country.

Decline and closure of the Faso Yaar (1991–96): The implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) as a window of opportunity for the development of the national business community

In March 1991, Burkina Faso signed a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defining the conditions of the implementation of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP).[16] Given the relatively good results of the Burkinabe economy during the 1980s (Camilleri, 2003, 1657), the policy reforms recommended in the early 1990s were more oriented towards supporting growth than towards stabilization and recovery (Zagré, 1994, 206). However, in leading to the liquidation of the Faso Yaar in 1996, the SAP nevertheless contributed to a profound reconfiguring of the business environment in Burkina Faso, which will have a crucial impact on the Chinese goods trade in the country.

15 Interview, Ouagadougou, January 21, 2011.

16 Developed by the Bretton Woods institutions to deal with the debt crises encountered by a number of South American and African economies since the 1980s, SAP consisted of a set of policy reforms aiming to maintain macro-economic stability, mostly through three main mechanisms: privatization, liberalization and deregulation.

The liquidation of the Faso Yaar was both justified by ideological and economic reasons. Ideologically, the closure of the Faso Yaar was indeed in line with the Bretton Woods institutions liberal position on the borders between state and markets. As a representative of the General Directorate of Foreign Trade explained:

> The idea with the Faso Yaar was that it was exclusively the State that was in charge of supplying the country, and the idea with the SAP was precisely that the State no longer have to manage it. This company was therefore liquidated.[17]

More pragmatically, it however appears that the closure of the Faso Yaar was, first and foremost, made necessary by the company's weak economic viability. Indeed, since the early 1990s, Faso Yaar had experienced a slow decline, both related to its progressive lost of some monopolistic positions as well as to its poor financial management, both aggravated by the progressive withdrawal of the State in accordance with the SAP. At that time, Faso Yaar indeed had to face with the growing contestation of domestic traders. More and more frequently, the latter argued in favour of the breaking of the monopolistic confiscation of certain products of mass consumption by the state enterprise. On some occasions, such calls received a favourable response from the government, leading Faso Yaar to lose its monopoly on certain products, such as rice.[18] At the same time, Faso Yaar encountered significant cash-flow problems, mainly due to poor financial management. During the first half of the 1990s, the working capital of the company had indeed decreased until it was no longer sufficient to guarantee the payment of the orders. In this situation, Faso Yaar depended more than ever on state support, which finally come to an end in the 1990s[19], paving the way to the closure of the Faso Yaar.

Ultimately, the closure of Faso Yaar was also justified by the apparent inconsistency of maintaining state trading company in a context marked by the gradual rise of a pool of national traders. If some local entrepreneurs were already involved in regional and national trade during the colonial period, as well as before, the post independence period is however characterized by the strengthen and expanding of national business community (Labazée, 1988). In this respect, Faso Yaar would have played a significant role in this rise, if we believe this former official, who explained:

> In 1967, when SOVOLCOM was created, people were illiterate. The state created this company to ensure the supply of the country, but also with the idea of gradually training traders so that they can go up. The people who were in business with us got rich and got used to trading methods. That is why, lastly, the government finally came forward that,

17 Interview, Ouagadougou, January 5, 2011.

18 Interview, Ouagadougou, January 21, 2011.

19 Interview, Ouagadougou, January 21, 2011.

> nevertheless, there were enough traders well trained to be able to disengage. It was part of its arguments to close the Faso Yaar.[20]

While the Faso Yaar participated to the strengthen and expanding of national business community, its closure has contributed to open a window of opportunity for the development of various trading accumulation itineraries autonomous from the state. As a trader explained:

> the closure of the Faso Yaar has been a great opportunity for me to develop my business. Before that, for many products, it was not possible to compete with the price of Faso Yaar. They imported big quantities and had monopoly. We had to trade other small things that we imported by ourselves or sell the Faso Yaar products for little profit margins. When they closed, the market was free.[21]

Free from the competition of the Faso Yaar and its policy of price control, Burkinabe traders were an ever-increased number to develop their own trading activities. If these activities have, at first, rooted on a regional level, they have progressively go global, to traditional trading destinations such as Europe and United States at first, and then to China and other Asian markets.

The Proliferation of the Chinese Goods Import in Burkina Faso (1994–2018): The Rise of African Transnational Traders and the Chinese Market as a Privileged Global Trading Destination

On the 2nd of February 1994, Burkina Faso made a new diplomatic shift, renewing its relations with Taiwan to the detriment of its cooperation with China.[22] As a result of this event, however, Burkina Faso's imports from China increased steadily, illustrating a gap between the country's diplomatic orientation and its commercial orientation. This gap has constantly grown since then as a consequence of both the multiplication of African transnational traders willing and able to explore new commercial routes outside the African continent and of the emergence of China as a privileged global trading destination.

20 Interview, Ouagadougou, January 21, 2011.

21 Interview, Ouagadougou, December 12, 2010.

22 As a justification for this turnaround, Taylor (2002, 132) explained "Such a profound and radical shift cannot be explained with reference to some sort of ideological conversion: financial inducements undoubtedly played a big role in influencing Compaore's decision."

The CFA Franc devaluation (1994–2003): Engaging in self-employment and exploring new trading routes

On the 11th of January 1994, African countries of the CFA franc zone experienced a 50% devaluation of their currency. As such a decision primarily aimed "to enable export chains to regain their competitiveness in world markets and to reduce domestic demand for imported products" (Deybe and Robilliard, 1998, 49), it had some significant and often ambivalent side effects on Burkinabe entrepreneurship, especially in the case of traders.

Following the devaluation, the turnover of traders decreased significantly (Camilleri, 1996, 142–43). This fall was mainly caused by the contraction of consumers demand, caused by the decrease in their purchasing power (Galand, 1994, 52). Besides the negative impact resulting of higher prices and shrinking consumer purchasing power, devaluation led to several other business environment transformations, which were also mostly unfavourable to Burkinabe entrepreneurs. At first, formal financing, which was already difficult to obtain for most small entrepreneurs before the devaluation, became even more inaccessible afterwards (Galand, 1994, 46). Simultaneously, the devaluation steadily reduced the capacity of self-financing, as "the different financial and relational pressures exerted on entrepreneurs tended to increase" (Galand, 1994, 52), as a result of a general increase in the cost of living. Finally, the devaluation also accelerated the process of mercantilization of each parcel of power, resulting in a continuous increase in the level of administrative corruption (Galand, 1994, 51). However, paradoxically, as the business environment became more demanding than ever, the devaluation led to an entrepreneurship impetus. Engaging in entrepreneurial activities is seen by an increasing number of people as a means to continue living in acceptable conditions (Galand, 1994, 54). In Burkina Faso, this involvement in entrepreneurship was largely made in an "informal" way (Camilleri, 1996), in order to avoid both the subjection to the numerous corruptive predations connected with business formalization and to protect the traders from family and relatives extensive redistributive solicitations.

While encouraging the rise of a multitude of new Burkinabe entrepreneurs, who progressively took their place in the national and regional business networks, the devaluation of the CFA franc, by increasing the price of imported products, also forced traders—especially those who had already developed significant economic and social capital over the years—to seek abroad for commercial alternatives that could fit with the reduced financial capacities of Burkinabe households. This search for commercial alternative initially led to a revitalization of second-hand products import from Europe, United States and sometimes Japan.[23] More importantly, it led

23 Such trade was already an essential component of the market integration of African economies into the world economy well before the devaluation, as it was notably the case of the *fripe* —second-hand clothes—, which has been imported in Africa since the 19th century (Bredeloup

traders, if not always to open, at least to explore in ever-increasing numbers, many "new" trading routes. As a textiles trader explained: "With devaluation, people had to search a lot because the products were no longer accessible. The devaluation has given a boost to the mentality of people. We had to find something more accessible. This is where a lot of Burkinabe began to make trips left to right. Because otherwise, by nature, Burkinabe traders did not travel much. They travelled, but only in the subregion or in Europe for some. Now they started to go further, in Asia".[24] In this respect, devaluation contributed to a profound reconfiguring of Burkina Faso's supply chains operated through the ever-increased internationalization of Burkinabe traders activities,

One of the first stages of this Burkinabe commercial networks extension was oriented to the former Soviet bloc countries. An entrepreneur of Lebanese origin who had been living in Burkina Faso since the 1970s explained:

> I remember, I worked with Poland, Yugoslavia and Russia. We started, as I remember, when the communist countries broke up. And then we went a few years later because there was stock. At the devaluation, some of these plants were already closed, but they still had stock they were selling off.

During this period, this trader explained that he have seen many African traders coming to supply in these plants as well. He finally added: "We still supply another year and a half or two years after the devaluation there; however, after, it was over (...) we had to look for other sources."[25]

If among these new sources, the Gulf States, including Dubai, were in a good position (Tatah and Pelican, 2009), a lot of Burkinabe traders have started to explore still further to the west. A. Sawadogo, a textile trader, based at the Central Market in Ouagadougou since 1989 and active in the business since the late 1960s, was one of those Asian pioneers. In 1996, in response to European prices that he found too high, he organized a first trip to India, from which he returned with a textiles container. After several successful trips in India, he however faced troubles with his supplier in 2000, what forced him to redirect his supply mostly towards Indonesia, but also towards China.[26] Numerous Burkinabe traders who were exploring Asian

and Lombard, 2008). With devaluation, however, the magnitude of the phenomenon, and the diversity of the imported products, significantly increased in all the countries affected (Galand, 1994, 48).

24 Interview, Ouagadougou, October 22, 2010.

25 Interview, Ouagadougou, December 15, 2010.

26 Interview, Ouagadougou, October 20, 2011.

markets in the second half of the 1990s explained that, at this time, they preferred to supply in Thailand.[27]

At the same time, Burkinabe traders were also an increased number to start supplying in China, more precisely in Hong Kong in the first place.[28] China's light industry reforms, implemented in the 1970s, made China a very competitive global manufacturing hub (Zhang 2006). In this respect, it fully satisfied the need of Burkinabe traders, who were numerous to declare being particularly attracted by the price and the diversity of the Chinese goods. Among the first Burkinabe traders exploring China were Mahdi Kaboré, the owner of two ready-to-wear boutiques and one motorcycle shop in Ouagadougou. Son of a fisherman who became a merchant, he started his business in cross-border trade between Togo and Burkina Faso in the 1980s. Then, he expanded his activities to other countries, such as Mali, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Like many entrepreneurs, this regional stage was an opportunity for him to accumulate the resources needed to extend his trading activities outside Africa. After many passages to Europe, he first travelled to Hong Kong in 1997. The same year, he also went supplying in Thailand, before going to Indonesia a few years later.[29]

Even if the number of Burkinabe traders who were able to supply in Asia was growing in the period following the devaluation, it must however be noted, that at that time, this number was still not very high—at least, it had nothing comparable to what may be observed during the next decade. Traders who went to Asia, particularly to China, usually were individuals who already had pre-existent economic and social capital, developed through many previous years of experience spent in international trade. In this respect, during the post-devaluation period, the majority of Asian goods—at large, and Chinese goods in particular—arriving in Burkina Faso were not imported by Burkinabe transnational traders directly from China, but from neighboring countries.

China as a closer, opener and more profitable trading destination than ever (2003–2018): Multiplication of Burkinabe transnational traders and Chinese goods import growth

Trade exchanges between Burkina Faso and China have steadily increased since the beginning of the 2000s. Estimated at US$ 5,071,000 in 1995 and then at US$ 15,750,000 in 2000, they increased tenfold during the following five years, reaching

27 This was also the case in many other West African countries, as traders often presents Thailand as one of their first Asian destinations (Marchal, 2007; Marfaing and Thiel, 2011, 2014).

28 Hong Kong was often the first Chinese destination for African traders, as notably highlighted by Bertoncello, Bredeloup and Pliez (2009).

29 Interview, Ouagadougou, November 18, 2011.

US$152,426,000 in 2005. In 2012, they amounted to US$365,293,000. Concerning imports, the increase has also been significant and seems to operate in stages. In 2000, the value of Burkina Faso's imports from China rose from US$ 4,917,000 to US$ 15,742,000. By the following year, the value stabilized at around US$ 20 million until 2004, when it reached US$ 36,525,000. Again, the value of imports fluctuated between US$ 30 and 40 million until 2007, when it finally amounted to US$ 97,137,000. The following year, it reached a historic threshold of US$ 157,054,000, before stabilizing again between US$ 80 and US$ 100 million for the next years.[30] In 2018, imports from China reached US$ 430 million, what made China the largest supplier of Burkina Faso.[31]

This dramatic increase of Burkina Faso's import from China has, above all, been related to the multiplication of Burkinabe transnational traders in African-Chinese merchant networks. Indeed, since 2000, the number of registered traders has exploded. According to the statistics of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Ouagadougou, while an average of 19 trading enterprises were created annually in Burkina Faso between 1990 and 1994, this number increased to 426 between 1995 and 1999. Between 2000 and 2004, 776 new business companies were created, 1,977 between 2005 and 2009, and 2,126 between 2010 and 2012.[32] Without being able to give a precise estimate, a representative of the Ouagadougou Enterprise House said that many of these new companies were internationally oriented, since "there have never been as many requests for the creation of import-export companies as in recent years".[33]

Such a multiplication of Burkinabe transnational traders now involved in African-China trade is composed of various traders' profiles. Of course, one can find some of the well-established traders, who were among the first to explore Asian countries since the mid 1990s. One can also find other long-lasting members of Burkina Faso's trading community, or their relatives, who would have started supplying in China only in the 2000s. A good illustration of this category is M. Ouedraogo, former reseller of Japanese motorcycles, who decided in 2003 to import bikes by himself from China, instead of suffering from the cut-throat competition that the Chinese motorbikes traders have brought in the sector.[34] This was also the case of Mr. Toé, son of a spare parts salesman at the Ouagadougou's central market, who

30 Statistics of the UNCTAD.

31 Statistics from the Observatory of Economic Complexity, available on https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/bfa/#Imports (on January 4, 2019).

32 Statistics of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Ouagadougou, October 2013.

33 Interview, Ouagadougou, November 19, 2010. According to my own research, a majority of the Burkina Faso's import-export companies are in fact only import companies, and have mostly made China their preferred trading destination.

34 Interview, Ouagadougou, December 12, 2010.

began his commercial activity in 2003. Like his father and brother, he initially specialised his business in the spare parts sector. First supplying in Mali, he made the following year a first order in China, taking advantage of his family's networks. Since then, even if he diversified his supply to other countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia, the majority of his merchandise is imported from China. To a certain extent, the extension of the commercial activities of this category toward China rely on a form of mimicry, which uses as a reference point the successful experiences of other precursor traders in African-China trade.

To these profiles of long-established transnational traders, or relatives, are also added some people, who take advantage of the new commercial opportunities offered by Burkinabe-Chinese trade to thrive and accumulate enough money to go global. One finds here some of the individuals, who have entered in trade, at a national or regional scale, following the devaluation of CFA francs. This was notably the case of Mr. Issata, the son of a mechanic and mechanic himself, who launched his trading business in the 1990s with the sale of spare parts imported from Nigeria and Mali. As he explained: "At this time, all the spare parts that I sold came from China. At a point, I told myself that I have to try to go to China by myself".[35] In 2005, when he had enough resources, he made his first trip to China to buy spare parts.[36] Capital accumulation at a regional level to subsequently extend in turn commercial activities outside the African continent appears as a common path in many profiles of traders who started to be involved in African-Chinese trade in the early 2000s. In many ways, in this category, the motivation to go to China is related to the will to trace lines of supply, whose these traders has hitherto been the last segment, and in doing so, to cut down on intermediaries.

Finally, one of the most astonishing dimensions of this multiplication of Burkinabe transnational traders is the rise of the apprentice international traders (Khan-Mohammad, 2016). This category of traders is made up of individuals who have no prior knowledge in international trade, before going to supply in China. The first subcategory of *apprentice international traders* is composed of retailers who collaborate with others to be able to finance the import of a container of goods. The path of Boucari Tassembedo notably illustrates this profile. Fashion designer, he opened a haberdashery shop in 2002 in a peripheral district of Ouagadougou. He then got supplies from traders, until 2008, when a friend proposed to him to participate, within his means, in the import of a container from China.[37] The second subcategory is made up of civil servants tempted to diversify their source of income towards trade. Given their low visibility and their desire to remain invisible—indeed, the combination of private and public activities is not tolerated within

35 Interview, Ouagadougou, November 7, 2011.

36 Interview, Ouagadougou, November 7, 2011.

37 Interview, Ouagadougou, January 27, 2011.

the Burkinabe administration—they are particularly difficult to meet. Their involvement, however, is no secret to anyone.[38] The emergence of this category of traders shows how commercial opportunities offered by China has, to some extent, participated to break the intimate relationship between capital accumulation and mobility in Africa, questioning the idea that only the most influential traders were capable of going and getting supplies outside the continent (Grégoire and Labazée 1993, 21–22).

As such, apart from their own capability to develop successful accumulation itineraries, such an entry of an ever-increase number of Burkinabe transnational traders in African-Asian trade networks relied on larger scale transformations, which have contributed to make trade with the world more reachable for African traders, and with China even more. In this respect, major reconfiguring, that reached the maritime and air transport in developed countries in the mid-1970s, before extending to Africa at the end of the 1990s, have played a decisive role (Pedersen, 2001, 97). In leading to an increase in transport supply linking Africa to the rest of the world, this reconfiguring has led to dramatically lowered transport costs (Marchal, 2008), largely contributing to decrease the cost of entry of a multitude of new traders in the Burkinabe-Chinese import networks. Simultaneously, at a Chinese domestic level, some transformations have also contributed to make the Chinese market still more reachable, such as China's entry into the WTO in November 2001 (Chen, 2009), or the skilful exchange rates management operated by China, that enabled Chinese goods to be imported even more easily and for less money, while being more profitable (Guillaumont Jeanneney and Hua, 2013).

Finally, China's central place in the transnational accumulation itineraries of an increasing number of Burkinabe traders can also be explained by the growing difficulties faced by African entrepreneurs in entering more traditional markets. The early 2000s indeed marked a tightening of European and North American migration policies (Gabrielli, 2007). Some Burkinabe merchants regretted this situation, which, according to them, was illustrated by the attitudes among embassy employees:

> I was going to the French Embassy; it was not the first time. Everything went smoothly. And there you have a new little girl behind the desk, who is not even looking at me, who speaks badly. While I am not here to flee Burkina Faso, I am not a clandestine; I will not beg. I'm here for business. I do not plan to stay in France afterwards. With my business, I earn more than her, and she looks at me like that. If she does not understand that, it's not worth it.[39]

38 Interview with the head of a union, Ouagadougou, November 29, 2010.

39 Interview, Ouagadougou, November 30, 2011.

Conclusion

This chapter allowed to trace in detail the history of the arrival of Chinese products in Burkina Faso. Such a historical presentation has made possible a profound questioning of the alleged causal link between the arrival of Chinese products in Africa and interstate cooperation between African countries and China, particularly in its current form characterized by large-scale development of the FOCAC.

In a first section, it has been shown that the initial arrival of Chinese products in Burkina Faso took place outside the chronological limits of FOCAC. This first arrival date back to the 1970s–80s. During this period, nevertheless characterized by the existence of interstate cooperation between Burkina Faso and China, Chinese products were provided by China—either free of charge or on preferential terms—and were subsequently resold by the Burkinabe government through a state enterprise: the Faso Yaar. On the one hand, thanks to the profits generated from the sale of these goods, this process enabled Burkina Faso to finance development projects jointly defined by the two states within the framework of Burkinabe-Chinese cooperation. On the other hand, this allowed Burkina Faso's government to ensure the access of the Burkinabe population to a wide range of low-cost manufactured products, and this throughout all its territory, thanks to the extended presence of Faso Yaar. This first part thus questions the apparent novelty of the presence of Chinese products in African economies. As such, it complements the recent work on the historicity of African-Chinese relations (Monson, 2004; Marchal, 2008), which attempt to bring this theme out of a scientific interest still largely focused on the unique historical moment of the FOCAC.

The second section has demonstrated that the proliferation of Chinese products in Burkina Faso took place in a context characterized by a lack of interstate cooperation between the Burkinabe and Chinese governments. Indeed, while Burkina Faso was reorienting its diplomatic relations to Taiwan in 1994, imports from China increased throughout the second half of the 1990s and exploded in the first half of the 2000s. Such a configuration therefore forces to explore other factors explaining the proliferation of Chinese products in Burkina Faso. While African transnational traders stand as the main actors of these imports, it appears that to understand this proliferation one must understand the conditions of emergence of these transnational traders, and the rationalities that have underpinned their orientation, in ever-greater numbers, to the Chinese market. In this respect, this chapter has made it possible to identify the cross-influence of a plurality of historical events occurred at a national, regional and global level, which has acted as constraints and opportunities for transnational traders. Thus, it appears that the proliferation of Chinese goods in Burkina Faso is first and foremost rooted in two internal transformations: the devaluation of CFA franc and the implementation of the SAP. The first event has encouraged self-employment, leading to the entry of many individuals into national and regional trading networks. It has also reduced the purchasing power of the Burkinabe, giving a decisive impetus to a multitude of transnational traders to explore new trade routes, especially to Asia. The second event, in leading to the closure of Faso Yaar, has reduced competition in many import sectors, promoting the development of national merchant capital. Finally, adding to the many changes that occurred at a Chinese domestic level during the next decades, there is a multitude of other global transformations that have also fuelled the proliferation of Chinese products in Burkina Faso since the early 2000s, such as the reducing of the cost of international transports, as well as strengthening of visa policies in Europe and United States.

In view of the above, this chapter highlights the importance of three dimensions, which, in my opinion, should be systematically taken into account by the studies on China in Africa, but also to a greater extent in all research on Africa in globalization. In the first place, it is necessary not to lose sight of the complexity and ambivalence of social facts in favour of a mono-causal explanation. Only an approach accounting for this equivocal character can indeed restore the richness of observed phenomena. In the second place, it is essential to take into account the historicity of African societies in the study of their relation to the world. And finally, in close connection with the previous point, it is absolutely essential to give African agency its place in the analysis, as other authors have already recommended (Marfaing and Thiel, 2011; Mohan and Lampert, 2012). This represents a decisive step to go beyond an out of date passive vision of Africans, in favour of a much more accurate interpretation of their decisive role as central actor of the African continent integration into globalization.

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4

Africa and China: Still Geographically Distant, Yet Increasingly Linked through the Belt and Road Initiative

W. Travis Selmier II

China has had millennia of contact with the rest of Asia, while Sino-Sub-Saharan history is episodic and comparatively short due to: 1, maritime distance, 2, Chinese and African focus on their respective continents with their respective land-based enemies, and 3, China's historic position as the center of global economics, receiving tribute from the periphery rather than reaching out. But, since establishment of the People's Republic of China [PRC], Sino-African ties have developed through mutual political support, rapidly growing economic relationships, and similar experiences as developing regions. Rapidly developing economic ties between China and many Sub-Saharan Africa [SSA] countries are as complex as the continent itself: SSA country-size, state of development, presence of natural resources, geographic location, complex national social characteristics and history with China each has impacts. Different Chinese actors—national government, private and state-owned enterprises [SOEs], and individual Chinese entrepreneurs—further condition Sino-African economic ties and influence the success of Belt and Road Initiative projects [BRI].

Sino-African Relationships: Economic, and Conditioned by Similar Experiences

> Looking at space, the West (especially European countries) is only separated from Africa by the Mediterranean Sea. European scholars of Africa I am acquainted with make casual remarks about going to conduct research in Africa as if doing so were as easy as taking a stroll through your backyard. In contrast, a vast distance separates China and Africa. Wenping He[1]

Noted Chinese scholar of Africa Wenping He summed up millennia of Sino-African history in her 2010 comment. While Chinese contact with the rest of Asia

1 2010, translation by The China Africa Project.

stretches back more than 2000 years, (Di Cosmo, 2004; Hansen, 2012; Liu, 2010), Sino-African history is episodic, truncated and largely a modern phenomenon (Duyvendak, 1949; Wheatley, 1972). This is partly due to the maritime distance between the two: Northeastern African and Arab maritime traders reached out to China and explored (Chaffee, 2018; Beaujard, 2022) while Chinese emperors and leaders looked to overland threats from the north and west, consistently focusing their efforts there up to the present day (Di Cosmo, 2004; Wang, G, 2013; Wang, J.S., 2012). Except for the voyages of Admiral Zheng He in the 15th century, there was little interest in seagoing outside East Asia from a Chinese imperial perspective.

But the last six decades have seen a shift toward a China engaged across Africa and with many individual African countries and leaders. The Belt and Road Initiative [also known as the New Silk Road or One-Belt, One-Road, henceforth called the BRI] involves an extensive number of infrastructure projects and accelerates deepening Sino-African economic relationships within this historical context. While more fully fleshed-out and planned along the land-based routes traversing Asia, projects further afield sometimes exhibit haphazard conceptualization and less planning (Economist, 2016; Selmier, 2018). The arc of Sino-African history, as episodic and sporadic as it has been, has had a huge and enduring impact on modern relationships, particularly so for BRI-linked projects (Omoruyi Ehizuelen, 2017; Zhang, 2017).

There are important parallels to China's maritime experiences from African historical perspectives: historically, each looked to land, as opposed to sea, for enemies. Sea-borne threats occurred only over the last three-to-five centuries. Aside from participation by individual Africans mostly from the Horn, Sino-African trade was carried by others, including Arab and Persian intermediaries (Chaffee, 2018; Saliba, 2008). While direct Sino-African relationships are a modern phenomenon, they are still of an economic nature. China's prominent impact over the last 15 years on inward Sub-Saharan Africa [henceforth SSA], demonstrates this. Overall SSA investment has shifted in three interlinked ways (Africa Pulse, 2018; Calderon and Boreux, 2016; Calderon and Nguyen, 2015): First, a commodity super cycle peaked and plummeted, greatly affecting African commodity-producing countries, importers of commodities and extractive industry participants. Second, financial crises in 2007–09 (the "global financial crisis") and in 2011–12 (the European sovereign debt crisis and its impacts on banks) dented inward flows. And third, the composition of flows changed, as FDI shrank in relative terms compared with inflows from portfolio investment and "other investment", which constitutes cross-border lending. China was an important factor in each of these three interlinked ways: Chinese demand for base metals grew from 12% to 50% of global demand between 2002 and 2015, and the sudden drop was due in large part to a drop-off in Chinese demand

(Büyükşahin, Mo and Zmitrowicz, 2016).[2] China's largely successful attempts to counteract the global financial crisis tended to boost commodity demand, at least initially, as well as provide liquidity to Chinese firms expanding into SSA. Growth in Chinese lending into SSA has been an important factor in SSA growth, and much of this growth has been channeled through BRI projects.

As a country, China is the largest creditor to Africa with roughly 15% of total credit extended, but a more targeted, smaller investor accounting for roughly 5% of total inward FDI (Chen and Nord, 2018). Considerable concern about "China's influence" in pan-African economic development also obscures as much as it illuminates (for recent critiques of this often miss-directed concern, see Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney, 2018; Hirono and Suzuki, 2014; Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens, 2018). Dreher, et al (2018) note that the Chinese Government's patterns of ODA (Official Development Assistance), for instance, follow a rather similar strategy to other governments through allocating more for political policy purposes; so-called "other official flows" are more often directed toward commercial purposes. Chinese SSA-inward FDI may involve the Chinese government, state-owned enterprises [SOEs] of varying ties to the national and provincial governments, privately-held multinationals, small- and medium-sized enterprises and individuals, or any combination of these many actors (cf. Brautigam, Tang and Ying, 2018; Wall, et al, 2018). The plethora of intermediaries involved in inward FDI eases in some cases and complicates in other cases both Chinese-originating SSA FDI and FDI from other countries, as my cases will show.

Herein, I sketch out Sino-African economic and political history, and then look at four country cases: Ethiopia [埃塞俄比亚], Angola [安哥拉], Guinea [几内亚], and Tanzania [坦桑尼亚]. Throughout the Chapter I note five unique factors influencing the social and political impacts of Sino-African investment flows: first, although African and Chinese governments knew of each other millennia ago, and sought out each other's products, only one organized short premodern period of visiting ships is known—the fleets of Admiral Zheng He (Duyvendak, 1949; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012; Wheatley, 1975). Second, Chinese governments never attempted to colonize Africa, which has helped make modern Sino-African political and economic relationships both closer and more trust-inspiring; third, the PRC's relationships with African political leaders and emerging modern African countries were somewhat fluid and usually supportive (He, 2017; Large, 2008; Yu, 2010). Fourth, PRC government and Chinese leaders have recognized the complexity and differences across African countries' above-mentioned factors, attempting to tailor approaches to each country rather than a less-targeted regional or continental approach (Doku, Akuma and Owusu-Afriyie, 2017; Smith, 2018). And fifth, rollout

2 China's oil consumption grew by roughly 130% over this period, then nearly plateaued for three years.

of Euro-Asian-African infrastructural development projects for BRI provides additional framing and funding for further Sino-African economic development (He, 2015; Kodzi, 2018).

The Long and Winding Silk Road[s] and Sino-African Interactions

> It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Chinese viewed the far southwestern fringe of their oecumene through Arabo-Persian spectacles. Paul Wheatley (1972, 114)

Sino-African history has been predominantly commercial and, until the second half of the 20th century, largely organized through intermediaries. While extensive Sino-African trade took place over the last two millennia, the Arabs, Persians and later the Gujerati organized this trade and carried the goods (Beaujard, 2022; Chaffee, 2018; Duyvendak, 1949). Admiral Zheng He's 15th century wide-ranging voyages, to Africa and elsewhere, were exceptional in China's maritime history as China appears to have been officially disinterested. Chinese maritime trade over the centuries has been conditioned by a mix of official restrictions, China's status as the richest state in the world to which many goods were brought as tribute, and general neglect of the greater world beyond the seas (Chaffee, 2018; Saliba, 2008) until modern times. While supporting foreign seagoing merchants, especially Muslim merchants, Chinese dynasties attempted to restrain Chinese merchants through limiting length of voyages and mandating severe penalties including death for taking money out of China (Chaffee, 2018;). Muslim merchants and, later, European merchants dominated trade and produced sophisticated maps.

Lack of direct contact between Africa and China did not diminish interest in each region's goods. Ambergris, horns and tusks, myrrh and other aromatics, and exotic animals flowed one way; precious metals, coin, porcelain and silk flowed the other (Beaujard, 2022; Duyvendak, 1949; Wheatley, 1972). In a sense, mutual knowledge of each region's existence without direct contact laid a foundation for more open relationships without the historical baggage which encumbers Afro-European relationships, for instance. Africans were transported in small numbers to China by Arab traders, working as servants for Chinese families and as security for Chinese sea captains as reported by Ibn Battuta.[3] But the horrible legacy of institutionalized slavery and imperial colonization was not something China created and, in fact, treatment of China at imperial hands gives additional common foundations to Sino-African relationships (Brautigam, 2009; Ziltener and Künzler, 2013).

3 Chaffee (2018), Duyvendak (1949), Wheatley (1972); for a summary, see Shinn and Eisenman (2012, 18–19).

So three historical parallels have added support to Sino-African relationships: each side suffered from exploitive colonization; each side tended to look toward the land rather than to extensive seagoing; each side sought out development paths with a minimum of foreign, asymmetric influence. Many African kingdoms grew to immense size and wealth but, as with China, threats tended to come from the vast African landmass rather than from sea except along the coasts. Modern threats came during periods of European exploitation and colonization in the last five centuries in Africa, similar to China's experience but starting some three centuries earlier. Yet unexpected complications in modern relations have arisen, as Emmanuel Kodzi (2018, 156) notes,

> increasing the level of [Sino-African] engagement is also associated with unintended effects, such as competitive pressures, power asymmetries, and diplomatic challenges. For host nation businesses, the combination of competitive pressures and the imbalance of power in China's favor raises the stakes for survival.

These are not the outcomes originally hoped for and promised. Arguing for similarity of treatments was an important part of the Bandung Conference in 1956, and this was reinforced on Zhou Enlai's foundational African tour in 1963 (Brautigam, 2009, 29–32, 36–38; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 33–38; Yu, 1988). But power and influence were ineluctably part of Chinese leadership's calculations as China itself was caught in tense, constricting webs of international power and influence. What George Yu noted (1988, 850–52) as China's geopolitical interests in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s not only casts a long shadow today, but is intimately intertwined with BRI projects:

1. "the perception that the Third World offered China an arena in which to achieve its political/ideological objectives."
2. International recognition of China [then, as the sole government by eclipsing Taiwan; now, as top Developing Nation political leader]
3. The Sino-Soviet conflict [in Africa, the conflict's shadow remains in some countries; in the BRI projects in Central Asia and beyond, China is successfully eclipsing Russian influence.[4]

The BRI, like the Silk Road, is conceptually open to interpretation, but key elements involve infrastructure spending, financing options, and official Chinese government recognition and support. The "Road" refers to sea routes and the "Belt" refers to land routes, and China's historical perspective has long focused on the land routes (Selmier, 2018; Wang G.W., 2013; Wang J.S., 2012). Ranging between one to as much as eight trillion US dollars in estimated costs, BRI had been focused initially on trade infrastructure consisting of ports, railroads, roads and airports extending from Asia

4 See Padilla (2017), Pantucci and Petersen (2012), Selmier (2018, 2020).

toward Europe (Padilla, 2017; Selmier, 2018). But, as BRI plans have grown, projects linked to economic development across Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere have been discussed and some developed.

Africa has become a key part of the BRI and an important destination for Chinese capital released through the BRI (Chen, 2016; He, 2015; Kabukuru, 2016). The BRI also fits into the arc of modern Sino-African history in a way which other regions, such as Latin America, Europe, or even parts of Asia, do not fit. Broadly speaking, modern Sino-African history has gone through three phases; by reinterpreting Yu's 1988 political model through the cases which follow, we may learn how and where BRI could succeed and how and where it may not succeed in varied African contexts. Sino-African relations in the 1960s and 1970s were predominantly geopolitical; China craved a UN Seat and a positive outcome to the Sino-Soviet split. As China started its modernization drive in the late 1970s, Chinese interest (and capital) turned inward; relationships were still important but China had less to offer. As discussed below, only certain countries—Angola for weapons, Tanzania for the Tanzania-Zambia railway—were consistently top of mind for Chinese leaders.

This fading of a Chinese presence—but with a fond, familial bond remaining - was foretold by Deng Xiaoping, in his UN Delegation Chair speech in 1974, when he stated that China was part of the Third World and that "China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one,"[5] and it was underlined during Zhao Ziyang's 1983–4 trip to Africa, when Zhao offered support but not capital (Brautigam, 2009; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 42–45; Yu, 1988). The last quarter-century has been a gradual buildup of trade relations, with increasing Chinese economic activity in Africa through investments and programs. In this context, BRI in Africa can be seen as the promise of greater commitment, capital investment and co-development.

Variation in Modern Sino-African Relations

> African nations should search for the best trajectories for their own development, taking into account their country and city-specific locational advantages and disadvantages in attracting more and more equitable international investments. Wall, Maseland, Rochell, Spaliviero (2018, 11)

As the cases show, there is considerable variation across SSA countries and the danger of speculative, even predatory, Chinese actors. Ethiopia, Angola, Guinea and Tanzania were selected for variance across SSA but there may be some selection bias: I have purposefully selected from different regions, different historical backgrounds, differing resource endowments and different country sizes. Looking at the

5 Deng famously coined this idea of three worlds in his speech, thereby still distancing the USSR and satellites [Second World] from both the US, Japan and Europe [First World] and China and its brethren.

map [page 278], we find Tanzania and Ethiopia on the eastern side of Africa facing toward the Indian Ocean and toward China, while Angola and Guinea, facing the Atlantic on the western coast of Africa, are considerably further away by sea from China. Non-littoral Ethiopia must obtain maritime access by transiting through Eritrea, Djibouti or Somalia, while Angola, Guinea and Tanzania each have ports and a considerable coastline.

Table 1 below provides additional geographic as well as political and economic bases for comparison. Within this sample, Ethiopia, Angola and Tanzania are larger countries in land terms at nearly 1 million square-kilometers or larger, while Guinea is 20–25% of their respective sizes. Ethiopia's 108 million people places it into the most populous dozen countries in the world, while populations of Tanzania, Angola, and Guinea ranked at 25th, 45th and 75th of 238 countries/territories in the world in 2018 analyzed in the CIA's World Handbook (2018). Size matters for both economic heft and political impact (Igbinoba, 2017), particularly in negotiating BITS [bilateral investment treaties] with China (Chen, 2016. See also Selmier and Oh, 2012 for conceptual development). Each country has a relatively young population, higher fertility rate [Angola's conspicuously higher] and similar life expectancy of 60–63 years. Notably, Angola and Tanzania's literacy rates [above 70%] outshine Ethiopia's [49%] and Guinea's [30%]. Angola is heavily urbanized [66% city-dwellers]; Ethiopia's population quite rural [21%], with Tanzania and Guinea in between.

Although populations vary threefold, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Angola have similar-sized GDPs reflecting a wide range of GDP per capita. But a glance at GINI coefficients reflects Angola's oil-based economy delivers lop-sided benefits to its people. Angola's and Guinea's economies are, in fact, heavily resource-oriented; Tanzania's is more balanced between resources, other industry and agriculture and services; Ethiopia is relatively resource-poor. Angola's large industrial sector includes its oil industry; Angola is ranked 14th in global oil production, just behind SSA's largest oil producer, Nigeria.

Politically all are classified as democracies, but there is a considerable spread in political freedom. Guinea and Tanzania are considered partially free in Freedom House's Freedom ranking, while Angola and Ethiopia are considered not free. Press Freedom rankings roughly reflect these overall political freedom rankings. Political risk rankings show Angola and Tanzania as relatively more stable, which I discuss below. The four cases generally cover the experiences of the SSA countries with most of the major colonial powers in SSA: Ethiopia remained independent, although it fought a war against Italy in the 1930s; Angola was colonized by Portugal; Guinea by France and Tanzania by Germany initially, then British control was established after WW I. Importantly, Guinea and Tanzania are old friends of the PRC; both early to embrace China, both considered as gateways to their respective regions. Angolan-China and Ethio-China relations have had more checkered histories.

Table 1: Demographic and economic comparison of Ethiopia, Angola, Guinea and Tanzania

	Ethiopia	Angola	Guinea	Tanzania
Region of Africa	Northeast	South	West	East
Area [1000 sq-km]	1,104	1,246	246	947
Coastline [km]	0	1,600	320	1,424
Selected demographic information				
Population [mill]	108.4	30.4	11.9	55.5
Population rank [among 238]	12th	45th	75th	25th
Median age [years]	18	15.9	19	17.9
Population growth rate	2.83%	3.49%	2.75%	2.74%
Urban population	20.8%	65.5%	36.1%	33.8%
Life expectancy at birth [years]	63	60.6	62.1	63.1
Fertility rate [children born/woman]	4.91	6.09	4.98	4.71
Literacy [total population]	49.1%*	71.1%	30.4%	77.9%*

	Ethiopia	Angola	Guinea	Tanzania
Economic overview (2017 estimates)				
GDP (PPP, in USD billions)	$200.6	$193.6	$30.0	$162.5
GDP - real growth rate	10.9%	-2.5%	8.2%	6%
GDP - per capita (PPP)	$2,200	$6,800	$2,200	$3,200
GDP by composition				
-- agriculture	34.8%	10.1%^	19.8%	23.4%
-- industry	21.6%	61.4%^	32.1%	28.6%
-- services	43.6%	28.4%^	48.1%	47.6%
GINI Index	33 (2011)	42.7 (2008)	39.4 (2007)	37.6 (2007)
Political overview (2017 estimates)				
Freedom ranking [0–100, ascending freedom]	12	26	41	52
Press Freedom [100–0, lower is freer]	86	73	66	58
Political Risk [0–100, ascending stability]	47.5	67.5	53.3	63.8
Colonial Relationships	none	Portugal	France	Germany, England

Notes: ^ 2011; * 2015 estimate

Sources: Except Political Overview, from CIA Handbook, 2018. All figures are 2018 estimates unless noted. Political Overview - Freedom ranking [2018] and Press Freedom [2017] from Freedom House [free-est SSA Press Freedom rankings were Ghana, 33, Namibia, 32] Political Risk from BMI Research

Figure 1: Mapping Sub-Saharan African growth



Source: Africa's Pulse, World Bank, Office of the Chief Economist for the Africa Region.

Economically, Figure 1 maps GDP growth for 2015–2018 against historical GDP growth between 1995–2014: Ethiopia and Tanzania are rated as "established", reflecting a decade or more of strong economic growth, while Guinea is rated as "improving," with Angola considered as "slipping" (Africa's Pulse, 2018, 18). With this backdrop we can consider each case.

Ethiopia: "The hub"

As Seth Kaplan recently pointed out, Ethiopia and China share many similarities: regional powers for millennia never colonized [completely], millennia of monarchies which ultimately fell to left-wing, military-oriented political parties, "desperately poor until recent spurts of economic growth" (Kaplan, 2018). Ethiopia and China share four other important similarities: hinterlands far from ocean access, a complex ethnographic makeup [common to other African states], modern emphasis on agricultural development, and the re-emergence of their status as hubs of political and economic activity. A second glance at Figure 1 shows Ethiopia's exceptional growth over the last quarter century since the death of Mengitsu and a shift toward state-directed economic growth.

Ethiopia has become the hub of African political and economic discussion, home to the African Union, UNDP-Africa and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. In some ways this has given Ethiopia additional leverage to keep Ethio-China relations at arms-length when Ethiopian leaders need to express independence and their own interests. This independence was expressed under Haile Selassie, who sent Ethiopian troops to Korea; when Mengitsu maintained distance from China; and through the willingness of Zenawi and other modern leaders to criticize China when they felt it on target (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 268–73).

But Ethiopia has also successfully engaged with China, drawing in investment from Chinese SOEs, private investors and entrepreneurs, and the Chinese government into projects in telecommunications, roads [for instance, "the China Road"], new industrial zones and long-distance and light railroads, including mass transportation in Addis Adaba (Jacobs, 2017; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 272–73; Xu, Dieter and Wang, 2018). Ethiopia has become a destination for small, medium and large Chinese firms (Brautigam, Tang and Ying. 2018). Regarding the recently opened line between Djibouti and Addis Adaba, Djiboutian government employee Daha Ahmed Osman "predicted that the new train would transform Djibouti and Ethiopia," stating:

> For this, we have the Chinese to thank, because they shared with us their money and their technology.... More than anything we thank them for showing confidence in us.[6]

An East African infrastructure "megaproject" designed, financed and constructed by Chinese firms, similar to the integrated one under development through Pakistan (See Selmier, 2018), is taking shape, linking Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and South Sudan through roads, railways and pipelines to port facilities (Iimi, Humphreys and Mchomvu, 2017; Kabukuru, 2016). But this project is experiencing financing issues from the Chinese side (Olingo, 2018), and there are regional security concerns as well expressed by Chinese analysts (Zhang, 2017, 110–11).

Air travel through Addis Adaba is rapidly developing, with Ethiopian Airlines' extensive training and maintenance facilities, FAA-certified, which service planes and train people from other countries and airlines. While optimally-located, Ethiopia is resource-poor, necessitating development programs oriented toward people. Haddis Tadesse, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Representative to Ethiopia and to the African Union, noted approvingly that of "the government budget… about 65 to 70% of it goes to pro-poor development activities such as agriculture, health, education and infrastructure" (quoted in Tafirenyika, 2015). Targeting funds at these areas fits well with not only the Chinese government's priorities, but

6 Quoted text and Osman's comment from Jacobs (2017); see Kodzi (2018, 156-58) for a less optimistic perspective.

with the Chinese model of its own development (He, 2017; Kaplan, 2018). But three concerns cloud the Ethio-China picture: first, Ethiopia is classified as "high risk of debt distress" (Africa's Pulse, 2018; Hurley, Morris and Portelance, 2018) due to its rapidly-increasing debt position, driven up partly by BRI projects. Secondly, there is increasing business competition across a range of service and manufacturing industries, including air transportation. And thirdly, domestic (Economist, 2018b) and regional (Zhang, 2017) security issues increase Chinese concerns.

Angola: "The reconstruction project"

When three decades of conflict ended in 2002, Angolan oil reserves seemed a bonanza at first—Angola clocked one of the fastest GDP growth rates in the world between 2002–2014 at 10.5% (Mailey, 2015, 24–25). Figure 1 shows Angola's stunning growth over 1995–2008, with per capita GDP rising at double SSA averages over this period. But inequality—not fully reflected in Angola's 2011 GINI coefficient shown in Table 1—is expected by analysts to be one of highest rates in the world (Africa Pulse, 2018; Calderon and Nguyen, 2015), capital flight is endemic (Africa Pulse, 2018; Ndikumana, et al, 2015) and economic growth highly volatile (Barrot-Araya, et al, 2018; Calderon and Boreux, 2016), partially reflected in Angola's inverse relationship between inward FDI and economic growth. Figure 2 below illustrates Angolan economic volatility—and, indirectly, China's role in that volatility—by showing that Angolan crude oil production has roughly flatlined for a decade while the benchmark Brent Crude price fluctuated madly, giving a sense of revenue fluctuations to a state which gets half its revenues from oil exports (see also Igbinoba, 2017, for indications of trade volatility). 95% of Angolan exports were minerals in the mid-noughties; most of this was petroleum of which roughly half went to China unrefined (Ben-Ari, 2014; McKnight, 2018).

These fluctuations complicate an already complex Angolan-China relationship. Chinese construction firms account for half of Sub-Saharan engineering/construction (Thomas, 2017) and, if Ethiopia is an example of better-conceived and executed projects, Angola is a prime example where Chinese construction efforts appear more "entrepreneurial" than planning-orientated (Burgiss, 2014; Mailey, 2015, 27; Marques de Morais 2011). Where the Chinese central government is formally involved in African construction projects through planning, financing or building, outcomes appear to be more efficacious. But Angolan-China history combined with Angola's stunning oil reserves have led to a relationship in which Angolan leaders "have acquired unparalleled financial power and tightened ties with China, [but] there is no money to continue with most of the major projects the Chinese are supposed to build," noted Marques de Morais in 2011.

Post-independence in 1975, as China (and the US) sought to counter the USSR through proxy wars, "[a]t one time, and sometimes concurrently, China supported all three Angolan [liberation] groups: MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA" (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 338–39). Support for each of the groups through arms shipments and undisclosed payments set the stage for undisclosed payments to continue once José Eduardo dos Santos, leader of the MPLA, became President. As Marques de Morais (2011) characterized the situation,

> Angola now faces a reverse democratization process: the comeback of a de facto one-party system that emulates the Chinese model but without the basic human development that China provides to its own.

The close Angolan-Chinese partnership may have become too close. Oil-for-loans-for-weapons deals during the struggles shifted toward oil-for-loans-for-development arrangements which increased Angola's debts to China (already half of Angola's total foreign debts of 44 billion USD), tying China closer to the volatile economy while opening up criticism of China-as-Imperialist (Chazan, 2018; McKnight, 2018). Rather than follow advice from the IMF, World Bank and other multilateral organizations (Chazan, 2018; IMF-Angola, 2017; Mailey, 2015), Angola's leaders sought alternative financing, including from several Chinese "policy banks" (state-owned banks tasked with financing and promoting Chinese business activities abroad), commercial lenders, state-owned companies, and a previously little-known Hong Kong-registered firm called China International Fund. (Mailey, 2015, 28).

The China International Fund and its related companies have complex and purposefully-convoluted corporate structures with a large number of off-shore banking center shell companies (Burgiss, 2014; Economist, 2011; Mailey, 2015). At the risk

Figure 2: Brent crude price and Angolan crude production

Source: McKnight, 2018, from EIA data.

of oversimplification, I refer to them jointly as the Queensway Syndicate. The public face of the Queensway Syndicate was Sam Pa, a somewhat shadowy fellow widely suspected to have worked for Chinese intelligence services, and who had arranged oil-for-loans-for-weapons deals in Angola. In September, 2004, in partnership with the President of the Angolan state oil company Sonangol and with the blessing of President dos Santos, a new, opaque entity named China Sonangol International Holding was formed to lend money into Angola and take oil in payment for immediate sale onto Chinese oil SOEs at market prices (Chazan, 2018; Mailey, 2015, 33-38; Marques de Morais, 2011). China Sonangol and the Queensway Syndicate captured huge spreads and, with this model of lending to fragile countries desperate for financing, expanded into other countries in SSA. I suggest here that a purpose of expanding BRI into Africa was to offset, isolate and, preferably, shut down operations such as the Queensway Syndicate.

Guinea: "The problem child"

Guinea's modern history is a sad one of exploitation and unfulfilled promises to its people. A long-time friend of China, Guinea has long been seen as China's gateway to West Africa. Guinean President Ahmed Sékou Touré was the first African leader to visit Beijing. But Touré balanced USSR and China off against each other, successfully obtaining funding from each (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 39; 285–86). Perhaps Guinean domestic politics hit its nadir during 2008–2010, when the death of long-"serving," self-enriching President Lansana Conté led within hours to a coup d'état in 2008.

Ostracized from international lenders, condemned by other countries around the world including its West African neighbors and cut off from aid donors, the Guinean junta turned to Sam Pa and the Queensway syndicate (Burgiss, 2014; Mailey, 2015, 52–54). The Queensway Syndicate quickly negotiated with the struggling junta, touting Angolan examples of their rapid, efficient project development management (although Angolan projects were either prettily painted billboards or under construction but behind schedule and well over budget). A joint venture was arranged, 85% owned by Syndicate affiliates, called Africa Development Corporation (ADC) with subsidiaries called GDCs. Its draft contract read:

> [C]onstruct and/or provide services in the following sectors: water, electricity ..., housing, port, fisheries, telecommunication, airport, airline, logistics, road, railway and all such transportation, infrastructure and other utilities projects; (ii) invest and operate diamond, iron, bauxite, gold, oil and gas and minerals concessions and (iii) such other projects as may be agreed by the Parties... Subject to the laws and regulations in force, *The Republic of Guinea shall give full exclusivity to ADC and the GDCs in respect of the sectors identified*... (quoted in Mailey, 2015, 56–57, italics added).

The exclusivity arrangement for nearly all of the Guinean economy outside of agriculture encountered pushback within Guinea and universal condemnation outside. Pushing further, the Syndicate offered to finance a complete audit of all mining firms inside Guinea, and then attempted to take over operations wherever possible irregularities could be claimed. But the election of President Alpha Condé in December, 2010, began to change the balance. Contracts were renegotiated with the ADC; Queensway Syndicate deals lost much of their luster as the press and analysts within Africa and outside exposed corrupt operations. In October, 2015, Sam Pa was arrested in a Beijing hotel as part of a corruption probe into Chinese oil company Sinopec, a frequent partner of the Queensway Syndicate.

Resource-rich, with one-third of world bauxite reserves and potentially the richest iron veins in the world in the Simandou Mountains (Economist, 2017, 2018; Johnston, 2017), Guinea has tremendous mining potential but also tremendous poverty. Table 1 shows low per capita income and very low literacy rate of 30%. Guinea possesses three major mining corridors running east to west and paralleling each other which could be developed to open up country through transportation development. Thus far, though, the development of the Boké bauxite mine (Boké is near the coast in the northernmost corridor in) has resulted in "focus on growth... at the expense of the local peoples' environment and livelihoods," according to Human Rights Watch's Jim Wormington (quoted in Economist, 2018). But this integrated bauxite project—and the Simandou iron complex and infrastructural development network (the southernmost corridor)—could become key BRI projects over the next decade. The two largest partners in the Boké bauxite project and the Guinean government signed an agreement at yearend-2018 to construct Guinea's first alumina refinery, with construction expected to start in 2019 and complete by 2022 (Aluminium Insider, 2018).

While the Simandou iron complex has been under preliminary study and site development for a quarter-century, no iron ore has been taken out (Economist, 2018a; Johnston, 2017). There are many challenges—environmental impacts, remote site, unstable Guinean governments until recently, and no existing transportation (Economist, 2017; IMF-Guinea, 2013). The closest egress is to take ore out through Liberia's Buchanan port by building a railroad to the Liberian border to link to an existing railroad. But Guinean governments have insisted on transportation through Guinea, which would require roughly 680 km of railway, three times longer than the Liberian route, and a new port, which would enable development of agriculture and other industries along the route (IMF-Guinea, 2013; Johnston, 2017).

Tanzania: "The old friend"

In the early 1960's, PRC leaders saw Tanzania as a gateway to Southern and Central Africa and since then, "Tanzania developed one of the closest and most consistent relationships of all African countries with the PRC" (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 259; see also Brautigam, 2009; Large, 2008; Yu, 1988, 2010). Tanzania was a training ground for liberation groups from these regions and her military has enjoyed a close, supportive relationship with China's PLA (Yu, 1988). While opposing the Sino-Soviet split, founding President Julius Nyerere and subsequent Tanzanian leaders have made China a key political and economic partner, and Chinese leaders have reciprocated through support, visits and in choosing to announce major African policy commitments in Tanzania.

Present-day private Chinese entrepreneurs in Tanzania range from large contractors to small manufacturers, including the emergence of a "plastics" cluster (Brautigam, Tang and Ying, 2018). The signature early economic development project in Africa, the Tanzania-Zambia railway (TAZARA), was constructed predominantly with Chinese labor in the 1970s (Brautigam, 2009; van Keulen, 2010; Yu, 1988). A TAZARA upgrade and expansion of Mtwara Port and the Tanzanian railway network (Iimi et al, 2017; Olingo, 2018; Oirere, 2018) could become BRI projects, but presently the Tanzanian Government is managing all railroad projects and allocating by competitive bids to contractors (Kilimwiko, 2018; Olingo, 2018). Also Standard Chartered, a British bank, is providing the USD1.4 billion loan to fund a stretch of railway line which would offtake much of TAZARA's rail traffic (Olinga, 2018). And the Tanzanian Government purposefully noted that Japanese-manufactured rails are being imported for the project due to higher quality (Olinga, 2018). Van Keulen noted in 2010 that considerable competition in large construction contracts sidelined other foreign firms, estimating that Chinese contractors were winning more than two-thirds of all public tenders for road construction, for instance (2010, 7). While likely not capturing this high a market share now, the ongoing Mtwara Port expansion does have a nearly complete Chinese lineup of Chinese construction firms, but no Chinese funding (Oirere, 2018).

While Nyerere's vision of *ujamaa*-socialism applied in African contexts was not coupled with economic development using external capital, perhaps more importantly it set the stage for the potential for rapid, sustained development through social development programs (see Brautigam, 2009; Helleiner, 1972; James, 2014). A glance at Table 1 shows that while Tanzania registers lower per capita income, she exhibits excellent literacy, the longest lifespans in the four cases, and the lowest fertility rates, even in a relatively rural, agriculturally-based economy. By disempowering predominant language groups through making Swahili the national language, Nyerere also laid the foundations for a more cohesive, inclusive state and an integrated national economy (Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh, 2015). When Sam Pa and the Queensway Syndicate came calling, they achieved only temporary success with Air Tanzania, then a failing airline, and were quickly shown the door. As J.R. Mailey cogently summarizes (2015, 48),

> Unlike many other resource-rich states across Africa, Tanzania had enough of an institutional oversight capacity to prevent Queensway from securing oil and mineral assets solely by appealing to the interests of a small ruling clique.

Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens (2018) argue this institutional capacity has gotten stronger since the Syndicate was shown the door seven years ago. Part of this improvement is due to controversial anti-corruption campaigns waged by President John Magufuli, elected in 2015, who has targeted the mining sector in particular (Paget, 2017; Roder, 2019). While this campaigns has been waged against non-Chinese mining firms for the most part, Sichuan Hongda Group's $3 billion joint venture to develop the Mchuchuma coal and Liganga iron ore fields has not progressed very far. This 80/20 joint venture with Tanzania's National Development Corporation was signed in 2011 (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 262–63). Sichuan Hongda claimed in late 2018 that incentives promised by the previous presidential administration had not been given (Mirondo, 2018), but numerous stories regarding too-generous terms and renegotiation have also indicated issues in the original contracts. In Tanzania's case, major infrastructural projects are moving forward, with Chinese firms participating but little Chinese financing.

Of Giraffes and Jobs, Voyages and Ventures

> Thus it happened that the giraffe from the African wilderness, as it strode into the [Chinese] Emperor's Court, became the emblem of Perfect Virtue, Perfect Government, and Perfect Harmony in the Empire and in the Universe. (Duyvendak, 1949, 35)

The gift of a giraffe to a Chinese emperor some 6 centuries ago still symbolizes the distance between China and Africa. Revered in China because it resembles a mythical beast symbolizing sagacity and excellent governance [麒麟, perhaps best-known in the West as the kirin after the eponymous Japanese beer], to Africans, giraffes could be considered as destructive, noisy or lovely depending on their behavior. From an African perspective, the Chinese giraffes striding into their countries may manifest any of these adjectives, as the cases above describe. But generally the Chinese have been welcomed, as they bring in jobs and capital, and show respect for diversity of cultures and the different realities each African government faces. Xi Jinping's announcement in September, 2018, that China is willing to give $60 billion in untied aid to African nations without political strings attached is also welcome (Fifield, 2018). His pronouncement and the growth of BRI projects have set off alarm bells in the United States; in response, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and Senator Chris Coons (2018) propose to:

> Reform and modernize government development finance by establishing the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC)... [thereby] more than

> doubl[ing] OPIC's investment portfolio and allow[ing] us to participate in equity investments, provid[ing] technical assistance, and issu[ing] catalytic grants to mobilize capital...

Ross and Coons (2018) are particularly concerned about the BRI and its "neo-mercantilist vision." Your author does not disagree that some BRI projects may seem neo-mercantilist, but suggests in this paper that other projects provide much-needed infrastructure which can be negotiated on commercially-founded analyses, and that China and Chinese firms have shown their capacity and willingness to do this.

Just as applying this broad concepts of the modern BRI and ancient Silk Roads to economic development is subject to interpretation, Africa's breadth and complexity necessitate country-level approaches. Table 2 provides a simple view of the four cases from Chinese leadership perspectives, allowing considerations of how of history, endowment, culture and location both require and permit tailored approaches.

Table 2: Cases from a Chinese perspective

<table>
<tr><td></td><td>Funded rebels</td><td>Old friends</td><td rowspan="3">Increasing population toward upper left</td></tr>
<tr><td>East Coast
[proximity to China]</td><td>Ethiopia</td><td>Tanzania</td></tr>
<tr><td>Resource State
[& West Coast]</td><td>Angola</td><td>Guinea</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Source: Author.</td></tr>
</table>

Tanzania and Guinea are old friends to the PRC, while Ethiopia and Angola are not, in part because China funded rebels either within and adjacent to Ethiopia and Angola, yet the success stories in this case study—Tanzania and Ethiopia—cut across relations with the PRC. Angola and Guinea are more distant from China, while Tanzania and Ethiopia are nearer and share some pre-modern history with China, and here we see more analytical traction as the eastern side of Africa shows as successful in this paper's case context. Angola and Guinea are prototypic resource states; Tanzania now has abundant resources, but extensive development of these is a modern phenomenon of the last a quarter-century. Tanzania's economy is more diversified, perhaps more so than even Ethiopia's, even with her large multilateral presence and rapidly-growing hub airport in Addis Adaba. Ethiopia

has the largest population with Guinea the smallest, a very rough indicator of economic heft. In terms of outcomes thus far with these four African cases, it seems resource states have had more difficult times with Chinese "entrepreneurs" such as Sam Pa. Existence of this type of Chinese businessperson presents problems for the Chinese Government and for other Chinese entrepreneurs, as a string of predatory deals tends to bias other observers. The speed at which Sam Pa was finally brought down after J.R. Mailey's 130-page report was released in 2015 indicates the Chinese Government could no longer tolerate his methods and the resulting public relations disasters.

Tanzania and Ethiopia are each quite unique, though. Tanzania is resource-rich as well as both agriculturally and industrially productive. Ethiopia's independence and population size give her an important voice. Both countries have a central geographic position for trade and transport, which strengthens their respective voices. The Chinese government has options in all four countries for commercially-viable BRI projects which advance those goals China has pursued in Africa in modern times: respect, influence, joint economic growth, and access to the vast resources with which Africa is blessed. These resources include its peoples, something Chinese entrepreneurs recognized decades ago.

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5

The Regional Dimension of Sino-African Development Cooperation

Georg Lammich

The relations and interactions between China and the African Union (AU) have intensified in recent years and have become, to a certain degree, institutionalized. New structures have been established, not just with the full membership of the AU in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) but also with the implementation of the AU-China strategic dialogue mechanism and various other initiatives. In addition to these mostly open cooperative structures, which are oriented towards a regular conference schedule but otherwise have an amorphous character, China-AU cooperation is starting to create regional solutions for hindrances to development on the African continent. In the context of regional capacity building and development, these new structures offer numerous starting points for the AU to become a focal point of the Sino-African dialogue, coordinate the various African interests and strengthen regional options. Whereas many traditional donors have long-established contacts with some states or regions without involving the AU, China is open to a more active approach towards the AU. For the African Union, the cooperation with China is not only an opportunity to finance existing development frameworks such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) but also a chance to implement new regional development schemes.

Introduction

The relations and interactions between China and the African Union (AU) have intensified in recent years and have become, to a certain degree, institutionalized. New structures have been established, not just with the full membership of the AU in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) but also with the implementation of the AU-China strategic dialogue mechanism and various other initiatives. These frameworks are mostly aimed at economic development and trade promotion, and have a consultative character and no or very limited decision-making power. The emergence of these new institutions within the body of the AU is not a reception of Chinese structures but a reaction to the interaction with an external partner that requires an adaptation of the internal system. In addition to these mostly open co-operative structures, which are oriented towards a regular conference schedule but otherwise have an amorphous character, China-AU cooperation is now also starting to create regional solutions for hindrances to development on the African continent. The prioritization of certain topics and the utilization of existing structures for the implementation of new institutions is often based on ad-hoc decisions that mostly follow Beijing's current agenda. In the context of regional capacity building and development, these new structures strengthen regional options and offer numerous starting points for the AU to coordinate the various African interests and become a focal point of the Sino-African dialogue. Whereas many traditional donors have long-established contacts with some states or regions without involving the AU, China is open to a more active approach towards the AU. For the African Union, the cooperation with China is not only an opportunity to finance existing development frameworks such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) but also a chance to implement new regional development schemes. In the last few years, several new development-related programs and instruments have emerged within the African Union that were initiated with a vital contribution from China. The genesis of the new African Union Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (ACDC), which was established with substantial support from China, is paradigmatic of the characteristics and potential of China's regional development financing. Given the limited attention this topic has received in the literature the main aim of this chapter is the examination of development measures inside the political dimension of Sino-African cooperation rather than the effects of this cooperation on the economic and social sphere. The research is based on the analysis of official documents and statements, as well as interviews with key officials from NEPAD, advisors close to interregional negotiations and scholars from Africa and China.

China's Regional Engagement in Africa

In the early 2000s, China entered a new phase in its African engagement that, apart from the economic sphere, mainly manifested itself through a deepening of bilateral ties between Beijing and numerous African states. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) served as the main instrument to foster this new relationship between China and the respective national governments. The recognition of African regional or sub-regional organizations by the Chinese side happened at this point out of deference to some African actors that were supporting regional integration on the continent but were otherwise not taken into account. In the first FOCAC-Declaration from the year 2000, China mentioned the "efforts made by the African continent to enhance sub regional cooperation" (Beijing Declaration FOCAC, 2000, 6) and acknowledged the founding of the African Union, but no further steps for establishing any form of cooperation with the AU or the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) were taken. China saw FOCAC in its initial phase as a tool for rationalizing its relationship with the African states that included an international dimension, such as the articulation of common positions in the United Nations (UN), but it did not consider the regional level as a dialogue partner.

This passivity from China towards the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor the African Union was also a result of the timing of the first FOCAC meeting in Beijing, which took place a mere three months after the adoption of the Sirte Declaration, the founding statute of the African Union. At the time of the FOCAC meeting in Beijing, the officially still-operating OAU, the predecessor organization of the African Union, was no longer relevant, and the designated successor was not yet functional. For the Chinese government, which only slowly developed an interest in interregional cooperation, but also for the African states, there was no convincing argument to integrate regional structures into the FOCAC process (Lammich, 2019, 105). As Ikome showed (2010, 209), the African states were split into two fractions that were arguing for or against a stronger role for the AU in the Sino-African dialogue; particularly, Morocco, as a non-member of the organization, argued against a stronger influence of the Union.

Despite the reluctance of Morocco, in the following years, China gradually approached the AU and other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, and in 2003, also included the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in some of its projects on the continent.

> China will, under the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, take concrete measures to strengthen cooperation with African countries, African regional and sub-regional organizations in priority sectors identified under the NEPAD, such as infrastructure development, prevention and treatment of communicable and infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis etc.) human resources development and agriculture (Addis Action Plan FOCAC, 2003, 3.2.2).

The character of the projects implemented under the FOCAC framework during that period remained largely bilateral, and China focused its diplomatic and financial efforts on several countries that were perceived as strategically important for China's interests on the continent. Only after the gradual consolidation of the AU and NEPAD in 2006 did China slowly approach some AU institutions. In the same year, China published its "African Policy," a white paper setting the cornerstones for China's future engagement with Africa. In this document, China, for the first time, promoted regional and multilateral initiatives for its interactions with Africa and explicitly expressed its interest in cooperating with the African Union. In accordance with its increasingly flexible geopolitical approach, Beijing extended its African engagement to the regional sphere and evaluated the AU as a potential partner for furthering its goals on the continent. Regional organizations were now seen as beneficial for economic development in Africa, which became one of the main objectives for China.

While China's 2006 African policy outlined numerous specific areas of cooperation with the African states and specified the envisioned development in several sectors, such as communication or transport infrastructure, the measures to integrate the regional organizations, especially the RECs, into the Sino-African dialogue remained vague.

> China appreciates and supports the positive role of Africa's sub-regional organizations in promoting political stability, economic development and integration in their own regions and stands ready to enhance its amicable cooperation with those organizations (China's African Policy, 2006, Part VI).

This hierarchy for China's African partners established in 2006, with the refined bilateral strategy of a certain appreciation for the AU as a security and international actor and the rather formal recognition of the RECs, characterized the subsequent years of cooperation. In the following decade, the state-to-state relationship has developed exponentially and has expanded to many new areas. The RECs are still marginalized, although some institutionalized dialogue structures have been implemented, and some agreements, mostly regarding transnational infrastructure projects, have been signed in recent years (Li, 2012, 10).

The most notable change in the relationship between China and the African actors sketched in China's 2006 African Policy was the deepening of ties between Beijing and the African Union. Just four months after the policy was published, during the third FOCAC summit, China announced its support for building a new AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. China also offered moral, technical and financial support for the Union and NEPAD, and lauded "[...] the AU's leading role in resolving African issues." (Beijing Action Plan FOCAC 2006; 2.5.2). In the following year, a strategic dialogue mechanism between the African Union Commission and the Chinese government was established, which met for the first time in 2008 in the Ethiopian capital (Xinhua, 27. 11.2008).

China's Second African Policy

On the eve of the sixth FOCAC meeting in 2015 in Johannesburg, China published its second African policy document outlining its long-term vision for the Sino-African relationship. In comparison to the 2006 policy, the new strategy is more comprehensive and detailed. It is built on elements from the FOCAC framework documents and sets the new parameters for the future alignment of the Forum and Sino-African cooperation (Mthembu, 2016, 2). While at its core, it is still a bilateral manifesto, it highlights development and security as future areas for an intensified interregional approach and dedicates the last passage to cooperation between China and the regional organizations.

> China values and supports the AU's leadership in building a united and strong Africa and promoting African integration, its centrality in safeguarding peace and security in Africa, as well as a bigger role for the organization in regional and international affairs (China's African Policy, 2015).

While the central role of the African Union is in unison with previous declarations, the new document specifies this role and also references the Agenda 2063, Africa's blueprint and master plan for development as the AU's strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent. While the recognition of the Agenda underlines China's support for a holistic development strategy for Africa, China's African policy is not committed to any kind of Pan-African vision. Industrialization and the modernization of the agricultural sector are the priority areas for China, where it is heavily engaged in bilateral projects, while regional infrastructure development, a main objective of the AU, is of secondary importance (China's African Policy, 2015, pt.III). At the FOCAC summit, which occurred soon after the second African policy was published, the Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced a bundle of initiatives for future Sino-African development cooperation covering various topics from poverty reduction and economic growth to health and environmental issues.[1] The so-called "China-Africa Ten Major Cooperation Plans" still follow the growth-oriented strategy that has dominated China's African policy since President Xi came to power. The key aspects of this strategy, which primarily reflects the needs of China's domestic industry are "industrial capacity cooperation" and "strategic complementarity" (Sun, 2015). These "Major Cooperation Plans" are mostly directed towards bilateral cooperation, and the focus on economic development and industrialization favours the implementation of national projects, while health and security cooperation also have a regional angle. The strong linkage between China's African policy and its national development strategy is most visible in the relocation of low-tech, labor-intensive industries from China to countries with low-labor costs in Africa; however, the AU is promoting the development of R&D capacities and technology-driven industries in Africa.[2] Overall, with this strategy, Xi confirms China's tendency towards bilateral economic cooperation, complemented by regional approaches in areas with supranational challenges. In June 2017, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi tried to bridge the gap between China's plans for Africa and the AU vision for development contained in the Agenda 2063. He speci-

1 http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/12/05/4083s906994.htm.

2 https://au.int/sites/default/files/bids/32725reoi_technical_assistance_on_smes_access_to_innovation_and_patents-3.pdf.

fied several thematic areas in which he sees commonalities between the two strategic frameworks, and in which China aims at intensified cooperation with the AU. On a strategic level, he proposed a stronger alignment between the two respective development programs, paying special attention to the implementation of the decisions of the FOCAC Johannesburg summit. He named peace, security, health and development as thematic areas for a stronger regional orientation of Sino-African cooperation, though he remained vague about any details or specific projects.[3]

From a theoretical perspective, the integration of regional organizations into the Sino-African dialogue has strengthened the bargaining power of the African side compared to a bilateral setting. While China might lose some advantages when negotiating with the African states in bulk, it is in favour of stronger coordination between the African states (cf. Alden 2005; Interview with policy advisor, Johannesburg 2017). The AU acts in a stronger regionalized dialogue structure as a catalyst for African interests and lowers the costs and complexity for China compared to maintaining 55 individual dialogues. In addition to the efficiency argument, the integration of the regional organizations provides a legitimizing effect for China's African endeavours.

Despite the growing appreciation of the AU as an African partner, Beijing sees many structural deficits in the organization and has some doubts about whether it will be able to establish its claim as regional agenda-setter against the existing national interests of the African states (Interview with Li Zhibiao, Beijing 2016). Bilateral cooperation is still the most efficient and pragmatic way for China to uphold its interests on the continent. The dichotomy in China's African engagement is, on the one hand, a sign of China's lingering hope that the AU will become a powerful African actor. On the other hand, it has been caused by various initiatives from the AU demanding a stronger role in the Sino-African dialogue. Although there has barely been a rationalizing effect for platforms like FOCAC, China can already profit from a greater legitimization of its African engagement and can gain a potentially strong ally for its future projects on the continent. Another positive effect for Beijing from the diversification of its African partners and a transfer of competences to the regional level is the stronger resilience of its African engagement. The Chinese dominance of the FOCAC process, together with the strong emphasis on mutual benefits and a win-win situation, has created high expectations on the African side that China will deliver some measurable welfare effects. By strengthening African ownership and multilateral participation, China can, in the case of the absence of positive developments, delegate some responsibility to its multilateral partners.

3 http://www.chinaembassy.org.sg/eng/jrzg/t1472729.htm.

Conceptual Framework

Because of the numerous definitions and interpretations of regional development, the term first must be operationalized in the context of this study. Starting from an absolute definition of development, policy measures that are a) immanent in the Sino-African dialogue, b) based on interregional agreements and c) aimed at generating regional welfare are considered. Although development includes many other aspects ranging from sustainability to equality, the evaluation of these factors is beyond the scope of this study. Agreements that are part of an interregional framework are a starting point for analysing the development-oriented effects of Interregionalism. In their demarcation from bilateral development initiatives, these projects have a regional focus and are part of the development strategy of the respective RO or interregional dialogue. This chapter thus focuses merely on the input-indicators that give an inkling of the number and character of the agreed measures and the resources provided. It does not look at the outcome of the respective policies after their implementation. Also, the welfare effects beyond the political dimension are somewhat neglected. The social and economic impacts on regional development are part of a complex system with multiple situative factors that hamper a clear distinction between bilateral projects and interregional projects and blur the line between intended and unintended effects.

Due to the special characteristics of Sino-African relations and China's reluctance to label engagement as Official Development Aid it is sometimes difficult to classify individual projects as development cooperation. In its interregional policy, China has articulated a clear intention to foster economic cooperation with the goal of supporting the African states and regions. These proceedings are well documented by Chinese and African official sources. They are used to map the intended and implemented policy measures aimed at regional welfare and show the quantitative manifestation of interregional development cooperation. Building on this document analysis, in combination with a series of interviews conducted with Chinese and African experts, the chapter assesses the relevance of Sino-African interregional cooperation for regional development in Africa.

China as a Regional Development Actor in Africa

The extent and character of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) contribution to development in Africa has been, over the last fifteen years, a much-discussed topic among Chinese, Western and African scholars (He, 2010; Kweku and Naidu, 2008; Rotberg 2009). These studies have primarily focused on the definition (Bräutigam, 2010) effectivity (Davies et al., 2008) and quantitative distribution (Dreher et al., 2016) of China's aid-related investments in Africa. Bilateral or sectoral case studies (King, 2013) have been predominant, while some have tried to analyse the extent of China's impact ex ungue leonem (Cheng and Taylor, 2017). While this chapter looks closely at the regional dimension of China's African engagement, there are some peculiarities in the Chinese development aid to Africa that impact the analysis and quantification on the bilateral and regional levels.

China as a donor

The Chinese government has a very broad and sometimes vague interpretation of development aid, and despite some clamour from other donors, there is no official Chinese definition of what it comprehends as development cooperation. China prefers to maintain its rhetoric of South-South cooperation, using catch phrases such as economic-cooperation, solidarity and mutual benefits, and tries to avoid any differentiation between the donor and recipient countries. Despite the reluctance of Beijing to attach an ODA label to its African cooperation, some of China's activities are aligned with the definition of the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of Official Development Aid (ODA). While this definition refers to concessional flows from high- to low-income countries, China does not see income disparities as a necessary condition for development aid.

> China is a developing country. Over the years, while focusing on its own development, China has been providing aid to the best of its ability to other developing countries with economic difficulties, and fulfilling its due international obligations (Preface China's Foreign Aid, 2011).

Despite this conceptual difference with the DAC, there is also a wider range of goods and services that China includes in its perception of development assistance. Trade concessions, as well as loans to companies that participate in infrastructure development, are seen by Beijing as part of its aid package to Africa, although, according to the DAC definition, these transfers, which are outside of the governmental level, could not be included.

China avoids evaluative and judgmental terms like poverty or neediness, but rather falls back to the euphemistic language of South-South cooperation and mutual welfare (King 2006, 5). In its first African policy document from 2006, China mentioned its role as a provider of development assistance to Africa in only one short passage, while the bulk of the document is concerned with economic cooperation and trade.

> In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached (China's African Policy 2006, 4).

The publication of the official policy document, China's Foreign Aid, in 2011 attenuated the semantic debate about the character of Chinese development aid, which determined the discourse for a long time, and research turned to questions about the transparency, quantity and efficiency of China's investments in Africa (Grimm, 2011; Sun, 2014).

China's engagement in Africa can be divided into eight categories that partially overlap with the DAC definition of ODA: projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development, medical support, humanitarian aid, volunteer programs, and debt relief (Sun, 2014). The exact amount of China's assistance to Africa is hard to determine due to the absence of a clear definition and a lack of data. In the early phase (1960–1980) of Sino-African cooperation, Davies et al. (2008, 6) estimated a transfer volume of 100 million US$ annually, which was mainly directed to the infrastructure and construction sector. Since the early 2000s, this amount has multiplied and is now valued at several billion dollars each year. The China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) assumes that China's aid to Africa increased from 631 million US$ in 2003 to 3 billion US$ in 2015, while the annual growth rates ranged from 43% to only 1% in 2015.[4] Other research groups, such as the AidData-project, considered these numbers to be too low and calculated the total amount of Chinese development projects as over 100 billion US$ (Dreher et al., 2016).[5] The main share of Chinese investment falls under the category of development finances, while the exact conditions of these loans are often not transparent enough to evaluate their concessional character.

Despite all the efforts from projects like CARI and AidData, the inconsistency of the available data and the unclear definition of Chinese aid prevent an exact estimation of the financial dimension of China's African engagement.

Apart from the challenges in defining and quantifying Chinese investments, the motivation behind these investments and their efficiency is another issue that is much debated (see also Alden, 2007; Bräutigam, 2015; Sun, 2014; Tjonneland, 2008). Like other donors, China has different motivations for assisting in the development of African countries. Development aid is used as a political instrument to foster Beijing's foreign policy ambitions and economic interests but is also a reaction to domestic drifts and a reflection of its norms and principles.

Development aid plays a crucial role in the enforcement of the One-China policy and the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan, and it paves the way for other economic transactions (exports, resource extraction and construction contract). China's assistance to Africa strengthens its self-conception as a responsible and significant global actor that strives for multipolarity and offers the developing world an alternative path to the Western development model. Statements in the FOCAC framework

4 http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-foreign-aid-to-africa.

5 For an overview of the debate about how best to evaluate China's aid and the different methods used, see "Visualizing China's Aid to Africa" (Constantaras, 2016) and "Estimating China's Foreign Aid 2001–2013" (Kitano, 2016).

stress the need for a different systematic culture and a new economic and political order for international relations. At the same time, China emphasizes that Sino-African relations are just an addition to the established centre-periphery model. “It (South-South Cooperation) is different from North-South Cooperation and can only be a supplement instead of a substitute for the latter” (Wang, 2011).

The African countries are seen as having an equal footing with China, and the partnership is not a one-sided economic burden but a possibility to create a win-win cooperation. This perspective also explains the fluid transition between development aid and economic cooperation, which is an important element of China’s holistic strategy (King, 2006, 7).

While this short overview tried to summarize the challenges in verifying China’s impact on African development, the following section examines the regional dimension of China’s contribution to regional development. Most of the current academic debate either takes place on a bilateral or sectoral level. Questions about the allocation of aid to resource-rich countries or particular sectors such as infrastructure development are paramount, while the local or regional dimension is neglected.[6]

The regional dimension of Sino-African development cooperation has also barely been noted by official Chinese sources, as the support for Africa is embedded in the state-centric concept of South-South cooperation based on the principles of mutual benefits, reciprocity and complementary achieved through agreements between single nation states. While the conclusion of these agreements is often staged in the multilateral framework of FOCAC, they have a strictly bilateral character. The disregard for regional organizations, which are not included in most of Beijing’s major undertakings in Africa, is a certain contradiction to the Chinese rhetoric regarding multilateral partnerships and promises of support for regional initiatives. Despite the dominance of the bilateral level, there is also a regional dynamic to Sino-African development cooperation.

The Regional Dimension of China’s Aid to Africa

Compared to the intensity of bilateral development promotion, China’s activities on a regional level are far less pronounced. While it is important to note that bilateral development initiatives without any direct link to a regional development strategy can have a positive effect beyond national borders, and from the Chinese side, country-based projects like a container terminal are often put in a regional context (Interview with IWAAS scholar, Beijing 2016), these secondary effects are not examined further. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the effects of the interregional cooperation on the regional development and integration process. Bilateral projects

6 A noteworthy exception is Dreher et al. (2016), who also included the subnational effects of China’s development cooperation.

without any coordination through NEPAD, the AU or one of the RECs create no spill-over effect on other forms of regional cooperation. The state-centric character of these projects does not contribute to an intraregional habitus that could lead to further regional cooperation in different settings. A direct linkage to a regional body is thus necessary for Chinese aid projects to have a development effect that transcends the national sphere.

China and NEPAD

In the Addis Ababa Action Plan from 2003, China linked its development strategy for Africa with the priority areas outlined in the NEPAD Strategic Framework adopted the previous year by the AU. China referred to a broad range of issues, including infrastructure development, the prevention and treatment of communicable and infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis), human resources development and agriculture. This initial support for the NEPAD Agenda was quickly replaced by a certain reluctance towards NEPAD, which was expressed in China’s African Policy from 2006:

> China will work with African countries within the framework of the Forum to explore new ways to enhance mutual political trust, promote the comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation, further improve the mechanism of the forum, and try to find the best way for furthering cooperation between the Forum and the NEPAD (China’s African Policy, 2006).

Moreover, the Beijing Declaration from the third FOCAC summit published in the same year linked the role of NEPAD mainly with China’s bilateral assistance.

The core principle of NEPAD, the African solution for African problems, corresponds with China’s foreign policy rationale and ideological framework. By strengthening the African ownership of the continent’s development strategy and the transfer of decision-making power to the recipient countries, the position of African actors and interests towards traditional donors has been improved.

From a Chinese perspective, this bolsters the autonomy of the African states and facilitates the development of global multipolar decision-making structures. Many areas of the NEPAD agenda, such as agriculture, infrastructure and human-resource development are already compatible with China’s own development plans for Africa and do not require a restructuring of China’s investment strategy. Beyond the rhetoric of African ownership, Taylor (2010, 62) pictured the NEPAD process as deeply rooted in a neoliberal worldview aimed at opening up and liberalizing African markets. China, which has followed a similar approach to integrating into the global economy for the last thirty years, has no difficulty in adapting to this concept.

China also interprets its bilateral support in sectors that relate to NEPAD, such as infrastructure development, as a direct contribution to the NEPAD agenda, regardless of its regional impact (King, 2006, 9). But China has also supported some genuinely regional projects such as the NEPAD Nurses and Midwives Post-Graduate Training Program, although the 2 million US$ provided for this program was an insignificant share of China's total development budget.[7] Despite its low financial contribution, the rhetorical support for NEPAD improved again after the reserved proclamations in China's African policy of 2006.

> China actively engaged in cooperation with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and sub-regional organizations of Africa. NEPAD training programs with Chinese funds progressed smoothly in some African countries (…) (FOCAC Follow Up, 2009).

However, by the FOCAC summit of 2009 in Sharm-el-Sheikh, the new momentum of China's regional approach had already faded, as both sides failed to translate the will to cooperate into tangible projects. China continued to pledge its support for NEPAD but did not make any commitments in terms of projects or financing. After a restructuring of NEPAD in 2010, the African Union and China tried to reinstall NEPAD as an essential actor in the Sino-African development cooperation.

> The two sides highlighted the important role of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in promoting African development and integration and applauded the cooperation between FOCAC and NEPAD. The Chinese side will increase exchanges and expand cooperation with the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency in a joint effort to promote economic and social development and regional economic integration in Africa (Beijing Action Plan, 2012, 2.5.7).

Despite the commitment of China at the 2012 FOCAC summit to increase its support of NEPAD in the following three years, the cooperation was limited to consultations about potential areas of future cooperation, the instalment of a Chinese mission to NEPAD and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture[8] (Interview with NEPAD official, Midrand 2017). At the 2015 FOCAC summit in Johannesburg, some concrete measures to support NEPAD, especially in the agricultural sector, were agreed upon.[9]

7 http://china.aiddata.org/projects/1773; NEPAD (2012, 25).

8 http://www.nepad.org/content/nepad-agency-signs-mou-china-agree-strengthen-cooperation-agriculture-and-rural.

9 The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) was also mentioned in the Beijing Action Plan 2012–2015 but only with regard to bilateral cooperation

China pledged its support for the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) a continental policy framework initiated by NEPAD in 2003 to achieve agricultural transformation and food security.[10] While agriculture development has been a focal point of China's African engagement since the 1970s and has gained even more importance during the new phase of Sino-African cooperation since the beginning of the new millennium, China has been hesitant to support the CAADP program, although it can be regarded as one of the more successful initiatives of NEPAD (Buckley, 2013, 5; Nnadozie, 2012, 6). China's passive stance toward the CAADP was, on the one hand, caused by the Chinese perception of heavy Western influence on the program. On the other hand, the funding conditions produced scepticism about the capacity of NEPAD and the regional actors in general (Knaepen, 2014). Despite these reservations, the agricultural sector, which is strongly associated with national projects and national ownership, is a good starting point for Beijing to link its bilateral cooperation with a regional development strategy. In contrast to large-scale regional infrastructure projects, Beijing can split its activities between several smaller projects with manageable costs and liable national stakeholders, avoiding the risk of the lack of guarantees for investment protection associated with multilateral projects under the NEPAD framework. When regional organizations act as the responsible agency and are in charge of the implementation of regional projects, their accountability for deviations in the schedule or in the budget is limited, as they do not dispose of the same financial capabilities as states. To minimize the risk of loss, in the past, China had already tried to split regional infrastructure projects into national subprojects to create distinctive responsibilities on the part of the participating African governments (Interview with NEPAD official, Midrand 2016). The bilateral preference of China also results from the lack of comprehensive coordination between the African states, the RECs and the African Union/NEPAD. The current dynamic of Sino-African cooperation, however, gives some leverage to the AU to establish itself as the main facilitator for that dialogue and to further the regional scope of the partnership. Compared to its sub-regional counterparts, the AU has enough actor capacity and sufficient support from its member states to become the political hub for Sino-African cooperation. NEPAD, as the technical body for regional development, offers a framework to integrate China in a holistic strategy for the whole continent and already has some successful projects to offer in sectors such as agriculture that are compatible with China's development priorities. At least on a rhetoric level, China acknowledges the importance of NEPAD for regional development and continues to voice its support but after various half-hearted attempts at reform and several relaunches of the

(Beijing Action Plan 2012; 4.1.3).

10 http://www.nepad.org/programme/comprehensive-africa-agriculture-development-programme-caadp.

NEPAD program, China has become more circumspect in its interaction with the agency. NEPAD suffers from insufficient financing and a shortage of staff, paired with organizational deficits and an unclear status in the AU structure. China, reminiscent of its traditional passivity in internal affairs, has not limited its support for regional development to the official regional development program, but has also supported other projects of the AU with a regional focus.

China's development assistance to the African Union

China is financing various programs to develop human resources, infrastructure development and health care that are directly anchored within the organizational core of the African Union structure and are directly competing with NEPAD. At the beginning of 2015, China and the AU signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the expansion of a continental transport network that envisions high-speed railway lines and road and air connections between the African capitals to boost Africa's industrialization.[11] The framework encompasses several intermediate steps, such as the implementation of a central planning agency within the AUC, and integrates existing projects like the Integrated High Speed Train Network, a flagship project of the AU Agenda 2063. Even though China provided no financial assurances, the Head of the Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, declared that the MoU was "[…] the most substantive project the AU has ever signed with a partner" (JPAS, 2015, 190) and was the beginning of a new era of AU-China cooperation.[12] Some of this enthusiasm was shared by the Chinese Vice-Foreign Secretary Zhang Ming, who declared at the signing ceremony: "This is the document of the century (...) the aviation agreement marks a new area for cooperation between the AU and China" (JPAS, 2015, 190). Part of this project is also a "Five Year Action Plan" (2016–20), which is a typical element of China's domestic development strategy (AU Handbook, 2018, 19).

Another project in which the AU and China cooperate and that has become a showcase for this partnership is the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Under the impression of the partially chaotic international coordination during the Ebola crisis in West Africa, in 2013, the AU announced the establishment of its own supra-regional center for the control of epidemic diseases and for the coordination of future communication between the African continent and international resources (Sivakumar, 2017). While international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) or the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control were sceptical and did not offer any substantial aid, China and the United States Center for Disease Control (USCDC) pledged financial and technical assistance to facilitate the founding of an African CDC (Butler, 2015). In

11 https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20161010-2.

12 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2015-01/27/c_127428344.htm.

September 2015, President Xi announced, during a visit to the US, China's willingness to support the Centre and formalized this pledge two months later at the 2015 FOCAC Johannesburg summit.

> The Chinese side will support the building of an African Union Disease Control Centre and regional medical research centres, reinforce laboratory and diagnostic capacities and encourage the African Union Commission to play a leading role as the custodian of Africa's continental initiatives in the health sector (FOCAC Johannesburg Action Plan, 2015).

China supported the initial stage of the AU CDC with a direct financial contribution of 2 Million US$, about a third of the overall budget of the organization, and delivered technical and logistic expertise[13] (Butler, 2015). In an agreement between the deputy chair of the AUC, Erastus Mwencha, and Zhang Xiangchen, the Vice Minister of Economic Affairs of the PRC in June 2016, China promised to expedite the construction and equipping of the African CDC and offered long-term support for the continuous operation of the Centre.[14] One year later, in 2017, the Chinese Foreign Secretary, Wang Yi, declared the extension of the AU CDC to one of the five top priorities in China's cooperation with the AU.[15] In February 2018, John Nkengasong, Director of the CDC, participated in a high-level visit to Beijing and secured further support from China, with a total volume of 500 Million RMB.[16]

The case of the CDC shows the potential but also the risks for the African Union in approaching China to finance its development-related projects. While China quickly agreed to support the construction of the CDC, it initially made no promises of long-term support. After the CDC evolved into one of the rather successful projects of the AU, China increased its assistance and used it as one of the showcase projects of its partnership with the AU. Even with this exalted position, China's financial contribution has a singular character linked to special occasions like a FOCAC summit or high-level visits. To date, there has been no institutionalized long-term cooperation with the relevant Chinese actors, and the support is based on China's goodwill rather than on a mutual strategy.

13 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201606/20160601345462.shtml9.

14 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/21/c_135454535.htm.

15 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1472730.shtml.

16 https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180209/communiqu%C3%A9-visit-african-union-commission-chairperson-peoples-republic-china.

The Regionalization of China's Development Policy

Most of China's investments in Africa are not or are only poorly integrated in regional development schemes. In particular, the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Maputo-, Benguela-, Sambesi-transport corridor, which are conducted under the authority of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and NEPAD, have been hampered by the national character of China's contribution to these regional initiatives. In addition, the construction of electricity grids, telecommunication infrastructure and port facilities with regional importance have been impeded by the coordination deficits between national African actors, China, NEPAD and the Regional Economic Communities (Interview with NEPAD official, Midrand 2016). While the lack of communication and coordination between the different African actors is not limited to projects with Chinese involvement, the scale of China's activities in infrastructure development make this issue palpable. Better coordination of these projects through the relevant regional authorities would create a regulative framework for a better allocation of resources from China and increase their regional impact. A stronger regional agency could help to mobilize other investors and to integrate China's infrastructure investments in traditional financing mechanisms such as the Africa Infrastructure Facility, the African Development Bank or the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).

In addition to hard-infrastructure projects, the development of human resources and technical and administrative capacity is another area of China's ongoing support to the AU and NEPAD (King 2010). For a long time, China's contribution to human resource development was limited to the training and deployment of personnel for the health sector. In the last decade, several new instruments for capacity building, such as the African Human Resources Development Fund, which provides scholarships to African students to study in China, have been implemented.

While the above-mentioned programs in areas such as infrastructure, health care and human resources are merely a regionalization of Beijing's bilateral development cooperation, there are also some areas that have a distinctly regional connotation. On the one hand, trilateral development cooperation with the EU and the USA, whereby, in the case of the EU, the first steps for a joint approach under the NEPAD framework have been taken; further, the CDC might be a steppingstone for closer cooperation between Washington and Beijing (Kuhn and Kolowa 2016, 69). Another issue that China has discussed in an interregional context but has excluded from its bilateral dialogues is human rights (Webster, 2013, 649). The Chinese government, which does not share the conceptual view regarding the definition of human rights and rejects conditionality as an iniquitous tool of former colonial powers, has criticized the approach of Western donors linking human rights with development cooperation.

China has uncoupled its African engagement from the issue of human rights, and the debate about China's impact in this area has largely been held in the African and Western discourse (Shaw, 2011, 23). While China has made no effort to join the debate on a bilateral level or within the international community, in 2016, the Foreign Ministry of the PRC co-chaired a consultative meeting together with the AUC and various African representatives to "exchange views on respective views and works on human rights, multilateral work on human rights and human rights technical cooperation."[17] The two sides also agreed to establish a regular consultation mechanism for human rights.

The inclusion and institutionalization of human rights in the dialogue with the African Union is a reaction to growing international and African criticism that China is a stabilizing factor for regimes that are violating international norms. China, which has dealt with many regimes shunned by other partners, ignored these accusations for many years, referring to a different view on human rights, the principal of non-interference or a "development first" paradigm. While a human rights discussion on a bilateral level would stress its relationship with countries such as Sudan or Zimbabwe, the AU offers more neutral surroundings. Through the establishment of an interregional human rights forum, China can deflect international and African criticism, and enunciate its own interpretation of human rights in a multilateral setting.

Conclusion

Fundraising for regional development projects may be the policy field in which the African Union shows its most efficient and united dimension. The reason for this camaraderie between the diverse groups of actors involved stems from a functionalist logic aimed at increasing the welfare effect of external investments. The simultaneous preference of the different regional and national actors for novel regulative frameworks that transcend national limitations serves to maximize the potential profits. The expected benefit of regional development cooperation is an incentive for the AU member states to engage in internal cooperation, which can accelerate consensus-building. While mutual development might be an easier setting for regional cooperation than conflict-laden topics such as tariffs or security, the AU still has no unified position or common strategy towards China. NEPAD cannot live up to its claim to be the leading regional development agency, and although it has been acknowledged by China, it has failed to shift China's development focus to a regional level. NEPAD, which was constructed as a framework for Western donors, has not come to terms with China's rising importance for development cooperation, and it has no coherent strategy to coordinate or divert China's bilateral aid.

In the structure of NEPAD, there is no institutionalized position for dealing with China's development activities or for communicating with the relevant actors in

17 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1355692.shtml.

Beijing. While there are infrequent talks between representatives of both sides tackling various topics, NEPAD has no follow-up mechanism to develop concrete initiatives or specify priority areas for China's regional activities. NEPAD regards China as an important partner with a potentially positive impact for regional development in Africa, but lacks the expertise and structure to actively incorporate China's diverse activities in its regional framing (Interview with NEPAD official, Midrand 2016). China is using the NEPAD agenda as a compass and legitimating factor for its development strategy but does not give much credit to its organizational capacities. China has regionalized some aspects of its formerly strictly bilateral development assistance, which in some areas, has increased the cooperation between the national and regional actors in Africa but has had little impact on the capacity of supranational structures. China's contribution to regional development is limited to sporadic support for individual projects and the rhetoric appraisal of NEPAD in its strategic documents and the FOCAC declarations. Parallel to NEPAD, the AUC has become the second regional development partner for China, challenging the already weak position of NEPAD. The AUC utilizes its established channels with Beijing to raise funds for its own development projects. These projects are intrinsic initiatives from inside the African Union's Commission and are not the result of an intraregional consultation between national actors. By diverting China's regional activities from Midrand to Addis Ababa, the AUC can add to its institutional capacity and strengthen its profile as a reliable partner for China, undermining NEPADS's position and emancipating itself from the AU member states.

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6

Reimagining Engagement and Realigning Priorities: Contrasting Indian and Chinese Approaches to Africa

Veda Vaidyanathan

With both India and China reengaging with historical and civilizational partners in Africa by utilizing new approaches and instruments in a fast-evolving geopolitical context, this chapter will try reimagining the contours of these relations using the Complex Interdependence theory. It will delve into the instruments and language the Indian and Chinese state are currently using to craft their policies toward Africa including the India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) and the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The chapter will then narrow focus and examine Indian and Chinese sub-national actors across sectors that are considered their forte: Chinese actors in infrastructure and Indian in healthcare. Adding another perspective to the analysis, this chapter will then highlight stories of Indian and Chinese individuals based in Africa. The attempt is to peel the layers of these engagements from a theoretical and supranational perspective to a national, sub-national outlook down to an individual frame of reference.

Introduction

The continent of Africa, replete with natural and human resources, is propitiously well endowed to pioneer an enviable growth story. It is currently at a historic moment in its transition, deftly moving away from its long standing image of a region in chaos and conflict to one of incredible potential and promise. Given that an emerging Africa houses prospects for a mutually beneficial economic intercourse, Asian powers like China and India have been reengaging countries with vaguely similar semantics and distinct approaches, based on multiple strategic realities.

While the Indian and Chinese involvement in the African continent has areas of convergences, the approach of each country varies entirely. Although both Asian powers have had civilization links with Africa, China has been more enterprising in building and maintaining contemporary relations with several African nations. It has championed itself as a fellow developing nation that is “ready to share with

African countries the practices and experience of reform and opening-up" (Beijing Action Plan 2019–2021, 2018). Interestingly, it is also one of the highest providers of aid and assistance to several African nations. The fact that this comes with just one major string attached (adhering to the One-China policy) makes it much more attractive than Western aid, which is perceived to be riddled with conditionalities.

Since 2009 China has become the largest trading partner of many African nations. In 2018 bilateral trade between China and Africa was valued at $204.19 billion and between January–March 2019 the trade volume was $47.61 billion (Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China, 2019). China is also the largest investor in terms of total capital ($72,235 million), investing more than twice the dollar amount of France ($34,172 million) or the US ($30,855 million), with 259 active projects that have generated 137,028 jobs thus far (EY Attractiveness Program Africa, 2019). China also has a huge diplomatic presence across the continent with embassies in over 50 countries and over 50 Confucius institutes in 33 African countries (King, 2018). For the past few decades most Chinese Heads of State as well as senior members of the party always travel to Africa for their first overseas state visit—a practice that is loaded with symbolism. The most recent of which was President Xi Jinping, whose maiden foreign trip as China's head of state was to South Africa, Tanzania and the Republic of Congo.

India's Africa policy on the other hand, has oscillated between passive and reluctantly reactive at best. Strategic apathy toward the continent was obvious on many fronts. The narrative of India's contemporary relationship with Africa is dominated by the historicity of their interactions—the century-old trade partnerships, socio-cultural linkages built by a thriving diaspora, nationalist movements during the Nehruvian era that supported anti-imperial struggles, and shifting geopolitical tides with the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). Beyond this rhetoric, what kept driving this relationship forward was the acquisition of critical assets by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) looking to diversify the energy basket away from West Asian nations and other commercial ventures by SMEs and MNCs.

However, in the past few years, a combination of factors has led to an infusion of energy in this otherwise jaded relationship. Total trade between India and Africa has also increased in recent past to $62.66 billion for 2017–18 while cumulative investments were valued at $54 billion, making it the 5th largest investor in the continent (Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, 2019). Additionally, Indian Lines of Credit (LoC's) has implemented 189 projects in 42 countries amounting to $11.4 billion (Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, 2019). Years of diplomatic neglect of the continent is being addressed with the top echelons of Indian leadership regularly visiting Africa. Most notably, President Kovind's first overseas visit since taking office was to Djibouti and Ethiopia in October 2017. He visited Madagascar and Mauritius in 2018 and Benin, Gambia and Guinea in 2019 (Mishra, 2019). Similarly, when Prime Minister Modi stopped by Mozambique during his

four-nation tour of Africa, he was the first Indian PM in 34 years to visit the country (Prime Ministers Office, 2016). In 2018 during his three nation tour of Africa he was the first Indian head of state to ever visit Rwanda and his visit to Uganda was the first bilateral visit by a PM since 1997 (The Indian Express, 2018). In a speech at the Ugandan Parliament PM Modi disclosed ten guiding principles for India-Africa relations and announced plans to open 18 embassies in Africa in addition to the 29 already present (Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, 2019), both indicative of renewed enthusiasm in the relationship.

With both India and China reengaging with historical and civilizational partners in Africa by utilizing new approaches and instruments in a fast evolving geopolitical context, this chapter will try reimagining the contours of these relations using the Complex Interdependence theory. This chapter will then delve into the instruments and language the Indian and Chinese state are using to craft their policies toward Africa including the India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) and the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). It will then narrow focus and examine Indian and Chinese sub-national actors across sectors that are considered their forte: Chinese actors in infrastructure and Indian in healthcare. Adding another perspective to the analysis, this chapter will then highlight stories of Indian and Chinese individuals based in Africa. The attempt is to peel the layers of these engagements from a theoretical and supranational perspective to a national, sub-national outlook down to an individual frame of reference.

Reimagining Engagement with Complex Interdependence Theory

Sino-Indian interactions in Africa are currently taking place at a historic moment in each region's transition. It can be argued that for the first time in the continent's history, powers that aren't considered traditional, that have thus far been political allies, are now presenting themselves as viable partners in economic development. As the interactions between these myriad actors become increasingly interlinked and co-dependent it is interesting to utilize the theory of Complex Interdependence to understand these dynamic themes. The theory is especially apt considering that it was brought forth by Koehane and Nye at a time when the realist approaches dominated the discourse in the post-world-war era but was unable to fully comprehend the shifts in global realities.

When traditional rationalizations of changes in geopolitics becomes inadequate, Keohane and Nye argued that there is a need to find new models that can provide better explanations (Keohane and Nye, 2001). Sino-Indian overtures in Africa is redefining development cooperation and they are utilizing vocabulary that stresses on the ethos of partnership. This therefore calls for a new analytical framework that helps contextualize fast changing realities on the ground to reimagine the nature and potential of these relationships.

The Theory of Complex Interdependence has three main characteristics, which when contrasted with the arguments put forth in this chapter, presents an interesting parallel. The first is that it acknowledges that there are several actors or channels that connect societies. These include formal bilateral ties between government representatives and their respective foreign office representatives but also other channels which are categorized as interstate; trans-governmental and transnational. This is true in the case of Sino-Indian relations with countries of Africa. As this chapter highlights, the relations between these entities are in no measure limited to interstate relations. Although the governments both on the national and state/provincial level interact with their counterparts in Africa, there are several other players, in different levels, that dominate and drive the relationship forward. Multinational companies, both public and private, non-governmental organizations and individuals.

The second characteristic is that there is an "absence of hierarchy among issues" which is to say that military and security issues don't always dominate the agenda. With different transnational and trans-governmental actors playing a part, there will be a variety of goals to be achieved and with each actor pursuing their own concerns, it will be difficult to have just one state dictated strategy. In the case of both India and China, although the engagement began on a governmental level, with both countries extending their support to the fight against imperialism and oppression to various African nations, their respective SOEs were encouraged to explore the untapped markets in Africa. Eventually the private sector in both Asian countries began to pursue a more economic agenda in the continent.

The third main characteristic is that when complex interdependence prevails, military force or the threat of it will not continue to be the tool of choice for solving issues. According to them "the negligible use of force leads us to expect states to rely more on other instruments in order to wield power" (Keohane and Nye, 2001). This is especially apparent in the case of China; even in the face of criticism, the Chinese state had been on the charm offensive asking for more integration with local societies and finding innovative ways to improve the image of China in the continent.

Another significant contribution of the Complex Interdependence theory is that it predicts that International Organizations will play a very different and important role in geopolitics. Not only do they provide weaker states to share a platform with more powerful ones, but it also helps set international agenda and promotes the formation of coalitions and political initiatives. Furthermore, the role of International institutions in political bargaining is very crucial. This is very clear in the case of the African Union (AU). It can be argued that the geopolitical clout of the AU surpasses that of some of its members. Scholars in New Delhi and Beijing both highlight the importance of political support of the African nations in platforms such as the United Nations. Both the Asian powers have also been engaging in Institution building with respect to Africa. Headed by the IAFS and the FOCAC, both countries have engaged nations bilaterally as well as multilaterally through the AU. Although some are skeptical over the success of the AU, as not many nations would forgo national interest over collective interest, several African scholars remain optimistic about the future role of the African Union.

This system of interdependence also means that actions of one actor which often has a profound impact on the other, is not necessarily driven by an altruistic rationale but often to further common interest. As relations between actors from India and China and those from Africa become increasingly layered, interconnected and complex, there is an increased risk of being more vulnerable to each other's policies or actions.

Similarly, even though the sectors of engagement have grown considerably, hydrocarbon energy and minerals still form a critical part of Sino-Indian engagement in Africa. Scholars argue that the African agency, especially in resource rich nations need to leverage their resources to enhance development cooperation and negotiate better deals. Keohane and Nye also contend that asymmetries of reliance exists and that less dependent actors can use the relationship as a leverage while bargaining terms. This is probably one of the oft-quoted challenges of Africa's interaction with the Asian actors—the fact that there is a power asymmetry with trade deficits usually being one sided.

Moreover, with a rich Indian diaspora in several African countries, especially in East Africa and increasing number of Chinese citizens living in the continent in addition to a wave of migrants from both countries, these local communities and societies are mingling in a way that they haven't before. These new forms of interconnectedness that transcends governments and institutions will call for a new form of engagement. Thus, reimagining Sino-Indian engagement with states in Africa through the prism of Complex Interdependence theory in many ways helps to look beyond the "neo-colonial" narratives or realist frameworks and provides an alternate point of view to examine these interactions.

Interactions Between Governments: Realigning Priorities and Crafting Narratives

Although relationships between India, China and countries in Africa were built under the rubric of South-South cooperation, it would not be inaccurate to argue that in the past few decades, countries in Africa have not been foreign policy priorities for New Delhi or Beijing. However, close examination of the literature and joint statements emanating from the multiple IAFS and the FOCAC indicate that Africa is becoming an increasingly important actor in their foreign policy formulations. The collective clout that African nations enjoy is being leveraged to identify and pursue common priorities pertaining to the global governance structures but also to further both New Delhi's and Beijing's larger geopolitical ambitions.

Representation in the UNSC in the case of India was brought forth in the joint statement from the third IAFS conducted in 2015 which stated that countries in Africa and India

> continue to be excluded from appropriate representation in the institutions of global governance that were designed for an era since long past. We demand urgent collective action to put in place more democratic global governance structures… (India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation, 2015).

The Belt and Road Initiative and Africa's role in advancing it, found liberal mention in the FOCAC document that was brought out in 2018. It said:

> The two sides believe that Africa is an important partner in Belt and Road cooperation, and pledge to leverage the strengths of the Forum and support China and Africa in jointly building the Belt and Road (Beijing Action Plan 2019–2021, 2018).

Their approach to and interactions with several African countries are also indicative of their evolving developmental strategies, priorities and instruments modeled to be different from Western approaches. The 2018 FOCAC document stated that

> China supports African countries in independently exploring development paths suited to their national conditions, and supports their efforts in formulating national development strategies, enhancing capacity building and improving state governance…and enhance coordination of each other's development philosophies and ideas along the progress of China-Africa cooperation (Beijing Action Plan 2019–2021, 2018).

This emphasis on enhancing individual development philosophies borders on the idea of non interference in internal affairs, a principle underscored in India-Africa relations as well and is a conscious step away from what is considered conditionality ridden engagement from Western countries.

Perhaps as a counter to the charges of neocolonialism and short sighted resource seeking gains that both New Delhi and Beijing have been accused of, literature from both IAFS and FOCAC highlight the civilizational, historical relations between actors. For instance, the 2015 IAFS document, states that

> the peoples of Africa and India have known each other and traded across the Indian Ocean for millennia. Our shared common experience of a colonial past and the solidarity of our resistance to it, have cemented our common yearning for a more just and fair international political and economic order in an increasingly globalized world (India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation, 2015).

Additionally, both Asian actors also underscore principles of equality, mutual benefit highlighting the "win-win" ethos of their engagements—an aspiration that many would argue is largely limited to the theoretical domain.

Interestingly these interactions have transcended a state-to-state relationship to include sub-national actors. Chinese provinces and Indian states are interacting independently with African counterparts just as civil society organizations, educational institutions and hospitals are also setting up linkages across the region. While SOEs from both Asian countries have a tremendous footprint across the continent, entrepreneurs with Small and Medium scale private industries are also active across sectors including agriculture, manufacturing, financial services, technology, hospitality and so on.

Sectors of Strength: Indian and Chinese Sub-national Actors

To ascertain whether India and China are informing the Africa growth story, it is vital to examine specific areas where their strengths are being leveraged. One of the major components of China's "alternative development model" with Chinese characteristics is its emphasis on and resources spent on building infrastructure—schools, universities, government buildings, rail networks, hydropower plants and highways. The infrastructure sector is perhaps the most interesting aspect of this relationship, and a strong variable to examine China's approach to creating a global footprint. Estimates point out that China has built over 3000 largely critical, infrastructure projects (Schneidman and Wiegert, 2018) while official data shows that China has built more than 5000 km of roads and railways in Africa and has trained 160,000 local people via its projects (Xinhua, 2017). However, a different point of view suggests that with the phenomenal rise in Chinese construction firms domestically, Africa has been a strategic outlet for exporting their overcapacity and consequently expanding their influence in the continent.

While SOEs like China Communications Construction Company Ltd. (CCCC) or the China Merchants Group among others are dominating the sector, private companies smaller in scale such as China Wu Yi Co. Ltd are also winning contracts across the region. However, China's foray into African infrastructure sector is by no means nascent; the TAZARA railway built between 1970–75 was a turnkey project supported and financed from China that extended from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Zambia's Central province. The construction of the TAZARA railway by the Chinese, after Western donors refused to fund the project, was China's single largest foreign-aid project and is now viewed as a testimony of China's long-standing commitment to the continent.

Since then, Chinese construction companies have been active in Zambia, Tanzania and beyond, contributing to their infrastructure development drive with projects such as expansion of Dar es Salaam port and Zambia international airport. Kenya, on the other hand, has housed some of the most high-profile projects in recent times such as the $4 billion Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway named "Madaraka Express." Chinese officials have termed this railway the "early harvest out-come of the Belt and Road Initiative" while Kenyan leaders attribute it to

Image 1: Mombasa Terminus

Source: Author, October 2018.

"accelerating African industrialization" (Pan and Morangi, 2017).

The narrative around the physical infrastructure built by Chinese companies in Africa sway from being an exercise in altruism, a diplomatic instrument used to foster political allies, an economic opportunity for Chinese construction firms to being viewed as a tool of exerting power and extending China's realm of influence. Several scholars argue that Beijing is positively contributing to addressing Africa's humongous infrastructure gap that is estimated to require massive investments to the tune of USD 130–170 billion (African Development Bank, 2018).

However, African scholars remain divided on the debt burden these infrastructure projects place on economies while some others highlight the transformational effect it has had on local populations. As one Kenyan economist argued:

> Debt is good. Debt is not the problem. Mismanagement of it is (Personal Interview, 2018).

Image 2: The 60,000 seater Chinese-built "National Heroes Stadium" in Lusaka, Zambia

Source: Author, September 2019.

This rather optimistic perspective is indicative of the gradual shift in the way China is perceived in the continent. Despite a range of criticism leveled against Chinese firms and violence targeting Chinese managers, Afrobarometer's recent survey of 36 countries showed that Africans rank the United States followed by China as a preferred development model for their own countries (Lekorwe et al., 2016). This shift in perception is by no means abrupt; Africa has been on China's foreign policy radar and its mode of interactions has altered the geopolitics of the region in many ways.

Similarly, one of the major components of India's engagement with the continent is in the health sector (Vaidyanathan, 2019). The emphasis on health in the India-Africa engagement is critical as Africa currently is host to 11% of the world's population, but bears 24% of the global disease burden with less than 1% of global health expenditure and only 3% of the world's healthcare workers (International Finance Corporation, n.d).

While the challenges in the health sector are daunting, estimations that Africa's pharmaceutical market will be worth between $40 billion–$65 billion by 2020 (Holt et al., 2015), implies phenomenal potential for actors in the Indian health industry.

Image 3: Author visiting the plant of an Indian pharmaceutical manufacturer in Gelan, Ethiopia, September 2017

Source: Author, September 2017.

India's health diplomacy in Africa is a confluence of both State led initiatives such as Team-9, Focus Africa and the Pan Africa e-network to provide aid and technical assistance, as well as sub-national actors who are actively exporting low cost generics, building health infrastructure, and hosting African medical tourists in India. The government of India has also created a $10 million India-Africa health fund, which aims to provide affordable medicines for diseases while creating opportunities for collaboration in research, building capacity in health systems with Indian expertise and extending 50,000 scholarships to African students to attend Indian universities, among other provisions (Government of India, 2017b). Moreover, private hospitals in India are running, hospitals and other health care facilities in several African countries including Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Rwanda, Mozambique among others.

India-Africa cooperation in health is unique given that India also bears a heavy disease burden (ranking 127 out of 188 countries in 2016) and has problematic health delivery systems (Pai, 2017). It also spends relatively marginal amounts on the health sector (1.5% of GDP as compared to the global average of 6%) and even less on research and innovation (0.88% of GDP) (Government of India, 2017a). However, India has a vibrant private healthcare industry, a booming pharmaceutical manufacturing base and a growing number of highly qualified medical professionals.

However, just as the Chinese debt-inducing mega projects have garnered considerable criticisms, a few Indian pharmaceutical manufactures have also been called out for the substandard quality of products. The potential of these interactions need to be measured against the pushback. Nevertheless, China's investments in the infrastructure sector in Africa is unprecedented and has the potential to jump start development in the region just as Indian engagement in African health could have positive spill over effects.

African experts have been vocal about actors like India and China can play in creating jobs in Africa and the critical role they can play in furthering African development. Another interesting phenomenon has been countries coming together to address specific challenges in Africa. For instance, India and Japan are exploring ways of leveraging their strengths and finding scope for collaborations with projects such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). Therefore, it would not be far-fetched to imagine that there are areas where India and China can find shared interests with other players and work together to provide more choices to their African counterparts.

In Search of Opportunities: The Indian Farmer and the Chinese Contractor

"Africa was a dream for me," explained an interviewee from Coorg, a rural district in the South West of India (Telephonic Interview, 2018). After having studied horticulture and plantation management in university, he managed estates in the Annamalai hills, floriculture businesses in Bangalore, Dubai and Kenya before he arrived in Ethiopia. In a few years, he went from manager to owner when a farm was put up for sale. He bought the 6 hectare farm located around 200 kilometers from Addis and demolished everything that existed. He proceeded to build the structures from ground up and today the 4 hectares produce cut roses, 120–125 stems pre square meter for markets from Africa, Asia, Europe and West Asia while the next 2 hectares will be in production by next year.

All of the inputs for the farm including fertilizers are sourced from importers locally and it employees around 120 locals. While most of the labor force is from adjacent villages, some come from as far as 150 kilometers. "Finding labor is not a problem, people come with friends and family by word of mouth. There are always a few people outside the gates of the farm looking for work." His move to Africa was fueled by a curious mix of a dip in the plantation sector in India and countries like Ethiopia opening up to foreign investors. A constant stream of agriculturists from India traveling to countries in Africa, looking for large tracts of virgin lands at nominal prices made the geography oddly familiar to new age migrants. "In the late 80's some of my seniors and friends left Coorg to buy plantations in Tanzania and Kenya and did very well. Africa was considered the land of opportunity."

The Chinese contractors working in Nairobi and Dar seem to favor African geographies for the "good life." Employed in SOEs flushed with funds, working on groundbreaking mega projects a tenure in Africa not only boosts professional prospects within the company, but allows them a standard of living they cant have in China. "I have a driver, a maid and a cook in my house here," explained one respondent (Personal Interview, 2018). "I eat freshly cooked food, have my clothes washed and ironed and am chauffeured to work everyday. The office has cooks from China so I don't miss home food." "How about family, are they with you?" He explains that they are not, he goes home once a year to meet his wife and infant son. Social life for an expat is pretty good he says, "lots of young interns from China come to work in companies here." Even among the Chinese respondents, there is a range—those that have been working in the continent for decades now—and the others who just arrived. One interviewee admitted that he learnt English after he came to Africa in the early 2000's, originally from Fujian, his accent is deeply Kenyan, "I can never live in China," he claims "too noisy, too many people. I like it here."

The office premises of a Chinese SOEs includes an indoor pool table, video game parlour, karaoke stations and lush gardens. Children's bicycles are strewn over the large portico and Kenyan staff and drying clothes on a line. The interviewees young family has joined him from China. "It's a good life here" he says "the air is clean—not like Beijing. But my daughter has to go back to China soon—she only speaks in Swahili and acts like a little African child, dancing like they do." For contractors and engineers working in China's SOEs, a stint in Africa helps their profile when they return to the mainland. "It looks good when it comes to promotions if you have some experience in Africa, but it is very frustrating to work here—everything happens so slowly compared to China."

The Indian farmer and the Chinese contractor both face the African conundrum—the opportunity is real but so are the challenges. "If you ask me, Africa is the future," an Indian entrepreneur explains while discussing the incentives the host government has in place for potential investors including 40 year extendable leases, where a square meter of land costs 10–20 USD. A short while later while listing out the challenges—the hidden costs of building water reservoirs, roads, high electricity interruptions, high labor turn over, low productivity of workforce, security fears and political instability and rioting on the streets—he adds as an afterthought "if someone is willing to buy this project from me, I'll sell it and take the afternoon flight back to India." In the floriculture sector, where the produce is stored in a cold room in the farm, transported on a cold truck to the airport, timing is imperative. "In this business, time is money. 100 boxes of roses cost 4500 dollars. If the roads are blocked and my truck cannot get to the airport, the losses are staggering—I've lost a lot in the past three years."

However, the challenges, as daunting as they are, don't seem to be an active deterrent, there is hope that the changes in local politics will reflect well on the business environment. "There are reforms underway, it's now time to wait and watch." The continents proximity to Indian shores, popularity of English as a working language and welcoming host governments means that it remains a favored destination for Indian entrepreneurs.

However, for Chinese interviewees working in smaller enterprises and private companies the reality was quite different. Most stay on project sites, office spaces and homes in temporarily eructed structures. "This is one of the ways we reduce costs," explained a project manager as we had lunch with the workers on site—prepared by Chinese cooks, and served by African staff. Once the project is completed these temporary townships are given to the local villages who convert them into schools or houses. "It is part of our CSR activities," explains a respondent, handing over a box of freshly baked mooncake. Most African stakeholders interviewed spoke at length about the long work hours, the work ethic and diligence of the Chinese employees. "There is no difference between working here and working in China", says a manager of a private Chinese enterprise, "for us it is about meeting the deadline, or finishing the project before the deadline." Equating higher worker productivity with improved chances of tapping into new business opportunities seem to be one of the strong drivers.

To the question "What is the difference of working with Indian or Chinese investors, who do you prefer?" a Kenyan official answered:

> We like both India and China and we want them both to invest. But Indian's take time, a road near my house being built by an Indian company is still not completed, it has been two years, in this time the Chinese would build a flyover and a tunnel around it. But our relationship with India is like a marriage—there was a ceremony and it is for the long term, our relations with China on the other hand is like an affair, there is pleasure and happiness—but it is fleeting (Personal Interview, 2018).

Issues related to increasing debt did not seem to garner hyperbolic responses, officials interviewed in Nairobi and Dar agreed that African states needed to become more accountable with their decisions. As a Tanzanian academic interviewed explained:

> I expect that my government puts its resources to use to sign the best possible deal with the Chinese and I expect them to put the interests of the country first. Now, if they don't—tell me, who do I blame? The Chinese or my own government? (Personal Interview, 2018).

Conclusion

As India and China realign their geopolitical priorities and reengage countries in Africa with a renewed vigor, they are weaving their own unique characteristics into the African growth story. As this chapter puts forth, as more sub-national actors enter the fray, the politics of interdependence takes on a new form. The discourse, therefore, needs to move away from those suggesting a zero sum game or a "scramble for Africa" and instead find common ground and new spaces for cooperation. This idea of developing nations pooling in resources or leveraging strengths to achieve common goals is by no means path breaking. Its origins can be traced back to the Bandung Conference of 1955; but the new avatar of South-South Cooperation is driven by very different objectives. Most importantly, although Western nations still largely dominate the economic landscape—both as economic partners and aid donors—fact remains that the rise of China and India as developing countries, offers countries in Africa alternatives.

Regardless, as India and China craft their agendas for Africa, it is imperative that countries individually or the African Union collectively also have in place strategies to deal with Sino-Indian overtures. In conclusion, the Hausa proverb "When the music changes, so must the dance," can be applied to the evolving relations between India, China and Africa as well. The jury is still out on whether New Delhi's and Beijing's Economic Diplomacy in Africa, which has the potential to help countries leapfrog their development processes, is in reality symbiotic in nature. One thing for sure however, is that their interactions is changing status quo on how business and geopolitics is conducted in the continent. For other powers engaged in the region, this means learning new steps and finding a new rhythm because if nothing else—the music has certainly changed.

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7

The Perils of China's Silk Road for a Pax Africana: Ghana's Prosaic Dance with Destiny?

Naaborle Sackeyfio

This chapter explores the implications of new developments in Sino-African relations that involve the capacity of African actors to effectively wield agency. As African states attempt to chart new pathways to development amid a trajectory wrought with peril, South to South cooperation has increasingly cast China's Silk Road in new light. The chapter examines the potential for economic transformation in emerging state actor engagement with China. In doing so, it elevates the concept of a Pax Africana and the possibilities for reimagining continental jurisdiction in the 21st century.

Introduction

Africa's "lions"—a term articulated by Lopes—are akin to Asian tigers (2010, 73) or Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa, represent the fastest growing economies on the continent and potential models for development. But their trajectory appears dependent on heightened infrastructural development from the BRICs and more specifically China—which today is the continent's largest development partner. In 2013, President Xi Jinping made an unprecedented announcement concerning a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Initially intended as a Eurasian transport network and integration system composed of transmission lines and communication networks, it evolved to its current iteration as a trans-regional cooperation model that connects Asia, Africa and Europe's policies, trade, funds and people in the 21st century (Onunaiju, 2017).

The transformative agreement is ambitious and there are potent reasons for optimism and yet caution since Africa's emerging powers continue to wrestle with agency and ownership over its trajectory.

A Pax Africana—which Ali Mazrui (1967) envisioned as an epoch of change depends on continental jurisdiction over internal affairs. But their trajectory appears dependent on heightened foreign direct investment from the BRICs and more specifically China, the continent's largest development partner responsible for the belt and road initiative an extraordinary initiative that is both transcontinental and sweeping in its scope for economic activity and connectivity. As the continent hurtles towards remarkable foreign investment interest and development, the nature of state-to-state partnerships vis-à-vis China and who stands to benefit is a critical question to consider. With remarkable engagement, China has established significant bilateral trading relationships with virtually all 55 African states. While regional trade between and among members of the African Union remains abysmal at under 20%, trade with European and Chinese partners is well over this figure. To illustrate, Songwe (2019) finds that "the share of intra-African exports as a percentage of total African exports has increased from about 10 percent in 1995 to around 17 percent in 2017, but it remains low compared to levels in Europe (69 percent), Asia (59 percent), and North America (31 percent)." For Africa's lions to chart a successful course of externally anchored development, these countries should presumably invest in regional trading partnerships utilizing the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) as a fulcrum for economic cooperation and growth. Yet regional instruments to propel the framework envisioned by NEPAD is without teeth as it were, while the political will for implementation by African Union, an intergovernmental body which created NEPAD appears ephemeral.

This chapter asks, what are the costs of Chinese partnerships for Africa's lions in a century many view as the Age of Africa? It broadly considers the consequences for Africa's emerging economic powers drawing from examples instead of an in-depth or individual case study approach. It suggests that African states revisit the notion of Ali Mazrui's Pax Africana which is pivotal if the continent is to transform its economic fortunes on its own terms under a current landscape that involves an African silk road. In tandem, the chapter argues that a resource-for-infrastructural-development imperil the rise and more specifically agency of Africa's lions or ascendant states. Although a silk road proffers benefits like investment and infrastructure to Sub-Saharan states, the capacity to harness political and ecological jurisdiction will likely depend on knowledge production systems/dynamics generated from these countries.

This chapter substantiates the argument advanced here, by exploring the dynamics of a Pax Africana that is anchored in knowledge production, followed by a discussion of crucial factors for establishing economic and political jurisdiction; what it means to de-center/de-centivize elite capture of resource rents as China's African silk road expands; how states may re-imagine knowledge production as renaissance. In addition, this chapter offers an assessment of China's South to South cooperation in relation to African economies and its relevant intergovernmental body—the African Union (AU). The chapter also briefly examines industrial zones in Ghana, Ethiopia and Nigeria. The last section of the chapter examines China's seeming omnipotence and the potential quandary the state poses for equitable environmental governance.

The Quandary

To withstand the age of resource extraction and exceptional interest in the continent's changing economic landscape requires new political tools and instruments, which are currently absent. Renewed interest in the continent's yet undiscovered wealth offers a timely opportunity for an economic "jurisdiction," reset as it were. Although debates over the continent's arbitrary boundaries and seemingly lost opportunities for a "do-over" have long proliferated, a heightened resource scramble and new blueprints for infrastructure development in lieu of these constraints may bode well for Africa's emerging powers. As potential models for ecological/environmental sustainability and resilience, African states as sites for food production, agribusiness, planetary renewal may well lay with the continent as regional, continental and global actors' interests intersect owing to shifting global supply chains whose locales will be increasingly African. Under deepening economic relations, the context for Africa-China's intersecting interests are worth exploring. Chinese investments potentially promise to deepen economic diversification and move African states away from single commodity exports a characteristic that have been difficult to shake. Vera Songwe (2019) notes for instance that, "between 1990 and 2014, as most fast-growing countries in the world diversified their economies, most African countries instead relied on rents from extractive industries."

Why a "Pax Africana"? Political and socio-economic jurisdiction over Africa's nascent states remains non-existent since the forces of colonialism and imperialism exacted the potent damage and a mark that looms large still. The ability of Africa's leaders to shape the continent's internal affairs has been effectively absent and despite the dawn of independence for many states beginning in the late 1950s, one can hardly speak of true independence given a global economic exchange in which many African states appear function as little more than suppliers of raw materials and mineral wealth to former colonial powers. In theory, nascent African states who secured independence in the late 20th century could no longer be ensconced by capricious administrations and a violent colonial apparatus. In the decades since the early post-colonial period, the paradox of a continent beholden to an extractive impetus in which states with lucrative natural resources appear to be mere bit parts speaks to the commodification in both the Euro-sphere and global realm. China's silk road for all the investment, renewal and an expansion it may augur potentially comes at the cost for the continental jurisdiction over its economic affairs. Although Hadland (2012) argues that African states wield considerable agency in relation to China, sovereign wealth "giveaways" in the form of land, resources and more are on alleged uptick (see Odoom, 2017) which upends the notion of African "ownership" over the contours of its economic arrangements.

Pax Africana and Knowledge Production in the Knowledge Economy

A Pax Africana—which encompasses the notion of an African Epoch of renewal in intellectual, political, economic and social terms is unequivocally potent. As geopolitical interests shift toward a continent that many claim will be the site of the next industrial age, foreign direct investment, will purportedly increase. Train systems, new highways, energy infrastructure, railway and transport innovations, and incessant construction are in near ubiquity. In Addis Ababa, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria and other states these changes are visible. Technological transfers, in Africa's emerging powers and special economic zones or spheres mark a tipping point for a continent in transition. Accelerating engagement with states like Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa looms large in the economic imaginary of what many frame as the future site of a green revolution. Yet, the coming reordering of economic and political relations of African states with China and other pivotal actors depends on how effectively it reconstitutes economic and political jurisdiction with respect to China's silk road, an unprecedented economic and trans-pacific initiative that expands its status as a premier global power.

The term economic and political jurisdiction is used here to signify the manner in which African states wield authority over both realms without reliance or interference from other state actors, especially former colonial powers and non-colonial powers who dominate the global economic exchange. How these states as regional powers navigate sovereignty "games" in these realms may preemptively situate "new" rules for doing business or in short economic governance with other powerful states. Sovereignty games is used here to denote mechanisms and processes that states and non-state actors deploy with a dilutory effect on recipient states or the target for leveraging economic or political power (Adler-Nissen and Gameltoft Hansen, 2008). Though China's industrial expansion along with European and other global power interests are on an uptick, a mounting Chinese presence engenders the privilege of a stronger bargaining hand. Leveraging the possibilities for an "African Silk Road" in a century many describe as the African age with these states presumably at the helm bodes well providing they create novel mechanisms for ideological, technological, political and economic jurisdiction and in short agency. The way to do so is to support and harness human capital and to borrow from Dawson and Sinwell's (2012) analysis, become knowledge producers and not simply knowledge users. But the level of precarity for urban youth across Africa's emerging economies whose livelihoods are dependent on informal economies is instructive. As Esson et al. (2016, 187) note:

> Conceptual frameworks such as the new mobility paradigm derived entirely based on conditions in the global North are inherently limited, despite their implicit claims of global relevance. Indigenous, colonial and postcolonial urban legacies of modernist urban planning, including land-use zoning and residential segregation, have long embedded conditions that necessitate high levels of flexible mobility for the conduct of even precarious informal livelihoods.

To achieve a Pax Africana in an interconnected world of multilateral trade and extractive calculus requires shifting the economic and political terrain of Africa's emerging players on the world stage. A Pax Africana implies a kind of political and economic dislocation from institutional mechanisms and dictums governed by established states since the Treaty of Westphalia which ushered the concept of sovereignty and the modern state system in 1648. Undoing the yoke of economic dependency on external actors, including former colonial empires and other global powers precedes any economic disentanglement.

Over the past decade or more, trade between China and Africa has been unsurprisingly substantial. Monetary pledges from Xi Jinping at the 2015 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) were a remarkable: $60 billion in loans, grants, and equity funds in support of ten cooperation areas (Eom, Brautigam and Benabdallah, 2018, 1). Astoundingly, China Africa trade was approximately $172 billion in 2015 (CARI, 2016) and Chen, Dollar and Tang (2016, 614) note that

> China's pattern of investment is different… As of end 2013, China had more ODI in Africa ($26 billion) than the US's ODI on the continent ($22 billion). So, China's *relative* focus on Africa is large, though it is still a small player in investment overall.

But overall and as a latecomer to African markets, its investment is substantial. In what amounts to state centric models predicated on what Brautigam and Tang (2011) refer to as "state-sponsored economic cooperation" may simply reinforce what some refer to as Beijing's long-term geo-strategic ambitions and unlikely foster sustainable local development (Gayan, 2008 cited from Brautigam and Tang, 2011). This aspect brings up another potentially worrisome quandary. For Africa's lions, and those endowed with ample natural resources, such investments amount to amassing political capital/goodwill between leaders can reinforce elite capture and enclave spheres of influence that spill into distributive politics in terms of how little of the revenue from these partnerships are of benefit to the public. Just two years ago, Eom, Brautigam and Benabdallah (2018, 8) forecasted continued emphasis on three priority areas that include money flows, capacity building and peace and security. These arenas, while laudable in many ways, nonetheless, signify key aspects of outsourced sovereignty—in terms of functions that are increasingly shouldered by China.

Sustainable Development

Although the creation of industrial or export processing zones are significant advancements, questions linger about sustainable development. Brautigam and Tang (2011, 28) in fact note that, "…many development experts are skeptical about the zones' prospects as tools of an industrial revival on the continent." Questions linger over whether export processes are sustainable and in what ways skills passed on to laborers make it into the market place of ideas, local entrepreneurship in terms of small, medium and potentially large enterprises. Skills transfer and local technological expertise and the role of economic growth under environmental globalization should arguably feature more prominently in bilateral and multilateral arrangements between China and its African partners. The question of what is, what can be, or what ought to be sustainable has received little treatment. Arguably the term sustainable development functions as an overwrought currency whose value is diminished by an all-encompassing narrative which frames it as a set of overarching goals to be completed in the distant future rendering it prone to "destination" disease. The latter connotates a way of scaffolding outcomes that re-ifies the mechanisms of growth and development as an inherently extractive process. This is to say that the notion of "sustainable" subsumes the idea of replenishable and the resources or inputs required to "replenish" using methods that are complementary. Insofar as China-Africa partnerships with the continent's promising states create feedback loops that support or at least balance these aspects, the prospect of an African silk road can flourish and yield positive dividends on both sides. Approaches grounded in "resilience" (Rees, 2010) since the early 21st century point out the possibilities for such transformation, but how doing so requires a paradigmatic shift. In a global economic exchange that privilege rapid delivery of outputs that are largely dependent on cheap labor, there is currently no African blueprint for avoiding the pitfall of "disposable" labor under an African silk road. A continent whose population weighs in at over a billion, a large number of youth stand to either gain or lose by a substantial margin. Sow (2018) points to Bill and Melinda Gates foundation's Goalkeepers report which estimates that by 2050 Africa's young population, i.e., those aged between 0 and 24 years old, will increase by nearly 50 percent. In 2050, the continent will have the largest number of young people, making up nearly twice the young population of South Asia and Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania.

The report cites the risks of insecurity, instability, and mass migration; however, it praises young people as the innovators, leaders, and workers of the future, stressing the importance of investing into young people's health and education in order to unlock productivity and innovation, thus reducing poverty (Sow, 2018). Transforming a youth bulge into human capital is thus essential, as the report and others find. The nature of human capital investments in a world increasingly marked by disposable labor and new forms of economic exploitation (see Bales, 2012) is critical to address as plans for an African silk road take further shape. The question of agency then is a critical one, in terms of how African states wield power, given the youth who make up the bulk of their states vis-à-vis Chinese and other actors looking to expand their economic partnerships especially in lieu of Shenzhen zones.

Knowledge Production as Renaissance

Knowledge production on social, economic and political scales depends on the ability to procure the space in which to do so. Under the weight of hegemony and sphere of hierarchical relations, the capacity to engage in push the boundaries of constitutive knowledge is constrained for post-colonial states. The encumbrance or heavy cloak of path-dependence—is not merely historical baggage, but the cumulative effect of rapacious extractive politics that in its utmost form eroded the conditions necessary for vibrant articulation. This violent apparatus continues in the near absent acknowledgment of restrictive and often demarcated arenas in which knowledge production and dissemination function especially as it relates to global North vs. global South. Knowledge production is rooted in constitutive forms and cultural contexts that define and sometimes operate in spheres that deride and reproduce an "othering" viewed in monolithic, unchanging, provincial and static terms. Ideas about historical, contemporary, cultural, political, economic and of course technological spheres from the global North receive preferential treatment as unquestionably valid fortes of the human experience. Following several decades since independence, spatial representation of African states on the global stage and under the categories mentioned appears protracted. All the while, China a country that thus far has played by its own rules, preferring to discard the norms of conditionality and consequently garnered considerable influence continues to rise. As African states arguably barter away resource rights (Oddom, 2017) and relegate indigenous development to the margins while engaged in a calculus that privileges outsourcing knowledge production, the consequences for a population that will be powered by youth suggests a collision course.

Knowledge dissemination for African states as well as the wider continent as currently articulated is at a crossroads. Outsourcing and utilizing knowledge systems that are exclusionary, inherently masculinist, extractive and privilege particular bodies, processes and mechanisms as superior and all-encompassing are ultimately reductive and deserve dismantling. What is required no less, are symbiotic, synergistic and complementary to African institutions both traditional and contemporary. Educational institutions as sites of learning invite invigoration not as spaces to replicate western education but as a window for cultivating and validating knowledge that in turn becomes shared, valued, constitutive and acknowledged as such by Africans in national and intercontinental terms. Reconstituting value to African systems of knowledge involves a reconfiguration of Africa's value or continental orbit in terms of what education means for a labor force, local entrepreneurship, enterprises—small, medium and large. Given the centrifugal force of informal economies, African futures are intricately connected to knowledge production systems that can invigorate labor mobility. Yet, the capacity for industrial jurisdiction in terms of in-ward oriented development and African markets remains irresolute. Arguably, regional integration mechanisms should be geared towards supporting and creating African industrial zones that build on physical and human capital as well as indigenous knowledge systems. But imprecise skills transfer and insufficient knowledge parks grounded in technological innovation and indigenous capital pose a quandary for both diasporic and local investment.

The largesse for capital and infrastructural investment in Africa's lions is substantial. These states' economic profiles reflect not simply an emerging country status but sites of profound transformations that are technological and science oriented. Human capital and numerous arenas for growth and expansion in education, manufacturing, industry and more illustrate the power of globalization in its heightened forms. Expanding interconnectedness among economic, political and environmental facets of globalization are demonstrative of a global economic exchange that offers possibilities for advancement. Nonetheless, there are considerable challenges. As land tenure systems collide with state led attempts to attract further investment through divestiture, as reports of state actions to cede mining and water rights to other state actors and corporations, these developments signal key blows to governance and chip away at economic representation. A tenuous dance with sovereignty amid the purported scramble for the continent's as yet undiscovered resources and technological wherewithal to mine and drill further into the reaches of the seas/land portend dwindling political capacity to deal with these changes.

Ecological Extraction and Looming Fortunes

Economic globalization in a century of declining natural resources/wealth amplify governance challenges for these ascendant states because they position market dominant actors such as the Chinese/companies and the specter of the neoliberal self in part liberated by the push towards democratic or at least some representative norms at odds with the self-interested pull of African states in terms of the manner in which parts of the economy function as mere enclaves (Mohan, 2013).

The impact of Chinese engagement for African states is thus mixed (Hanauer and Morris, 2014). Although leverage, power and an economic upper hand are China's to claim, African states can reap the benefits of what presently appears to be a somewhat skewed bargaining prowess at least from the perspective of African states (see Sackeyfio, 2019). This depends on the careful weight of short term and strategic objectives against the long-term viability of African spheres of external interest. Some preface the continent's promise on a global integration strategy (Onunaiju, 2017). This may well be accurate given an attractive development paradigm that celebrates mutual economic welfare unsullied by great power interests during the 20th century. As Onunaiju notes,

> the Silk belt and Road initiative originally envisioned as a Eurasian transport network and integrated system composed of railways, highways, aviation, navigation, oil and gas pipelines, transmission lines and communication networks form which industrial clusters would emerge has become a globally inclusive framework. It is one aimed at the promotion of orderly and free flow of economic factors as well as a (sic) efficient allocation of resources as well as economic policy coordination… (Onunaiju, 2017, 32).

With more than 100 countries onboard (ibid.) this unparalleled arrangement, level of interconnectedness and capacity for inter-state transformation is considerable. States like Ethiopia are fast becoming an industrial hub, with special economic zones created by the Chinese alongside Indian investment and now has the continent's first modern electrified railway to the Port of Djibouti—a concrete and positive development for Chinese-Ethiopian economic relations. With large numbers of the continent's youth under the age of 25 who are unemployed, industrialization and establishment of special economic zone areas that include shoe or rubber factories seem ideal. But if raw materials from African states continue to be processed by market dominant actors and skills transfer to indigenous labor forces remain miniscule, the presumed economic expansion for local actors, enterprise encourage dependency and reinforce comparative advantage by the former.

In Ghana, for instance, a country whose motto since the post-independent period and under the tutelage of Kwame Nkrumah, the continent's first pan-African president was self-reliance, the jagged outcomes of development understandably appall. Inward oriented development conceived by Nkrumah as a focus on industrialization using the Volta River and the-then largest man-made dam on the continent—the Akosombo—to produce aluminum via natural reserves of bauxite seemed viable. Deficits in capital accumulation, absent inputs required for this radical vision including technological capacity "in-house" that is, complicated an ambitious blue-print for economic change. Before his political demise in 1969 and subsequent exile in the 1970s, Nkrumah with skillful mastery navigated a difficult terrain informed by cold war era politics. Playing U.S. interests against Russian and Chinese overtures allowed Nkrumah some agency as he banked on vacillation and to some extent ideological intrigue to secure monetary support and technological assistance from the latter two in particular. His legacy was ultimately tainted by an over-bloated bureaucracy, ideological departure from stances that initially galvanized the country, mismanagement and heavy-handed politics that earned the ire of significant numbers of Ghanaians as well as without. The model of self-reliance Nkrumah touted represented a call to action not just for Ghanaians but across the continent, ultimately stymied by historical and institutional contingency in ways that were un-anticipated. Since the dawn of 21st century, succeeding administrations have yet to articulate an overarching policy that builds on internally generated development platforms, rural/urban "knowledge spheres" and further diversification without external investment from development partners like China and other actors. Ghana, for all its political achievements as one of the most stable and model states remains dependent on external assistance primarily through infrastructural development which is paradoxically limiting the scope of agency in its mining and energy sectors for instance (see Sackeyfio, 2019).

China and South-South Cooperation

Utilizing a combination of diplomatic and economic instruments, China's active engagement on the continent according to Besada (2013, 83) is more than mere posturing as a global player. In essence, the author contends that "like all other great powers is engaged in the pursuit of multiple objectives…and notes that in any case, Sino-Africa relations date by to early Han dynasty (140–87 BC), long before China's rapid economic expansion and its significant demand for the continent's minerals." However, the question of externalities for African citizens in terms of environmental costs of degradation and whether these advances are ultimately beneficial to unskilled labor, women in urban and peri-urban areas as well as small and medium entrepreneurial aspirants remain. Given a large uneven ratio of development between rural and urban as well as peri-urban areas in Africa's emerging economies, absent amenities that include energy, potable roads, rural credit access, economic progress of Ghana or any "African lion" for the matter depend on the integration of these populations. The presumption of win-wins for both the Chinese dragon and Africa's lions is dependent on marshalling its own impetus for regional development alongside an African silk road. While the development trajectory of China cannot be replicated owing to historical, institutional, unique/different political cultures and unique advantages possessed by individual countries, African states must build capacity on their own. Ghana, for instance has to draw on its own in-house expertise founded on a re-drawing of its educational institutions in terms of purpose, objectives and societal transformation and what each component means. It has to deconstruct coloniality and knowledge production and generation if it is to reclaim spaces of power in a digital and increasingly technologically driven age. It must interrogate the new approaches that are rooted in national development plans and economic diversification the youth who are in essence the driving force of both state and continental reformation. This endeavor, no small task by any estimation should ideally include recasting the neoliberal project and the marketization of labor, while locating the totality of mechanisms that remain historically anchored in stratifying cloak of class division and rooted in inequality. Moreover, as different global powers seek to engage the continent with a number of strategies, a related question is whether a coherent strategy exists for harnessing the potential development spin offs that could accrue from increased investments, trade and aid from the Asian giants (Cheru and Obi, 2011, 94).

Manufacturing Sector in Ghana

Clustering and industrial zones years ago were somewhat contentious largely owing to the presumed ambiguity over the extent to which these effort would yield positive benefits. Drawbacks in spontaneous clusters are noted by Bräutigam and Tang (2011). As they contend, "they have significant weaknesses, notably poor infrastructure, weak linkages to modern sources of innovation and technology, and a general absence of government support" (2011, 28). They note this despite some successful efforts in terms of 'bottom-up clusters of industries such as footwear cluster in Aba and the vehicle parts cluster in Nnewi in Nigeria (Brautigam, 1997; Meagher, 2010). Nonetheless, Nigeria, as one of the largest economies and second only to South Africa is on the cusp of an infrastructure revolution as China deepens its engagement in value creating chains. Examples like the Abuja-Kaunda standard game and the Lagos-Ibadan rail, a Lekki Free Trade Zone or site of reindustrialization efforts stem exclusively from Chinese participation. On a continent where the manufacturing value of Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for a mere 1.24% of the world manufacturing value (Brautigam et al., 2018). Chinese investment in this regard is not merely strategic, but prescient. As an economically stable country insistent on capturing more investment especially from Chinese firms/companies, the stakes for Ghana couldn't more appealing. In turn, attractive African markets and the competitive pressures of Chinese market inform the shift from trading to installations of factories for manufacturing (Jin, cited in Brautigam et al., 2018). Equally compelling is Tang's (2018) suggestion that "based on the 'flying geese' model, countries tend to be leaders and followers in producing for global value changes," while other perspectives note the readiness of Chinese manufactures to shift their production bases to Africa owing to a heightened comparative advantage.

Despite controversy among the Ghanaian electorate, concessionary loans have helped to cement manufacturing deals as part of a broader investment in an oil for infrastructure framework. Since the 2000s, the Chinese government and Chinese banks have notably offered a large number of concessional and commercial loans to Ghana for infrastructure construction in the telecom, energy, fishing and transportation sector. In 2011, for instance, the China Development Bank and the Ghanaian government signed a commercial loan worth some $3 billion dollars (ibid.). In what may well account for an exception to a dominant narrative of asymmetrical relationships with African partners, the Chinese-Ghanaian relations are almost akin to a golden era. Tang (2018) reports local technological and skill transfer which is an uncharacteristic description of Chinese operations as a market dominant minority. To illustrate, local linkages consist primarily of Ghanaians with a ten to one ratio of Africans to Chinese, yet even the author acknowledges that management stems mostly from the latter.

Conclusion

The notion of an African silk road in the 21st century is a welcome, but potentially fraught development. As China increasingly re-casts its nets to attain further comparative advantage in lieu of declining U.S. interest in the region save to reemphasize its pledge to fight a global war on terror and accompanying "hot spots," the net gains for Africa's emerging powers are promising. Heightened infrastructural development, the spread of technological innovation in the examples peripherally highlighted in this chapter point to accelerated interest that is likely to re-shape the contours of individual state as well as continental fortunes. Reaping the benefits of an African Silk road as the chapter contends largely depends on how well the states briefly treated marshal a Pax Africana—growth, expansion, knowledge production and bargaining leverage done on its own terms. At first glance, this may appear paradoxical, after all, an investing country is expected to follow its self-interests which are resource and arguably geopolitically oriented. A Beijing consensus or "no strings attached" policy framework is not only novel for this economic giant, it offers huge dividends in contrast to Washington consensus and attendant conditionalities.

Although the parameters of a Pax Africana are imprecise, the political opportunity costs of minimal engagement within and between African states couldn't be higher. Regional integration mechanisms under the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) lay out lofty, ambitious goals that lack political will of its member states. Economic interests of powerful actors such as the Chinese seem almost zenith in contrast to interest within the continent to build on existing resources, human capital and regional solutions to resource extraction, infrastructural and ultimately sustainable development. The share of intra-African exports remains miniscule relative to bilateral trading relationships between China and individual states. A concrete roadmap for re-dressing this anomaly is sorely needed. Although, presumably, the prospects for growing regionalism are a step closer given the recently established African Common Free Trade Area Agreement. Former Nigerian foreign minister and current chair of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Eminent Panel, Ibrahim Gambari, noted earlier this year, a need for African countries "to reduce dependence on the EU" and urged more use of its resources to support the organization (Adebajo, 2019). Exorbitant trading costs continue to prohibit regionalism with the resulting, but salient criticisms of the organization for neglecting to negotiate the parameters of a continental free trade agreement without close collaboration with extant regional economic communities (RECs) (ibid., 2019). The lack of convergence between Nigeria as the epitome of an Anglophone sphere and French dominated Francophone members is an impediment to further progress even as regional blocs within this promising new arrangement are prioritizing road transport, cross-border trade, industrial development and agro-processing (ibid., 2019).

Ushering an epoch of renewal in both Africa's emerging powers such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, South Africa requires an intellectual, political, economic and social pivot if the continent is to fully emerge as the site of a fourth industrial revolution. Resource extraction, agricultural production, an emphasis on imports, infrastructural development from without requires economic jurisdiction as a cornerstone of any common free trade area. In tandem, so does the continent's ecological futures which are tied closely to an African silk road which likely entail an inherently extractive trajectory that depletes rather than sustains the possibilities for a renewal. Technological developments on the continent require investment by individual states while knowledge production under current course are insufficient and necessitate new anchors for a knowledge economy that can power a "silk road" and more critically a Pax Africana.

This chapter has argued that African lion's or emerging powers as the sites of amplified engagement from China need to revisit Ali Mazrui's notion of a Pax African to reconstitute the terrain under which the continent's economic fortunes are currently situated. I have suggested too, that a resource for infrastructure framework limits agency and in tandem ownership since the driving force of these partnerships undermine sustainable investment, reify resource rents and perhaps implicitly encourage enclave economies that are dislocated from the very purpose of a silk road as a new sphere for capital accumulation and expansion. A discussion of knowledge production, aspects that support economic and political jurisdiction; decentering elite capture of resource rents; re-configuring ecological globalization; and the broader context of China's South to South cooperation, and examples of industrial zone outcomes are relevant to the seeming liminality of a number of perils notwithstanding potential benefits that can also accrue in these states as well as across the continent. Despite the benefits of investment, infrastructural expansion, and innovation that the silk road promises, the ascendance of these states depends on the capacity to usher knowledge production systems that support and generate new spheres for an African "epoch." In short, a New Bandung conference as William G. Martin suggested over a decade ago is one way to reconceptualize the Sino-African relationship. This statement was likely made to buttress an evolving relationship in which African states exercise more agency as partners (2008). As he stated, "such a scenario raises the prospect of one last radical transformation, that is the significant disruption of racial hierarchies through which regional land global accumulation operates" (2008, 132).

In sum, the capacity for transformation or renaissance should ideally encompass political, economic, social and ecological dynamics that an "African silk road" augurs. While many African states shun the suggestion that the terms of its Sino-African partnerships are neo-colonial and or purely extractive in nature, the manner in which African youth stand to benefit from a looming industrial and increasingly urban landscape will likely determine the scope of a silk road that either confirms purported win-win scenarios or the opposite. Moreover, an African renaissance is likely to emerge only under a "united Africa" underpinned by the six emerging powers. In all, regional integration promises to remain a pipe dream unless these states revamp and energize existing political, economic, intellectual and ecological landscapes that govern capital accumulation and ultimately the possibility of a Pax Africana.

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8

China in the Developing World—Rogue Aid Donor or Cure That Comes with Side Effects?

Andreas Fuchs and Elena Quante

As a donor of development aid, China has often been accused of being a threat to the development of a just and inclusive Global South, "underwriting a world that is more corrupt, chaotic, and authoritarian." On the one hand, China's motives for allocating aid to developing countries do not differ much from Western countries. Although recipient countries' neediness plays a role in aid allocation, both actors are also motivated by commercial and political considerations. On the other hand, China differs from Western actors since it strictly adheres to the principle of non-interference in recipient countries' internal affairs, implying that it does not tie its development aid to good governance principles. Therefore, we argue that while calling China a "rogue aid" donor appears to be unjustified, Chinese development aid comes along with some side effects that might lead, among other things, to a local rise of corruption and nepotistic aid allocation.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has intensified its development activities around the globe. Although not a new provider of development finance, it is often labelled as a "new donor."[1] There is widespread concern that China is a threat to the development of a just and inclusive Global South. Critical voices claim that China predominantly follows its own interests, including the exploitation of natural resources, at the expense of the developing countries that receive the "aid" (e.g., Laurance, 2017; Economic Times, 2018; Mourdoukoutas, 2018).

Moisés Naím, Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Policy magazine, stated in a famous 2009 article that "rogue aid" donors like China "collectively represent a threat to

1 The first country to receive Chinese aid was North Korea in 1953. The first African recipient country was Egypt in 1956. Since then, the number of recipient countries has steadily increased. Nowadays, China is active in approximately 140 countries and makes new commitments to about 90 countries per year (Fuchs and Rudyak, 2019).

healthy, sustainable development" (Naím, 2009, 95). He goes on to claim that "they are effectively pricing responsible and well-meaning aid organizations out of the market in the very places where they are needed most," and that, if they are successful, "they will succeed in underwriting a world that is more corrupt, chaotic, and authoritarian" (Naím, 2009, 95). This claim has been supported and contested widely by media outlets (e.g., Foreign Affairs, 2015; Kuo, 2017) and academic work (e.g., Bräutigam, 2009, Dreher et al., 2011, Dreher and Fuchs, 2015).

In this chapter, we review the related literature. As we will discuss below, based on the empirical evidence on China's aid allocation, labeling China a rogue aid donor appears unjustified (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015, Broich, 2017; Dreher et al., 2018). However, there is also empirical evidence detailing the side effects of China's aid allocation which is partially supportive of Naím's claim that China makes the world "a more corrupt, chaotic, and authoritarian" place. That said, we emphasize that research on China's foreign aid is still in its infancy and that much more research on the topic is warranted. Until recently, reliable information on Chinese development assistance was sparse if at all existent. In 2013, AidData released a project-level database on China's development projects in Africa (Strange et al., 2017). Subsequently, this database has been georeferenced to enable subnational analyses of China's development finance on the African continent (Dreher et al., 2019a) and has been expanded to cover the entire developing world. Although the recent stream of empirical research on the effects of Chinese development is growing, more studies still need to be conducted, especially on the long-term effects of Chinese aid allocation on economic, political, and social outcomes in recipient countries.

Motives for Aid Allocation

It would be a myth to say that major donors of development aid act purely out of altruism when allocating aid to developing countries. Commercial and political self-interests play a significant role in the decision of where to become active. When it comes to understanding the potential motives of aid allocation from Western donors, there is a large body of literature available in both political science and economics (e.g., Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011). Generally, the neediness of the recipient country (typically measured by the GDP per capita), as well as commercial and political considerations play a huge role in determining where to allocate the aid money. Alesina and Dollar (2000, 1), for example, find that "the pattern of aid giving is dictated by political and strategic considerations" with the result that "an inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony receives more foreign aid than another country with similar level of poverty, a superior political stance, but without a past as a former colony."

Some Western countries also show an interest in the sustained democratization of recipient countries and thus allocate more money to countries with comparatively good governance. Alesina and Dollar (2000, 1–2) note that countries which have recently democratized receive a "surge" in foreign aid and that "changes in aid flow over time in a country tend to reward 'good' policies, notably democratization and [trade] openness." It is widely believed that aid is more effective in countries with good policies (e.g., Svensson, 1999; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Given that Western countries consider a recipient country's neediness along with its domestic policies, they also pursue their own political and strategic interests by providing development aid. Do, then, China's motives, as revealed by its aid allocation pattern, fundamentally differ from Western countries' motives? And if so, how?

Looking at a donor country's political and commercial self-interest, it appears that China and Western donors share similar motivations. China's pursuance of political interests seems to be rather obvious in this context. As China wishes to exert greater influence in world affairs, it seeks to improve its image as a global player and build coalitions with other developing countries (Fuchs and Rudyak, 2019). Countries that demonstrate a closer voting alignment with China in the United Nations General Assembly receive significantly more aid than countries with a looser voting alignment (Dreher et al., 2018). Additionally, recipient countries that recognize the government in Taipei, Taiwan, rather than the People's Republic itself, pay with foregone aid receipts from China (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015). Countries recognizing Taiwan typically receive—if anything—humanitarian aid only, for example Haiti after the 2010 earthquake (Tubilewicz, 2012). Income level, as expected, is also important when determining Chinese aid allocation, with poorer countries receiving more aid than richer countries (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Dreher et al., 2018). However, income is not only an indicator of developmental need, but could also reflect the fact that it is supposedly cheaper to buy policy concessions from poorer countries (see also Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). China does not differ much from Western donors in the sense that they both allocate more aid to politically aligned countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2005; Dreher and Fuchs, 2015).

An often-cited allegation, however, is that China prefers countries that are rich in natural resources: While China is quick to highlight the mutual interests of both the recipient country and itself, critics claim that it is mainly the People's Republic that benefits from the relationship. By tying aid money to goods and services from China—recipients are required to purchase almost 80% of them from China (Brant, 2015)—, the government in Beijing is said to place its own commercial interests over the recipient countries' needs. But when speaking about Chinese "aid," one has to distinguish between official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF). ODA is aid in the strict sense, i.e., grants and highly concessional loans with the aim of promoting economic development and welfare, whereas OOF includes less concessional loans, loans at market rates, and grants to developing countries for representational or essentially commercial purposes. When analyzing ODA only, there is no robust evidence that China indeed favors countries with significant natural resource endowments (Hendrix and Noland, 2014, ch. 5; Dreher and Fuchs, 2015). Only when OOF is considered, is there any robust empirical evidence that natural resources play a role for allocation of such development finance projects (Dreher et al., 2018).

Furthermore, when controlling for other factors that influence China's aid allocation, there is no robust evidence that China is significantly more active in autocracies (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Broich, 2017; Dreher et al., 2018). It rather seems that China strictly adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. In other words: China does not seem to care whether it is dealing with an autocracy or a democracy.

Based on its aid allocation pattern and in the light of the political and commercial determinants of Western aid giving, calling China a "rogue aid" donor, as quoted in the beginning of this chapter, seems indeed blown out of proportion. But does this, as a result, render Naím's claim invalid that the People's Republic is "underwriting a world that is more corrupt, chaotic, and authoritarian"?

Creating a More Corrupt World?

Knowing that China strictly adheres to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, it does not seem very likely that it would engage in countermeasures against local corruption. However, not acting against corruption does not necessarily mean it underwrites a more corrupt world. In order to test this claim, there is a need for studies to investigate a potential link between Chinese development activities and a rise of corruption. Two recent studies, one by Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018) and the other by Brazys et al. (2017), find empirical evidence supporting such a relationship.

Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018) investigate the effects of Chinese development finance on local-level corruption in Africa. As such, they compare the level of perceived corruption of active and upcoming Chinese project sites. Their results indicate that Chinese aid projects promote local corruption. More specifically, they find that individuals living within a 50km radius from an active Chinese project site are more likely to report to have bribed the police, particularly in order to get a document or a permit. On the other hand, they do not obtain similar findings for inactive project sites, i.e., areas of future Chinese projects, which is taken as evidence that their finding is indeed causal. The corruption-increasing effect of development projects seems to be China-specific since no similar effect is observed for the World Bank, another leading aid donor in Africa.

Isaksson and Kotsadam offer two theoretical explanations of why development finance might influence the local corruption level: Economic incentives and norm transmission. The former implies that increased economic activity increases the risk

of attracting corrupt actors and stimulates corrupt activities among locals. The latter implies that a corrupt environment stimulates corrupt behavior (Hauk and Saez Marti, 2002). The empirical evidence in Isaksson and Kotsadam supports the latter, i.e., that norm transmission causes the increase in corruption. This can be seen in light of accusations that Chinese contractors often make use of "corrupt practices to win contracts away from more honest companies in recipient countries" (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018, 148). The high corruption level in China is said to be linked to its rapid economic transition:

> In China, the transition to a more market-based economy, known as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics,' has resulted in considerable changes to how firms operate within the new commercial business environment. Inevitably, when any system undergoes such rapid transition problems will arise: the huge increase in opportunities in the private sector combined with the traditional power of local and national officials has led to a proliferation of corruption at all levels of the Chinese economy. (Cole et al., 2009, 1495)

Beyond the direct effects of Chinese development projects on corruption, they appear to have an additional effect on co-located projects by the World Bank. Brazys et al. (2017) study in Tanzania how "proximity to [Chinese] projects is correlated with citizen perceptions of, and experiences with, local corruption." Their results support the earlier finding that Chinese projects are associated with more corruption. Generally, World Bank projects are associated with lower levels of corruption. However, interestingly, when World Bank development projects are near Chinese projects, there appears to be a rise in corruption in the whole area. The authors attribute this to "something akin to a 'fog of aid,' wherein an increasing number of local development projects makes it difficult to monitor and sanction corruption" (Brazys et al., 2017, 250). Nevertheless, even though the two studies seem to support the thesis that Chinese aid underwrites a more corrupt world, it is important to take into account the peculiarities of Chinese "aid": Brazys et al. attribute their findings solely to OOF rather than aid in the strict sense (ODA).

Nepotism on a Subnational Level

The Chinese government stated in the 2014 White Paper on Foreign Aid that "China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully respecting their right to independently choose their own paths and models of development" (State Council, 2014). This principle of non-interference in domestic affairs appears to have an effect on the location of development projects within countries. In this regard, Dreher et al. (2019a) call Chinese aid "demand-driven" aid in the sense that it is the government of the recipient country that proposes an initiative for a new project. It is the “right to independently choose their own paths and models of development” (State Council, 2014) that gives African leaders considerable freedom in choosing the type and location of Chinese development projects. This leads to the construction of many “prestige projects” that are unrelated to the goal of poverty reduction (Bräutigam, 2011). These projects include presidential palaces, sports stadiums, and conference centers.

However, the construction of prestige projects is not the only aid effect of the non-interference principle that has been criticized. As Dreher et al. (2019a) show, significantly more aid is allocated to the birth regions of African political leaders, which tend to, on average, already be richer than other regions in the country. The Dreher et al. study also shows that there was no similar effect for World Bank projects, which suggests that Chinese aid projects are easier to direct towards areas preferred by the country’s leader. In quantitative terms, aid money in the birth regions of political leaders is 270% higher than in other regions. When Dreher et al. run the same analysis for the birthplaces of the African leaders’ spouses, or, in case that the leader is polygamous, for the birthplace of their first spouse, it appears that more Chinese aid is allocated to the birthplaces of the political leaders’ (first) spouse as well. This supports the claim that nepotism drives this finding.

Aid and Conditionality

Aid provided by the so-called traditional donors, i.e., mainly OECD countries and the big international financial institutions, is often explicitly or implicitly tied to conditions, such as the improvement of political institutions, the commitment to implement good policies, or to the respecting of human rights. It is widely believed that aid is more effective in those countries where solid institutions are in place and good policies ensure the efficient use of aid money. Additionally, aid can serve as an incentive for a democratic transition when it is raised in response to democratization (Kersting and Kilby, 2014). Likewise, it has been shown that aid can induce a reduction of corruption if the aid conditions are properly designed (Öhler et al., 2012). Taken together, aid can—at least in theory and according to some empirical papers—positively affect institutions in recipient countries.

Some empirical studies support the effectiveness of aid conditionality (Montinola, 2010; Stokke, 2013), but there are circumstances under which donors do not use their leverage on recipient countries, in particular when donors have competing priorities (Bearce and Tirone, 2010). Dunning (2004), for example, argues that during the Cold War, strategic interests played a more important role than democratization efforts, and that it was only after the end of the Cold War that Western countries could focus on progress towards more democratic policies in recipient countries.

In the 21st century, a new challenge to imposing conditional aid on recipient countries has arisen since the significant aid activities of both authoritarian and democratic donors has led to increased competition between donors. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2016, 425) conclude that the world is entering “an era in which Western nations are likely to increase aid donations and receive fewer policy concessions.” Authoritarian donors usually do not even care about or hinder democratization. Empirical evidence in Bermeo (2011) shows that aid from authoritarian donor countries helps the regimes of authoritarian recipient countries to stay in power. In related work, Li (2017) analyzes whether China’s economic engagement on the African continent leads to a decrease of the democratization effect of aid conditionality applied by Western donor countries. He argues that the availability of Chinese aid gives African recipient countries more options to choose their funding, which in turn makes them more likely to resist pressure from Western donors to improve their governance. Li expects that Western countries feel compelled to compete with China and, as a result, lack credibility that they will sanction recipients that do not comply with conditionality.

Indeed, the empirical results in Li (2017) show that with China rising as an emerging donor on the African continent, the democratizing effects of OECD development aid diminish. It appears that aid conditionality only works under specific circumstances, namely when there is no significant alternative funding available. This supports the idea that donor countries have a higher leverage against recipient countries in the absence of donor competition. In the words of Li (2017, 217), their threat to “pull the plug on aid” becomes more credible.

With China as a rising donor, it becomes more difficult for Western donors to give incentives for developing countries to transform their political system. As Li (2017, 206) points out, this is not necessarily solely driven by increased donor choice for recipient countries. Since the multilateral aid platform has become more dysfunctional and, as a result, less effective, recipient countries keep turning to China as a major donor. This trend is supported by the perception that Chinese aid is less bureaucratic and disbursed more quickly. Moreover, some countries look up to China’s development model for their own aspirations. The sum of these points makes China a serious contender as a donor for developing countries.

Empirical research indeed shows that this competition forces the so-called traditional donors, such as the World Bank, to attach fewer strings to their loans. Hernandez (2017) finds that the number of conditions tied to World Bank loans decrease with increasing inflows of Chinese aid. This effect is particularly visible in low-income countries since they have successfully found a way to “shift loan negotiations with the World Bank closer to their own interests” (Hernandez, 2017, 544). While some might welcome this change, as it gives African states more autonomy in choosing their own fate, some fear that it will lead to the creation of a less democratic world (Li, 2017).

Conclusion

Critical voices, in particular comments made by observers in Western countries, have dismissed Chinese aid as being predominantly self-serving, even going as far as calling China a "rogue aid donor." When comparing the aid motives of Western countries and China, empirical studies show that Chinese motives for aid allocation do not differ much from those of Western countries in the sense that both are guided by commercial and political motives. Hence, the accusation that China is a rogue donor is an exaggerated claim, especially when you compare its aid allocation to other major donors like the United States or the World Bank. However, we went on to look at the side effects that seem to come along with Chinese development projects. On a local level, recent research shows that corruption rises in the areas situated nearby Chinese aid projects, and, due to China's strict adherence to the principle of non-interference, aid is disproportionately allocated in the birth regions of African leaders. Additionally, increased donor competition appears to pose a challenge for Western countries who wish to tie aid to conditions for building good institutions or supporting good policies. This may indirectly support a shift towards the rise of more authoritarian regimes in developing countries.

Despite these findings, there are other reasons why Chinese aid to developing countries should not be condemned prematurely. On the positive side, Chinese aid appears to promote economic development and growth. Recent research shows significant results of average positive effects of Chinese aid on economic development and growth in recipient countries and subnational regions receiving the aid (Dreher et al., 2019a, 2019b, 2020). Although it might initially appear as counterintuitive, Chinese economic cooperation might even have a positive effect on democratization under certain circumstances. Empirical evidence suggests that mostly party-based regimes, which are similar to China, are stabilized by China's engagement, whereas other types of authoritarian regimes experience a destabilizing effect (Bader, 2015). This destabilizing effect "is related to transitions to democracies for non-party regimes" (Bader, 2015, 667). The question of whether or not China underwrites a more autocratic world turns out to be full of complex nuances and thus deserves more research.

In the end, it is a normative question and one needs to trade off the positive and negative effects against one another. In any case, more research needs to be done to fully understand the allocation, development effects, and side effects of Chinese aid in the long run, with particular focus on how different types of autocratic regimes benefit from bilateral cooperation with China. For the governments of recipient countries and their international development partners, learning how to mitigate the negative side effects that seem to accompany the positive effects of Chinese aid should be of the utmost concern.

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9

The Revitalization of China and Côte d'Ivoire Cooperation, 1994–2013

Ebi N'godo Filomène

While in the early hours of independence, some West African countries such as Mali and Ghana cooperated and maintained diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, it was not until March 2, 1983, that the Côte d'Ivoire and the People's Republic of China formalized their relationship and began to cooperate. After a few years of latency observed between 1984 and 1993, the two states tried to revive cooperation. China, with patience and determination, is launching an all-out diplomatic offensive. It renews its principles, signs agreements, increases its development aid and strengthens its activities with Côte d'Ivoire. Thanks to the engagement of both countries, since 1994 there has been a gradual strengthening of cooperation ties.

Introduction and Overview

The revival of Sino-Ivorian cooperation since 1994 and the strengthening of relations between the Chinese and Ivorian states observed since 2002, are the fruits of a process involving various factors and actors that took place in a context marked by unprecedented economic recession, the troubled political situation and repeated social unrest, ideological mutations in the world and reforms in China. The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire under the leadership of President Felix Houphouët-Boigny has been officially recognized as a partner by the People's Republic of China on March 2, 1983. Between 1984 and 1986, "agreements are signed in the agricultural field" (National Office for Technical Studies and Development, 2000, 12–13). However, no project has been realized from 1986–1993. It was not until 1994 that the first ever Sino-Ivorian cooperation project, namely the Guiguidou rice development, was started.

Since 1994, Sino-Ivorian cooperation has been going well. China is increasingly present in Côte d'Ivoire, as evidenced by the actions carried out in the various fields, such as the construction of roads, buildings so that one wonders, how the Chinese and Ivorian authorities managed the shift from a latent cooperation to a flourishing one over the period 1994–2013?

The objective of this study is to highlight the different strategic elements on which the Chinese and Ivorian authorities relied in their boost of the Sino-Ivorian cooperation.

This analysis was possible thanks to a data collection carried out in the documentation centers of certain local institutions such as the Ivorian Public Debt Department (PDD), the Ivorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the National Office for Technical Studies and Development (BNETD). Information was also collected in journal articles and local newspapers, taking into account the point of view of diverse actors (Ivorians, Westerners, Chinese). All documentations resulting from this research is classified into two types of sources, namely primary and secondary sources.

Primary sources include reports from local institutions. For example, the reports of the BNETD (2000) and MFA (2014) make the history of Sino-Ivorian cooperation comprehensible through the enumeration of certain agreements and the different visits exchanged between the Chinese and Ivorian authorities. As for the 2018 report of the Direction of Public Debt, it lists the various loan and grant agreements concluded between the PRC and the State of Côte d'Ivoire. These figures provide a take stock on financial cooperation between the two countries since 1986. Secondary sources focus on different aspects of the Sino-Ivorian relationship and provide more general information on the evolution of cooperation.

The cross-checking and cross-linking of information from these different sources provides the necessary resource for the development of this work. However some difficulties have to be underlined, the content of the agreements is sometimes inaccessible, e.g. the figures concerning the financial cooperation. Often for the same loan agreement, the amount given by the local newspapers differs from that of the PDD. This makes it difficult to define the exact cost of certain projects and leads to different sources to find the exact amount.

This study is organized around two main axes. The first part, the strengthening of cooperation through agreements and visits, gives a brief historical account of the establishment of Sino-Ivorian cooperation, and reviewes some agreements and influential visits between Chinese and Ivorian nationals. The second part deals with the financial diplomacy of Beijing, it highlights the types of financing, the flexibility of the course of the projects and some achievements of China on the Ivorian territory between 1994–2013.

Strengthening of Sino-Ivorian Cooperation through Agreements and Visits

All the power of cooperation between China and African countries is based not only on the precautions taken at the start by the Chinese authorities before investing in a country, but also on the willingness to cooperate by African governments.

In Côte d'Ivoire, this approach can be summarized in a few elements, namely the signature of agreements and high-level visits between Chinese and Ivorian authorities. This first part deals successively with three points: the historical recall of the beginnings of cooperation, the diversity of agreements signed between 1994 and 2013, and high-level exchange visits.

Overview of the history of Sino-Ivorian Cooperation, 1983–1993

The recognition of the PRC by Côte d'Ivoire and the signature of the diplomatic agreement confirming the links between the two countries, is the result of a long process enamelled with ideological confrontations. Indeed, in 1965, pronouncing on the diplomatic relations with the countries of the East, during the 1st congress held after the independence, Felix Houphouët Boigny (1965, 6–7) affirms this:

> In addition to the Western countries with which we have friendly relations, we will not refuse to establish diplomatic relations with the Eastern countries ... who will undertake not to take advantage of these diplomatic relations to interfere in our internal affairs, which will commit to respect our institutions, not to foster or encourage subversive actions in our country (Côte d'Ivoire) ... in revenge, we exclude the possibility of any diplomatic relations with Beijing China whose criminal policy is based on the permanent revolution by subversion in the countries where it settles, on the physical suppression of those who do not share its ideological conceptions in the conduct of business. (translated by the author)

This statement immediately shows the refusal of Côte d'Ivoire of Houphouët Boigny to establish any connection with the Chinese Communists. Because for him, China eager for space and ideological expansion, is a "danger" for humanity, especially for emerging free Africa. Clearly, Houphouët is against "any advanced progressist and communist on the continent" (Aurégan, 2016, 264–265). However, a few years later, new facts occur in the evolution of the history of China and Côte d'Ivoire that gradually change the trend and the vision of the Ivorian President.

On the Ivorian side several events, likely to slow the growth of the country, follow one another. Economically, the 80s are the end of the economic miracle. The country then enters a phase of economic recession induced by the global crisis of the 80s. The effects on the Ivorian economy are notorious and result in "the instability of the Gross Domestic Product, the unpredictable fall of the costs of agricultural products on international markets and the drop in the export rate" (Séka et al., 2008, 10). In addition to this uncomfortable financial situation, the state has to face the social problems characterized by the demographic explosion with the multiplication of social and political upheavals between 80 and 90 as corollaries. Côte d'Ivoire must find other ways to deal with the crisis.

At the same time in China, the Mao-era (1949–1976) is coming to an end, his successors are trying to reorganize local institutions through various “reforms” including those of Deng Xiaoping. For Ian Taylor (2012, 3) the period between 1978–1992 “represented an abandonment of Maoism.” The impacts of this new political orientation on society are becoming increasingly visible. A constitution was drafted and approved on December 4, 1982. At the international level, the authorities began the gradual opening of China to the outside world. It begins with progressive economic development, provides assistance to some countries like Guinea and Ghana.

As soon as the Chinese Communist Party is softened and Deng Xiaoping's policy is more in line with Houphouët's aspirations, there is no longer any obstacle or difficulty in reconsidering his position. Thus, on March 1, 1983 in Beijing, the agreement establishing the Sino-Ivorian cooperation is signed by the foreign ministers, Simeon Ake of Ivory Coast and Wu Xueqian of China.

The principles of cooperation are also elaborated and published the following day, March 2, 1983 in a joint communiqué reported by Auguste Miremont (1983, 1) as follows:

> The principles of equality, non-aggression, mutual benefits, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, non-interference by one State in the internal affairs of the other and mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political and economic options.

This statement, which covers both political and economic matters, was reiterated in March 2013 by Ambassador Zhang (2013, 21). The latter places special emphasis on “mutual respect, safeguarding territorial integrity and national sovereignty.”

As a result of this recognition, two agreements in the areas of agricultural and cultural cooperation are signed. The first elaborated on June 3, 1986 gives the Chinese government's approval for the future realization of “1000 hectares of rice growing, including 500 in Danané and 500 in Divo” (BNETD, 2000, 1–2). The second was concluded in 1992 by Qian Qichen, representative of the Chinese government, and Kablan Duncan assisted by the Ivorian Minister of Culture Henriette Diabaté (Yedagne, 1992, 4).

This retrospective look at the cooperation from 1983 to the death of the first Ivorian president in 1993 shows that no major cooperation project has emerged. Slowness is observed in relationships, which is not the case for the following period.

Let's emphasize that the first period of Sino-Ivorian cooperation is marked by very few agreements for financing cooperation projects. However, it has the merit of seeing the recognition agreement materialized, laying the foundations for cooperation in key areas such as diplomatic, scientific, technical and economic cooperation. It is this founding agreement of 1983, which is exploited by its successors and favors the signing of different financing agreements at the beginning of the 21st century.

A Variety of Agreements between China and Côte d'Ivoire, 1994–2013

All of China's achievements in Côte d'Ivoire are always preceded by a series of loan agreements that vary according to the project in sight. Since 1994, the PRC and Côte d'Ivoire have signed agreements in various fields (commercial, economic, military, cultural and scientific). In this part, special emphasis is placed on agreements signed in the economic field for financing and infrastructure development.

According to data collected from the Ivorian Public Debt Department and the Ivorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018, 4–6; 2014, 4) there are “49 financing agreements for various cooperation projects between the People's Republic of China and Côte d'Ivoire from 1986 to 2013, including 47 over the period from 1994 to 2013.” Following the political trend and the evolution of cooperation in Côte d'Ivoire, these agreements can be grouped into three periods: 1994–1999; 2000–2011 and 2011–2013.

The 1994–2000 period, which we consider to be a period of revival of Sino-Ivorian relations, marks the reign of Houphouët's first successor and is characterized by the signing of 14 financing agreements. Specifically, 13 of these agreements allow the realization of two key projects that are the Hydroagricultural development of Guiguidou and the Palace of Culture of Abidjan. This period begins with the signing of two cultural cooperation agreements to complete the one signed in 1992 to finalize the construction of the Abidjan Palace of Culture. The first is signed on November 16, 1995 by Ivorian ministers N'goran Niamien and Chinese Yang Wensheng (Ahiko, 1995, 14). The second supplementary loan agreement is signed on May 14, 1997; the other 12 agreements covering this period will follow.

Between 2000 and March 2011, 22 financing agreements were signed. Of these 22 agreements, 20 are used for the construction of infrastructures such as the Maison des Députés (parliamentarians' hotel) of Yamoussoukro and the Gagnoa General Hospital, as well as economic cooperation projects to be determined by the two states. The other two are for natural resource projects. In addition, there are two debt cancellation agreements.

The third, which runs from June 2011 to december 2013, 11 agreements are signed. The latter contribute to the implementation of various infrastructure projects such as the Abidjan–Grand-Bassam expressway, the drinking water supply of the city of Abidjan (phase 1), and the construction of the Soubré hydraulic dam.

It should be noted that since 2013 agreements have been increasing, favoring the implementation of major projects such as the extension of the autonomous port of Abidjan, the rehabilitation and development of Côte d'Ivoire's electricity network, the video protection platform project of Abidjan city, and the Olympic Stadium of Ébimpé. A part from agreements on cities, included in the framework of infrastructure development, there are many others such as that signed on January 18, 2003 in Beijing for the exploitation of the manganese field of Lauzoua, and the one on the exchange of notes between the National Federation of Chinese Women and the Ministry for the Promotion of Ivorian women.

These different agreements signed between States are important and promote the strengthening of ties. They show the precautions taken by the authorities of Beijing and Abidjan for a good collaboration. Admittedly, it is under the reign of President Felix Houphouët Boigny that the bases of Sino-Ivorian cooperation are laid. However, the cooperation agreements take all their senses under the chairmanship of his successors, Henry Konan Bédié (1994–1999), Laurent Gbagbo (2000–2011), and Alassane Ouattara (since June 2011).

The increase in number of visits by the Chinese authorities in Côte d'Ivoire and Ivorian authorities in China is also boosting Sino-Ivorian cooperation.

Reciprocal State Visits: A Way to Strengthen Cooperation Links

Visits between Chinese and African authorities are an important element in Sino-African relations. They help strengthen the actions of China in Côte d'Ivoire, while reassuring the Ivorian and Chinese authorities. They concern above all the various displacements of high level personalities of the political spectrum, the delegations of businessmen and the missions of economic operators, carried out reciprocally between the two countries during the period 1994–2013. It is a question of analyzing the most important visits of this period by grouping them according to the titles of the personalities concerned. According to data from the report of the Ivorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014, 2–3), they can be grouped into different categories: heads of state, ministers, and economic operators.

At the level of heads of state, there are three remarkable visits to China. The first is that of Ivorian President Henry Konan Bedié in May 1997. Chinese Ambassador Lide Liu considers this visit of the President of the Ivorian Republic, as a new page in the annals of relations of friendship between the two countries. According to Doualy (1997, 4) "this visit contributes to strengthening the political, economic and cultural ties between the two states." Indeed, this move in Chinese territory is historic because it is the first time that a president of the Ivorian republic is making a state visit to China. It revives mutual trust between the two states.

In this regard, Séka et al. (2008, 10) stress that

> It is under the reign of the second Ivorian President, Henri Konan Bédié, that cooperation will grow. This cooperation will be further strengthened during the reign of Gbagbo Laurent.

The audience granted to the Ivorian Head of State by the Chinese authorities, the loan and grant agreements signed during this visit are likely to attract the attention of the Ivorian authorities and allow them to become more interested in China. This hearing also reassures Chinese politicians about the full support of their Ivorian colleagues for Sino-Ivorian cooperation. It paves the way for several other meetings and is seen as a catalyst for cooperation between the two countries.

If the visit of the second Ivorian President in China is significant in the Sino-Ivorian relations, that of Laurent Gbagbo remains decisive for the decade 2000–2010. The latter goes to China from April 23 to 29, 2002 at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin. The Ivorian President takes this visit to reiterate his commitment to the relations between the two countries. The meeting between the two heads of state is a factor consolidating the Chinese presence in Côte d'Ivoire, as evidenced by the signing of agreements to finance development projects. It allows China to obtain important markets in Ivorian territory. Later, "Chinese companies are launching and implementing several projects in Côte d'Ivoire" (Pang, 2013, 24). It was after this visit that projects such as the parliamentarians' hotel of Yamoussoukro, the conference room of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Gagnoa General Hospital, the modern colleges of Anyama and Toupah were built. In addition to this visit, many hearings are given by President Laurent Gbagbo to Chinese ambassadors in Côte d'Ivoire to discuss possible obstacles encountered in the implementation of projects but also, to discuss issues related to the consolidation of relations between Abidjan and Beijing.

Let also note the trip to China by the head of state of the Côte d'Ivoire Alassane Ouattara in July 2012. This visit, which comes a few months after his inauguration, in the context of the 2010–2011 post-electoral crisis, not only allows to reassure the Chinese partners of its interest in cooperation, but also to revitalize and continue the activities begun by its predecessors.

At this level, the visits are not reciprocal, because during the period 1994–2013 no Chinese head of State visited Côte d'Ivoire. In February 1999, however, Hu Jintao, then Vice President of the People's Republic of China, visited Côte d'Ivoire.

The displacements carried out by the Ivorian Heads of State on the Chinese territory show the interest that they attach to the cooperation between the two countries. If during this period, no Chinese head of state came to Côte d'Ivoire, this can be explained by the fact that the People's Republic of China grants more autonomy to its ambassadors who succeed each other in Côte d 'Ivoire in the management of issues relating to cooperation.

In addition to the heads of state, important delegations of Ivorian and Chinese ministers lead the cooperation over the period 1994–2013. On the Ivorian side, they went to China, among others: Leon Koffi's minister of the Ivorian defense; Kablan Duncan, Prime Minister; Lida Kouassi Minister of Defense; Leon Monnet of Mines and Energy; Charles Koffi Diby of Economy and Finance; Amani N'guessan, Minister of Defense; Youssouf Bakayoko, Foreign Affairs; Guillaume Soro, Prime Minister and Nialé Kaba of Economy and Finance. All of these visits are aimed at bringing closer and strengthening ties with China.

Similarly, Côte d'Ivoire receives Chinese ministers, including Li Lanqing, vice prime minister in 1996. Meng Xiaosi, deputy Chinese vice minister of culture, heads a delegation to visit Abidjan on December 1, 1997. This is part of the policy of strengthening cultural exchanges between Côte d'Ivoire and China. During his stay, the Chinese delegation and officials of the Ministry of Culture in Côte d'Ivoire headed by Minister Bernard Zadi Zaourou, visit the site of the Palace of Culture of Abidjan and take stock of the progress of work. The country receives Vice-Ministers Sun Guangxiang in May 2000 and Siao Zhonghuai in September 2003. In June 2011, Zhai Jun, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, arrived in Ivory Coast. The latter is followed in January 2012 by Yang Jiechi Minister of Foreign Affairs. At this level, the balance tends to balance because the number of Chinese ministers who visit Côte d'Ivoire is increasing more and more. This shows the interest of the different governments in cooperation.

Except the visits of Heads of State and Ministers, the MFA report (2014, 7–8) refers to dispatch of delegations of economic operators. In May 2012, the People's Republic of China hosts 30 Ivorian economic operators. Conversely, a delegation of Chinese investors under the aegis of the National Council of Ivorian Patronat stays in Côte d'Ivoire in September 2004 to evaluate with BNETD, the investment opportunities offered by the Ivorian territory. In their wake, 200 Chinese economic operators are staying in Ivory Coast from 8 to 10 August 2012 at the invitation of the Ivorian Head of State. The same applies to the of arrival of 150 other operators from the Chinese province of Hubei on 22 October of the same year. The number of visibly important Chinese operators reflects their enthusiasm to explore all the economic fields of Côte d'Ivoire.

In addition to these few visits, there are many others that precede 1994. The arrival of the Chinese Head of State in 1992 is an illustration. In this regard, contrary to the work of Anthony Caubin (2010, 43) who states that "there has never been an official visit of a Chinese president in office in Côte d'Ivoire," we underline that in July 1992 Chinese President Yang Shangkun (1988–1993) did indeed make a five-day official visit to Côte d'Ivoire. This was his first visit to Sub-Saharan Africa.

The creation of frameworks for multilateral meetings, such as the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC), is also likely to strengthen ties between states. Since the initiation of the FOCAC in 2000, Côte d'Ivoire has been invited and participates by sending delegations made up of high-level personalities. During these summits, many business relations are formed between Chinese and Ivorian companies. The participation of President Alassane Ouattara at the 5th session of the FOCAC Ministerial Conference followed by the working session with his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao on the sidelines of this conference, are fruitful. Several sites are started just after this summit.

All these agreements and visits are likely to guarantee good understanding between Chinese and Ivorians. Also, the financial diplomacy of Beijing is strengthening.

Financial Diplomacy of China: A Factor for Consolidation of Sino-Ivorian Cooperation

Like the visits, China's financial assistance is also needed to strengthen cooperation with Côte d'Ivoire and other partners in Africa. Development support, although recent, has been constantly growing in recent years. It is done through donations and loans and is regulated by Chinese organizations such as Eximbank. This planning favors the financing and realization of major infrastructure projects at lower cost.

Three kind of financial aid for development projects

The financial assistance offered by the People's Republic of China to developing countries must be adapted to the conditions of those States so that they can make the necessary profits together. To do this, Beijing organizes it through donations, long-term interest-free loans and government-subsidized preferential loans.

Figure 1: The donations made by the Chinese government to Côte d'Ivoire from 1997 to 2013



Source: Figure produced by the author using data from the Public Debt Directorate of the Côte d'Ivoire.

The donation received by a country from its cooperation with China is a support, a help in kind or in cash non-refundable and interest-free. From May 4, 1997 to May 10, 2013, the Ivorian State received from the Chinese government "17 donations totaling 50,378,750,000 Franc CFA" (Public Debt Departement of Côte d'Ivoire, 2014, 2). These gifts are shown in Figure 1 according to their main objects.

Table 1: Conclusion of long-term interest-free loans between Côte d'Ivoire and the Chinese government by sector from 1986 to 2013

Purpose of loan	**Amount in Franc CFA***	**Amount in USD (approx.)**
Guiguidou rice farming project	4,459,000,000	7.5 Mio
The construction of the Cultural Palace	11,466,000,000	19 Mio
The acquisition of military equipement and materials	2,160,000,000	3.6 Mio
Construction of the *Maison des Députés*	5,096,000,000	8.5 Mio
Different technical and economic projects to be determined by the Chinese and the Ivorian governements	23,497,400,000	39 Mio
Total	**46,678,400,000**	**78 Mio**

* CFA stands for *Communauté financière d'Afrique*. 1000 Franc CFA are about 1.67 USD and 1.52 Euro.
Source: Author with data of the Public Debt Department of the Ivory Coast 2018.

The diagram reveals that various fields of activity benefit from Chinese government donations. An important part is intended for the realization of technical and economic cooperation projects (in green) often determined by the two States. Of the 17 grants awarded during the period 1997–2013, 14 are for cooperation projects. The financing of the projects favors the development of Côte d'Ivoire and allows it to have infrastructures. The conference room of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the modern college of Anyama are proof of this. All these achievements lead the Ivorian authorities to become more interested in cooperation with China. To these gifts are added the different types of loans.

The long-term interest-free loan is an amount that the Chinese government grants directly to the government of the recipient country, namely Côte d'Ivoire. It is a loan to reimburse on a long term and interest-free as indicated by its name. Most of the major public works carried out in Côte d'Ivoire come from these long-term interest-free loans. Table 1 groups by sector the long-term interest-free loans made available to Côte d'Ivoire by the People's Republic of China from 1986 until 2013 for the financing of infrastructure projects.

As indicated in Table 1, in total for the realization of the projects, the Côte d'Ivoire benefits until 2013 from the long-term interest-free loan in the amount of 78 Mio USD. In addition to the loans for the targeted projects, there are many others that are intended for the realization of various economic cooperation projects to be determined by the two governments.

The preferential government rate loans is intended for all kinds of development projects but is more used in the industrial sector. In Côte d'Ivoire these loans allow

Table 2: Preferential government rate loans between Côte d'Ivoire and Eximbank from 1996 to 2013

Date of Signature	Purpose of loan	Amount in Franc CFA*	Amount in USD (approx.)	Interest rate (%)	Duration of loan (years)
19/09/96	HUAKE Automobile project	326,335,000	0.6 Mio	5%	15
04/11/96	Lic Pharma project	1,110,291,000	1.9 Mio	5%	15
09/04/97	Yto-CI project	1,057,420,000	1.8 Mio	5%	15
05/05/97	Seismic exploitation project	1,850,485,000	3.1 Mio	5%	15
14/03/00	Artisanal & semi-industry exploitation of gold of Zérégbo	637,000,000	1.1 Mio	3%	15
01/07/08	Governmental electronic project	14,680,000,000	24.6 Mio	2%	20
11/02/10	Construction of residences concorde	25,480,000,000	42.6 Mio	2%	20
03/10/11	Construction of Abidjan–Grand Bassam motorway	57,388,640,000	96 Mio	2%	20
13/04/12	Bonoua water treatment station project	49,725,200,000	83 Mio	1,5%	20
04/01/13	Soubré hydroelectric dam project	250,000,000,000	417 Mio	2%	20

* CFA stands for *Communauté financière d'Afrique*. 1000 Franc CFA are about 1.67 USD and 1.52 Euro.
Source: Author with data of the Public Debt Directorate of Côte d'Ivoire.

the financing of productive projects of cooperation over the period of 1996–2013. These are the Huaké Automobile project, Lic Pharma, Yto-CI, and the seismic project. This type of loan also contributes to the construction of infrastructure as indicated in Table 2.

Two elements make Chinese loans attractive. In addition to being interest-free or with a low interest rate, their reimbursements are made over a long period as shown in Table 2. China also proceeds by remitting debts to help develop the Côte d'Ivoire. From 1997 to 2011, the Chinese government canceled part of the debt of the State of Côte d'Ivoire estimated at 17,834,298,583 Franc CFA.

Donations, loans (interest-free and low interest rate) added to debt relief, contribute to the development of Côte d'Ivoire. For the realization of a cooperation project, China often associates these three forms of aid. This allows it to strengthen its cooperation with Côte d'Ivoire. Added to this is the flexibility of the cost of projects carried out by China.

The flexibility of the cost of projects carried out by China

Another element that makes China unbeatable compared to the other partners of Côte d'Ivoire and promotes the development of cooperation is the cost of the projects that its companies carry out. The question of cost is a means of competitiveness for Chinese companies in Côte d'Ivoire for various reasons. In view of the lack of financial resources needed to carry out these development projects, the Ivorian government most often entrusts development projects to companies that propose a lower cost. The People's Republic of China delivers development projects at lower prices. As a result, African governments, including Côte d'Ivoire, are increasingly attracted to China's proposals.

Western companies, in particular French, in charge of construction since independence, have prices much higher than their Chinese counterparts. For the financing of the same infrastructure development project, the cost proposed by a French company is usually "50%" (Niquet, 2006, 6) higher compared to the offers of Chinese companies. Under these conditions, it is easier for China to obtain more markets in Côte d'Ivoire without competition with its predecessors in this area. The problem of saying the least that Western companies raise in the acquisition of construction sites in Africa and especially in Côte d'Ivoire is rather an advantage for China. Because for the African States, the most important criterion of selection of the company for the realization of the big works is that of the price and in terms of price, Chinese companies are in a good position. This favors the rapprochement between China and Côte d'Ivoire and the multiplication of major infrastructure works on the Ivorian territory.

Thus, over the period 1994–2013, there are about ten influential infrastructures realized in various domains namely the rice development of Guiguidou, the cultural palace, the parliamentarians' hotel of Yamoussoukro, General Hospital of Gagnoa (images 1 and 2), MFA conference room (images 3 and 4), Abidjan–Grand Bassam motorway, rehabilitation of the ministerial block, the Bonoua water treatment station, Soubré hydro-electric dam, and well other cooperation projects.

Aid planning, coupled with the flexibility of project costs, shows the momentum that China and Côte d'Ivoire are having for strengthening the links that unite them.

Image 1: General Hospital of Gagnoa (front view)

Image 2: General Hospital of Gagnoa (profil view)

Source: www.bnetd.ci/test/hgg (August 11, 2013).

Image 3: Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference room (front view)

Image 4: Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference room (inside view)



Source: Photos taken by the author in Abidjan September 30th, 2018.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the current strength of the cooperation between People's Republic of China and Côte d'Ivoire is a result of a long process in which the authorities of these two states have been engaged since 1983. They take precautions to go on good bases, express principles, sign agreements to legitimize and legalize their various activities. Having laid the foundations for the cooperation, the high-level mutual visits and the organization of Sino-African meetings facilitate the exchanges between the various parts.

In the practice, China shows itself more pragmatic by occurring where it is requested and where the need is smelt without emitting of limitation. It develops a strategy of attractive financial support through the donations and the loans, then proposes development projects with lesser cost and in accordance with the local government. All this approaches shows the accuracy with which, the Sino-Ivorian cooperation is established, maintained and strengthened.

It is thus thanks to this projected and progressive method taking into account all these elements that the People's Republic of China and Côte d'Ivoire succeed in strengthening their cooperation. Today, this relaunching is more visible on the Ivory Coast territory through the realization of several projects of infrastructures.

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10

Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Central Africa: The Specter of White Elephants?

Yorbana Seign-Goura

One of the most visible signs of Chinese presence in Africa those last decades is in the infrastructure field with the so-called "resources for infrastructure" swap. China back to Africa consists in financing and building infrastructures in different sectors (transportation, building, electrification, water and sanitation). This chapter aims to evaluate Chinese financed and built infrastructures in terms of their raison d'être and their significations within Central African countries of Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Niger, Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo. Based on observations, interviews of experts and literature on Chinese infrastructures, we review purposes, qualities and significations of those infrastructures in Central African countries. Findings reveal that Chinese infrastructure development in Central African countries is based on economic diplomacy in which China has more interests than African countries. Also, Chinese resources for infrastructures swap deals are used as tools and symbols of state power than as real tools of local development promotion. These practices resulted in poor quality and non-resilient infrastructure projects within the area with the threat of white elephant remake in Africa.

Introduction

China's contemporary engagement with Africa is subject to complex controversial debate within scholars working on Africa-Asia relations. Yet, China has recently become the major financier of economic infrastructure in Africa and in various localities of the world with the Belt and Road Initiative (Aoyama, 2016; Bluhm et al., 2018). Central African countries constitute one of the poorest areas in Sub-Saharan Africa where the need of basic infrastructure is acute. Ports, airports, highways, bridges, roads, dams, telecommunications infrastructures are highly needed. With China ready to finance those projects, the supply meets demand as mentioned about China infrastructure financing in Africa by Dollar (2008). And the demand is high as Central African countries in Sub-Saharan Africa lagged behind others regions in terms of infrastructure gap. In 2008, Foster et al. (2008, 23) estimated that Africa counts among its development challenges a major infrastructure deficit, with investment needs estimated to be on the order of US$22 billion per annum and an associated financing gap on the order of US$10 billion per annum. Putting aside the economic incentives that are real, this study intends to understand ins and outs of Chinese infrastructure projects in those poorest and risky countries. To some extent, the research aims at understanding if Chinese infrastructures projects in Central African countries are responses to local needs and to what extent local expectations are integrated into Chinese plans.

Based on the critical desk reviews of second hand data collected through documents written on Chinese investment in infrastructure projects in Africa, I will analytically review incentives, local implications, significations and discourses of Chinese financed projects in Central African countries mainly in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa, hence DRC) and Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville, hence Congo) (see Map p. 278). Furthermore, I argue that Chinese infrastructure development in Central African countries contributes to sustainable development and modernization of Central African countries. To back my assumptions, I argue that within the framework of South-South cooperation and seeing the policies and practices in this system of cooperation, Chinese actors' discourses are based on good incentives of mutual benefits and spreading the Chinese successful model of development into those countries.

For this purpose, the scope of this chapter is as follows: I will first explain the methodology and analytical framework for the research then make a review of Chinese financing different types of projects in Africa with the focus on Central African countries (section 2). After that, I will look into the existing literature showing Chinese incentives behind those projects (section 3) and will research on local implications and significations of Chinese financing infrastructure projects (section 4). Lastly, I will discuss perceptions and discourses of Chinese infrastructure investments before ending the chapter with a brief conclusion debating the future of Chinese financing infrastructure with regard to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Methodology, Context and Analytical Framework

The study this chapter is based on is a desk review of literature on China-Africa relations with the focus on Chinese infrastructure investments in Central African countries. I did a critical analysis of this literature in relation with a research question reviewing to what extent Chinese infrastructure investments are responses to local needs and expectations in Central African countries: What are the incentives, significations and discourses about those investments in this African region? The review is situated in the analytical framework of South-South development cooperation (SSDC) whose origin is to be located back in the 60s. South-South cooperation is commonly defined as follows:

> A process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions. South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to North-South cooperation (Kamioka and Flores, 2018, 4).

This definition remind us of the multiple political, economic, social, technical and cultural relations between developing countries. China and other developing countries are playing a growing role in South cooperation understood broadly as defined above and involving development practices. China–Africa relations need to be situated within this cooperation framework where China deals with African countries in various fields.

South-South cooperation places emphasis on self-reliance and synergies between development assistance, trade, and investment and is based on some principles below according to the Finance Center for South-South Cooperation (FCSSC, 2017, 156):

- adherence to the respect for partners,
- sovereignty and non-conditionality in the field of politics,
- emphasizing mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, as well as the promotion of economic development of both sides.

Chinese infrastructure investments are proofs of South-South cooperation as China claims that its cooperation with African countries is also based on mutual benefit principles equality recognized by South-South cooperation philosophy. Besides this, eight principles are supposed to guide China's practices of development cooperation with third world countries. Those principles are according to FCSSC (2017, 8):

- emphasize equality and mutual benefit,
- respect sovereignty and never attach conditions,
- provide interest-free or low-interest loans,
- help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance,
- build projects that require little investment & can be accomplished quickly,
- provide quality equipment and material at market prices,
- ensure effective technical assistance,
- pay experts according to local standards (Chin and Frolic, 2007).

Within the framework of South-South cooperation for the implementation of development principles, Chinese investments in African infrastructure sector are supposed to reveal the implementation of those principles with positive outcomes. Chinese infrastructure investments are illustrations of policy implementation and this research could be a way of checking to what extent realities meets theories and principles. For analyzing Chinese infrastructure investments outcomes, significations and discourses in Central Africa, the framework of South-South cooperation for development might be a relevant analytical tool. Different types of Chinese infrastructure projects will be analyzed through this cooperation concept.

Review of Chinese Financing Different Types of Projects in Central African Countries

Infrastructure investment is one of the SSDC priorities and has received great emphasis because it is said that this sector is vital for growth of the productive sectors and for poverty alleviation (Modi, 2011, 33). As noticed by Arewa (2016), the infrastructure deficit in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has led to inadequate supplies of electricity, causing power outages, high transport costs, and logistical and health problems for local populations. Infrastructure deficit caused a vicious circle of underdevelopment in SSA. Within the spirit of South-South relations, Chinese infrastructure investments in Central African countries are essential for their development and their modernization. These motives explain various extractive, transport, energy, port, and entertainment industries' infrastructure investments. The importance of infrastructures in the development of society were known in all over the world (Ghimire et al., 2017). However, in the development cooperation world, infrastructure investments got its period of up and down. It was first viewed as critical to support growing foundation development in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) then fell out of favor in official development aid (ODA) from developed countries and if sustained, infrastructure projects were subject of social and environmental impacts scrutiny (Michalopoulos, 1989).

Out of Western ODA priorities, infrastructure projects became central to Chinese investment in Africa and within South-South cooperation priorities (Modi, 2011). In that perspective, Chinese have been active building roads, railways, dams, and powers stations as well as public buildings throughout Sub-Saharan Africa region. Over a decade, the official Chinese figures for the value of the projects completed increased more than twenty-fold between 2003 and 2015 (Jenkins, 2019, 120). Central African countries over this decade have developed many infrastructure projects with China. China has been involved in financing hydroelectric power in many countries as of Lom Pangar in Cameroon since 2003, Boali-III since 2009 in Central African Republic, Simulki since 2011 in Democratic Republic of Congo, Belinga since 2006 in Gabon, Imboulou project in the Republic of Congo since 2003 (Hannam, 2016, 393–396; Brautigam and Hwang, 2017). China kept on increasing investments in hydropower in Sub-Saharan Africa even if some scholars found that misinformation and misunderstanding surrounding China's engagement in hydropower infrastructure projects in Africa is widespread (Brautigam and Hwang, 2017, 314). Below is a table related to Chinese power projects in Sub-Saharan Africa showing figures for Central Africa countries.

Table 1: Number of power projects with Chinese participation in Sub-Sahara Africa between 2010 and 2020

	Generation capacity			Transmission and distribution capacity		
	Completed projects	Current projects	Planned & financed projects	Completed projects	Current projects	Planned & financed projects
East Africa	14	9	5	10	10	1
West Africa	17	4	2	6	2	2
Central Africa	8	5	2	5	1	2
Southern Africa	15	7	8	4	5	1
Total 1	54	25	17	25	18	6
Total 2	**96**			**49**		

Source: IEA 2016. *Boosting the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: China's Involvement*, p.12.

Myths surrounding Chinese hydropower projects in Africa such as inflated numbers of projects, Chinese bad labor practices and other rumors related to the growing presence of China in African hydropower projects were checked and demystified by some scholars based on data collected. It was advised that others companies and finance agencies should cooperate with China in this controversial sector which is vital for Africa development (Brautigam and Hwang, 2017). Those power projects involved Chinese firms that are also active in non-energy projects such as roads, airports, railways, and water sanitation systems according to International Energy Agency (IEA, 2016). Other Chinese projects in Central Africa are extractive projects enabling Chinese companies to build energy infrastructures ranging from oil field development to refineries in Angola, Chad, Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, and Sudan. As well, Chinese companies have secured projects for minerals (including copper, iron, and bauxite) in countries such as DRC, Gabon, Guinea, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Foster et al., 2008). Most of energy projects are based on the model of "resources for infrastructure" whereby repayment of the loan for infrastructure development is made in terms of natural resources, e.g. oil (Foster et al., 2008, X). "Resources for infrastructure" are also called "Angola-model deals" and are agreements allowing Chinese companies to finance and build infrastructure in Africa in exchange for access to natural resources. Resources for infrastructure deals are made to facilitate much-needed infrastructure investment and therefore a good response for escaping the resource curse phenomenon in Africa (Kelley, 2012; Alves, 2013). China became the first crude oil importer of Angola between 2010 to 2016 due to huge number of resource for infrastructures swaps issued from their bilateral relations (Diop, 2017).

Chinese infrastructure project are said to be unconditional and they involved personalized deal making with political elite and excluding outsiders (Konijn, 2014, 5). China adapted this deal model with African countries based on Chinese experience with Japan in 1970s (Brautigam, 2009).

Chinese infrastructure projects are mainly financed by China Ex-Im Bank, which (like any Ex-Im bank) is devoted primarily to providing export seller's and buyer's credits to support the trade of Chinese goods. But in financing projects abroad, the China Ex-Im Bank's terms and conditions are agreed on a bilateral basis, with the degree of concessionality depending on the nature of the project (Foster et al., 2008). With all those infrastructure projects in Africa and their financing, China is to some extent infrastructure financier for Africa. Those facts enable us to research the incentives for China to finance projects in Central African and assess them if there are commonalities and disparities with others African areas.

Incentives behind the Projects

Official reasons given for those infrastructure investments by Chinese companies backed by Chinese officials are that those deals are win-win agreements. As Alves (2013, 208) puts it: "China's infrastructure-for-resources formula is largely the product of a timely convergence of interests between China and African countries at the dawn of the 21st century." However, by unpacking the China's real motivation in Africa, Alves (2013) uncovered the economic, political and strategic incentives of China presence in Africa. Motivations for African countries by accepting those deals are officially first for the needs of infrastructures, then modernization and development (Kelley, 2012). Provided incentives given by stakeholders from China and African countries drove many scholars to call it, win-win cooperation. However, by going deeper in Chinese investments many scholars detailed push and pull factors of Chinese investments in Africa and that revealed contrasted interests between the stakeholders. Infrastructure investments, mainly in large dams in the Global South, cause economic, social, environmental issues in the host countries as well as they

hold benefits such as flood control, job creation, improved energy access (Siciliano et al., 2018). The situation of Chinese investments might or might not be different from consequences of Chinese energy projects in Africa. Exploring the push and pull factors of Chinese investment in hydropower projects in the Global South, Siciliano et al. (2018) have found incentives sustaining Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa that could be extended to Central African countries (cf. Table 2).

Many incentives sustaining hydropower projects in the Global South could be taken as reasons explaining also Chinese infrastructure investments in Central Africa as the region is within the Global South and China had various projects related to energy and non-energy within the area.

Beyond those push and pull factors, China is criticized by Western countries and international institutions for the lack of transparency in its financing system of African infrastructures that is allegedly leading those countries to debt distress (Tan, 2019). The lack of transparency in Chinese investments in Africa even raises questions about the real incentives of China in Africa with most of scholars accusing China of colonial ambition of perpetuating practices of resources extraction from Africa and the use of economic diplomacy by backing Chinese companies investing in Africa.

Chinese investments in Africa are then subjects of divided appreciations. On one hand, some scholars said those investments are helpful for Africa as China provided many valuable infrastructures in priority sectors of health, water, sanitation, energy. For them in two decades, Chinese investments had positive records in Africa and exceeded what Western countries did in Africa for half a century (Broich, 2017; Zitelmann, 2019). On the other hand, other scholars are critical about Chinese presence in Africa accusing it of exploiting Africa in the same manner then the old donors but invoking the motivations of South-South solidarity principles, win-win cooperation and other good intentional incentives as washing discourses (Niquet and Touati, 2011; Moyo, 2012).

In sum, push and pull factors identified here summarized largely incentives given by projects stakeholders in Central Africa and by extension in the Global South. Those factors critically reviewed by scholars showing the divided appreciations of Chinese presence in Africa. This being said, what might be the significations of such investments in Central African countries that are in need of basic infrastructures?

Table 2: Push and pull factors of Chinese overseas investments in hydropower in Africa, 2010–2020

Drivers	Push factors (Chinese investors and financiers)	Pull Factors (host countries)
Political	• Going out strategy (1.0 and 2.0) • Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)	• Improve energy access and energy security • Development and economic growth • "No strings attached"
Econo-mic	• Access to new hydropower markets for hydropower companies • Access to cheap loans for hydropower companies • Bundling of aid, trade and investments	• Access to finance • Low costs and reduction of overrun costs • Bundling of aid-trade and investments • Industrial development
Geopo-litical	• Access to natural resources (water, minerals, fossil fuels) • Geographical proximity, political relationships and cultural similarities • Hydropower imports	• Climate change mitigation • Investment in low carbon energy • Establish new international geopolitical alliances
Reputa-tional	• Help countries from the Global South to develop • Desire to become the biggest dam-building player at the global level	• Icons of modernity • International agreements on climate change–clean development mechanism (CDM) projects

Source: Siciliano et al., 2018 p.21.

Local Implications and Significations of Chinese Financing of Infrastructure Projects

Perceptions and significations of infrastructure projects are various and their appreciations might be different and variable from stakeholders. Positive outcomes from China-Africa relations vary and are divisively perceived as economic, social or political opportunities.

Job opportunities

For populations of Central Africa, Chinese investments in infrastructure have many opportunities but also negative impacts on their living conditions. Discussing the advantages of Chinese cross border infrastructures, Malchow and Waldmann (2017) cited direct and indirect employment opportunities then also socio-economic spillovers of the infrastructure during their construction process. To illustrate those effects they explained that direct jobs are created during the preparation, construction, operation and maintenance phases of those infrastructures. Indirect jobs are related to jobs resulting from goods and services provided by sub-contractors or local suppliers for the construction of the infrastructure. In this way, infrastructure-building phases are at the basis of economic activity providing employment and job opportunities for local population and Chinese as well. Yamin et al. (2015) found in their research multiple purposes for resources for infrastructure swaps including in the Central African countries of Gabon, Guinea, and the DRC. That shows the diversity of projects' outcomes and perceptions. They imply for instance the construction of a wide range of infrastructure projects in transport (railways, roads), education (schools), health (hospitals), energy (power plants), agriculture and water supply. Those infrastructures are helpful for people living in those projects areas. They may also have others functions.

Infrastructures and modernity

Chinese investments are subject of lots of criticisms but also narratives noticed that China provided enough infrastructures to Africa that are changing its appearance and urban landscapes. Ports, stadiums, railways, dams, roads are providing African countries with images of urban and modernized cities. With Chinese power plants, the electrification of Africa is growing.

Those positive aspects of Chinese investments in Africa are presented to sustain the thesis of mutual gain and modernization of African countries (Wu and Bai, 2017; Yin and Vaschetto, 2011, 47–57; Kelley, 2012, 38; Alves, 2013). Beyond infrastructure projects, China presence in Africa is maintained through discourses showing the benefits of Chinese development model as road for African states and its cooperation model free of political conditionalities.

Beyond those positive outcomes, there are negative aspects of Chinese infrastructure investments in Central Africa and they are related to Chinese labor practices, the poor quality of infrastructure and environmental damages. Narratives denounced Chinese project financial system, mainly the credit lines binding procurement of services, goods and often labor (a minimum of 50%) from China, what leaves a small margin for local content to the recipient countries (Alves, 2013). China is heavily criticized by scholars for creating jobs opportunities in Africa for Chinese by employing them even for non-skilled positions (Kelley, 2012, 38). African labor is said to lack competencies while China strategy is to bring Chinese employees to Africa. China would emphasize the mutual gains but with the focus on Chinese businesses having multiple social effects in terms of employment, technology transfer, capacity building and particularly improvement of living standards of populations receiving these investments in Africa (Dollar, 2016). Collateral damages of Chinese projects that are numerous and are threats for the environment might increase the process of climate change in Africa.

Chinese infrastructure in Central African countries are contributing to structural change in those states by shaping their policies of development and modernization via those huge infrastructures. Appreciated for compensating African deficit in infrastructure by providing basic public services to local populations, they are also denounced for their environmental effects on those countries, which shows mitigated views and criticisms of China's presence in Africa.

Perception and discussion

Many criticisms are raised on the Chinese presence in SSA in relation with infrastructure investments. According to Rhys (2019, 114) many of the comments on Chinese presence in SSA are critical, the two following narratives being dominant in the Western media. The first sees China's presence in Africa as part of a neo-colonial scramble for African natural resources, while the second stresses China's political ambitions as a way of challenging Western influences in the region.

The group of criticism dominated by Western media sees Chinese investors in Africa as opportunistic and exploitative (Ado and Su, 2016). Those criticisms relieved by local media in African countries influenced a lot local population's perception of Chinese investments. Africans following those media will depict negative image of Chinese investments as exploitative and strategic investments in order to provide jobs for Chinese.

On one hand, rare are international media giving a positive image of Chinese investment in Africa. On the other hand, local media would appreciate those investments despite their exploitative aspects denounced by Western media. For example

in the DRC, an analysis of media coverage shows that the vast majority of domestic newspaper articles and comments were positive of the "resources for infrastructure swap" (Grosskurt and Konijn, 2012; cited in Konijn and van Tulder, 2015). In addition, political and business elites involved in the Chinese projects would see them as positive investments enabling Africa to emerge and follows the path of development designed by China via its model (Camba, 2018). Those narratives are revealing practices of patrimonialism that are rampant in Africa and by the way especially in Central Africa. Interlacing relations between political elite and foreign businesses in Africa show the conundrum of the political regime in Africa as Mkandawire (2015, 587) puts it: "Neopatrimonialism is said to involve the manipulation of foreign exchange to generate rents for the state and the favored clients." Those narratives sustained as well the hypothesis of Chinese economic and public diplomacy with the African states by dealing exclusively with political and economic elites in African states.

The second set of criticisms stresses the fact that China in Africa is looking for political domination in the international arena by promoting its national interests under the cover of South-South cooperation ideology of mutual gain and non-political interference on local issues. By this way, China is challenging OECD traditional donors as it launched a new "Going Out" strategy designed to strengthen trade relationships and encourage domestic firms to invest abroad (Kilama, 2016, 530).

Having in mind various narratives revealing different perceptions of Chinese infrastructure investments in Africa, our assumptions at the beginning of this research that underlined the fact those Chinese infrastructure investments are to contribute to the development and modernization of Central African countries falls under the framework of scholars depicting China-Africa relations as South cooperation strategy with mutual benefits as impacts. To some extent, facts on Chinese investments in Central African countries did not contradict those assumptions as seen through the number of power plants projects supported by China in Central Africa revealed in Table 1. Other non-power projects have proliferated in Central Africa as of the oil refinery in Chad in 2011, dams in Cameroon, roads constructions in DRC, oil projects in Congo, and official buildings construction in most of those central African countries financed by China.

Even if China is defining its investment strategy with win-win cooperation principles many criticisms related to infrastructure investments are showing their mitigated records. Those criticisms are pointed out below:

- Scholars have shown that the local economic impact of those investment are little as China generally employed Chinese labor, and in subtle ways money invested in infrastructure is repatriated back to China (Kelley, 2012, 38; Dollar, 2016).
- The poor quality of those infrastructure is as well denounced as they will deteriorate few time after their construction and there are little financial or

technical investments to maintain them (Kelley, 2012, 38). This raises the question of the future of those infrastructure projects and their sustainability.

- The financing system of those infrastructures is driving African debt trap as the lending practices were revealed and denounced by many scholars as well. African governments are trapped by cheap credit lines offered by China for the finance of infrastructures in Sub Saharan Africa (Allix, 2017).
- Few local labor received training enabling them to maintain those infrastructures after departure of Chinese workers. Machines provided by Chinese companies have operational instructions in Chinese language that are unreadable for local workers or insufficiently trained engineers.
- Also denounced by scholars are geolocalization of those infrastructures in Africa. Dreher et al. (2016) found in their research on Chinese development finance projects across 3,097 physical locations that were committed in Africa over the 2000–2012 period that when African leaders hold power their birth regions receive substantially more funding from China than other subnational regions. This shows the biased location of Chinese finance projects in local political and business elites' areas due to their involvement as China-Africa local stakeholders.

All practices denounced by scholars in China-Africa infrastructure investments projects at the continental level could be observed also at the regional level in Central Africa as Chinese cooperation with these countries involves as well financing of energy and non-energy projects (cf. Table 1).

In sum, under the influence of Chinese infrastructure projects, Central Africa region is going through structural transformation toward urbanization, economic modernization and diversification of its economy. Despite negative local perceptions and myths surrounding those infrastructure projects, the materiality of infrastructures in Central Africa is shown through the presence of energy projects (power plants, oil and gas infrastructure, dams, highways) and non-energy projects (big statues, stadiums, official building such as airports, parliaments).[1] The materiality of those infrastructures represents signs and symbols of Africans countries revealing that China is more interested in dealing with elite's needs and interests than in real contribution to local development.

Future Perspectives: Toward the Remake of "White Elephant" Projects?

Built infrastructures are symbols of power for local regimes by the sizes and representations behind them. If local interests are really integrated in Chinese infrastructures projects they should drive to more sustainable projects with less impact on the environment and more projects in African development priority sector of agriculture, health, water. Investment schemes could vary from a country to another based on their geographical environment but the priority for the Central African countries that are among the least developed countries should be the same. The state of Chinese investments projects is flooded by criticisms related to Chinese imported labor to the detriment of local people, the socio-environmental impacts of projects contributing to increase climate change issue in Africa, and the lack of competencies to maintain the infrastructure after Chinese departure. Those issues raise the question of Chinese debt trap strategy and the prevalence discourses of China exploiting Africa instead of following the South-South cooperation principles of mutual gain that are widespread in official Chinese and African discourses. Another issue that could be raised from those criticisms is about the sustainability of those infrastructures, which triggers the fear of *"the specter of white elephants"*[2] pending as a Damocles' sword on Central Africa states. Viewed on this perspective, Chinese infrastructure projects are repeating the same errors of the history done by traditional donors in the 1960s after the African independence days. Discussing factors explaining failures of mega development projects and their economic impacts in newly independent African countries, Amankwah-Amoah and Osabutey (2017), based on the case study of the Volta River project in Ghana from the 1950s to the 1960s, cited poor bargaining power and weak integration of the project outcome to future development objectives, with negligence by succeeding political actors. This brings us to the conclusion that despite structural changes brought by Chinese investments, there is at this stage of Chinese infrastructure projects, a risk for a remake of "white elephants" projects in the future. By linking past mistakes of traditional donors, which are being repeated by Chinese infrastructure investors in Africa today—even if their discourses and strategies are different from those of OECD countries—, it is plausible to have a remake of the history of white elephants in the future.

However, an evolution of the "resource for infrastructure" model in Africa has been noticed these last years in China-Africa relations. The shift is that the "Sino-Africa swap formula" is based on African state to Chinese corporate arrangement instead of state-to-state one backed by public diplomacy. It consists in a government granting a resource development production license to a private Chinese investor, while in return getting funding for infrastructure connected to the resources (Olander, 2019). This new model is being experienced in Ghana with the bauxite deal, and with projects in Congo, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Is this a redeeming shift

1 Some pictures of those infrastructures will be shown in the annex of this chapter.

2 The concept of "white elephants" refers to heavy infrastructure projects that were built during the early era of Western and Soviet development aid to African countries in the 1960s and 70s and were abandoned due to lack of resources to pursuing them by the new independent countries.

for China-Africa relations? We should wait and see in the coming years outcomes from these new projects.

Conclusion

China-Africa relations have been subject to many criticisms these last decades of China's return to Africa (Michel and Beuret, 2008; Alden et al., 2008).

Analyzing business relationships between China and Central African countries based on literature review, we found that Chinese infrastructure investments push and pull factors for investing in Central Africa are not different from those linking traditional Western donors to Africa for decades. Besides that, all ingredients are present in China-Central African countries infrastructure investments with outcomes of white elephants in the future, those failed infrastructure projects that have paved the history of African countries cooperation with old donors in the 1960s seem to come back. Specters of white elephants are hanging as Damocles' sword on Central African countries as China-African investments relations are repeating errors of the history of cooperation. Knowledge transfer, lack of competent human resources, Chinese language issue are problems raised in this cooperation practices preventing Africa to control the sustainability of infrastructure projects in Central Africa and in all African countries. Those critical practices are driving Chinese infrastructure investments away from respecting the principles of South-South cooperation claimed in discourses.

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a huge infrastructure project that aims at delivering trillions of dollars in infrastructure financing to Asia, Europe, and Africa. Scholars think that based on Chinese infrastructure financing actual system the BRI raises the risk of debt distress in some borrower countries among which African countries (Hurley et al., 2018). There are fears of seeing Central African area with the BRI projects being trapped by Chinese debt trap diplomacy that raises also the issue of unsustainability of Chinese infrastructure projects in the future.

Is Africa evolving toward a new Chinese white elephant model? This is a relevant question to be asked now and its answer requires further research on the impact of China-Africa relations with focus on the Belt and Road Initiatives project, which implies the spread of Chinese infrastructures' projects by connecting Africa, Asia and Europe.

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Annex: Pictures of Chinese Financed Infrastructure Projects in the Central Africa Region

Image 1: Yaoundé Conference Center in Cameroon (building completion 1985)

Source: http://www.afriquepremiere.net/grande-ceremonie-douverture-du-symposium-international-sur-le-patrimoine-architecturalsipamov-le-27-novembre-2019-a-yaoundecameroun/.

Image 2: Chadian House of Parliament (building completion 2013)

Source: https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-Le-groupe-parlementaire-MPS-condamne-les-tentatives-de-destabilisation_a70503.html. February 8, 2019.

Image 3: Memve'ele dam construction in Cameroon

Source: Photo by Elias Ntungwe Ngalame, 2017.

Image 4: China-Gabon Friendship Stadium (renovation completion 2011)



Source: https://lematin.ma/journal/2017/stade-de-l-amitie-sino-gabonaise-d-angondje/265114.html.

Image 5: Democratic Republic of Congo, Zongo 2 hydroelectric dam (built in 2018)



Source: https://www.afrik21.africa/en/drc-sinohydro-has-finally-completed-the-zongo-2-hydroelectric-dam/July 2018.

11

The Challenges of Cross-National Knowledge Sharing: A Case Study of an International Collaborative Project Between South Korea and Tanzania

Sooa Lee

My study investigates the emergence and development of an Official Development Aid (ODA) project of the Korean government that focuses on the establishment of joint research center in a Tanzanian government funded university. In particular, I used participant observation and in-depth interviews with directors, professors, staff members, and students engaging in the collaborative project between Korea and Tanzania. The micro-level analysis of cross-national university-university collaborative projects in a Korean national university with Tanzania shows the interactions of national and institutional structures and individual agency that affect the process of cross-national knowledge production between Korea and Tanzania. By investigating the relationship between structure and agency of the collaborative project with Bourdieu's concepts of symbolic power and habitus, this study argues that the balance between structural and individual efforts leads to the sustainable relationship between two countries.

Introduction

The fair recognition of researchers engaging in scientific collaboration is an important element to sustain healthy relationships among African and Asian countries. However, despite the growth of collaboration, the contributions of researchers from the Global South are not fairly recognized in scientific collaboration (Rochmyaningsih, 2018). To understand the contributions of researchers from countries with various degrees of development, a close investigation of the relationship between national or institutional structures such as the effects of national, historical, economic, social, and cultural factors on individual agency such as personal will or aspiration is crucial. Therefore, from January to August 2018, I conducted eight months of field work in a mechanical engineering laboratory in South Korea (hereafter Korea, or Korean) that is collaborating with Tanzania. In particular, I used participant observation and in-depth interviews with directors, professors, staff members, and students engaging in the collaborative project between Korea and Tanzania.

By identifying the national, economic, social and cultural contexts that affect the international research collaboration projects from the bottom up, this study reveals the relationship between structures and individual agency in the process of cross-national research collaboration between Korean and Tanzanian universities. In addition, the case study of an international academic research collaboration project in Korea entails the contributions of actors from a bridge country where has rapidly grown economically and technologically throughout the past thirty years. In 2010, Korea emerged as a new donor country of Official Development Aid (ODA) by joining the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Choi, 2011). As a result, studies that have highlighted the transition of Korea from a recipient to donor country have suggested the new role of Korea as a bridge between developed and developing countries (Kim et al., 2013; Kalinowski and Cho, 2012; Mawdsley, 2012; Choi, 2011). In addition, a status of a bridge country has positioned Korean researchers in between the center and periphery in the process of research collaborating with researchers from a developed country (Hwang, 2008).

To study international collaborative projects in Korea with Tanzania, this study uses the definition of Bozeman and Boardman (2014) regarding research collaboration. Bozeman and Boardman (2014, 2) define collaboration as "social processes whereby human beings pool their experience, knowledge and social skills with the objective of producing new knowledge, including knowledge as embedded in technology." With this broader definition, the authors distinguish "knowledge-based" and "property-based" collaborations. According to the authors, knowledge-based collaboration aims at producing knowledge such as journal articles while property-based collaboration aims at generating wealth such as new businesses and profits. Notably, the definition of Bozeman and Boardman does not require the achievement of the aim. That is, the definition prioritizes processes over results.

As a case of the research collaboration between Korea and Tanzania, this study examines the emergence and development of an Official Development Aid (ODA) project of the Korean government that focuses on the establishment of joint research center in a Tanzanian government funded university. By investigating the relationship between structure and agency of the collaborative project with Bourdieu's concepts of symbolic power and habitus, the study argues that the balance between structural and individual efforts leads to the sustainable relationship between two countries. The first section of this chapter examines national contexts of each country as brief economic and technological background of Korea and Tanzania. Then followed by the sections of literature review and theoretical framework, the rest parts of this chapter discuss research design, sites, and findings. Finally, this chapter concludes with contributions, limits, and implications of the study.

National Contexts of Korea and Tanzania

Social, political, and economic contexts of each nation are inseparable from the development of science and technology in each nation, and thus influence the micro-level interactions in research collaboration. Prior to discuss previous studies pertaining to academic research collaboration, this section explores the national contexts of Korea and Tanzania in terms of economy, and science and technology. For example, as a key indicator of national economy, Figure 1 shows the trend of per capita GDP for Korea and Tanzania that has varied over sixty years. In addition, the gap of per capita GDP has increased since 1970s. As of 2016, GDP per capita for Korea is 36,151 USD and Tanzania is 2,518 USD.[1]

Figure 1: GDP per capita for Korea and Tanzania



Source: Maddison Project Database, version 2018.

Until the 1970s, S&T in Korea was in the stage of adopting and imitating foreign technologies (Hemmert, 2007). Industrial R&D has been developed in the 1980s while basic research capabilities have been built up since the 1990s. Hemmert (2007, 30) suggested that the Korean S&T policies sought transition from a "technological catch-up nation" to a "contributor of cutting-edge knowledge" by expand-

1 See www.ggdc.net/maddison for documentation and explanation of the data series.

ing R&D resources after 1997. In addition, the rapid growth of Korean economy in the 90s led the continuous raise of R&D investment in Korea (Bark, 2004; Wagner et al., 2003). Because the government driven investment on science and technology in the 70s and 80s was positively associated with the national economic growth, the Korean government stressed the importance of overcoming the financial crisis in 1997 through R&D (Bark, 2004). According to the OECD (2018), companies, research institutes, universities, and government laboratories in Korea have increased the ratio of R&D expenditure since the end of 20th century and the ratio has reached around 4% in 2015. The ratio of R&D expenditure for Tanzania is available only for three years: 0.34% for 2007, 0.38% for 2010, and 0.53% for 2013. Even though the R&D expenditure as percentage of GDP does not sufficiently explain the national context of science and technology, the ratio suggests that Korea has invested relatively larger percentage of GDP on the development of S&T since 2004.

As for Tanzania, even though the expenditures on S&T increased during the 1980s, the amount of expenditure was low and the large amount of the expenditure relied on international funding (COSTECH, 2015). That is, financial constraints limit the growth of S&T capacity in Tanzania. Therefore, the Tanzanian government first established economic development programs such as the National Economic Survival Program in 1981, The Structural Adjustment Program in 1982, The Economic Recovery Program in 1986, and the Economic and Social Action Program in 1989 with the induction of foreign aid in the 80s (Enos, 1995). These economic programs do not entail direct plans for the S&T development. However, the development of economy will eventually lead to the reduction of foreign dependency of S&T expenditures for Tanzania. In a recent classification of the countries in terms of the GNI, the World Bank (2018) defined Tanzania as a country with the low-income economies (countries with a GNI per capita of $1,005 or less) and Korea as a country with the high-income economies (countries with a GNI per capita of $12,236 or more). In terms of the level of economic development that considers trade policy and geopolitical tensions in addition to per capita GNI, the United Nations (2018) categorized Korea and Tanzania as developing country. The United Nations (2018) also demonstrated that Tanzania is one of the least developed countries (LDCs) based on the compiled data of per capita GNI, a human assets index, and an economic vulnerability index.

The statistical data such as GDP per capita and R&D expenditure per GDP from the Maddison Project Database, the World Bank, and OECD implied that two countries—Korea and Tanzania—are in the various levels of development in terms of economy and science and technology. In particular, according to the categorizations of the World Bank and OECD, Korea is a high-income, developing country that emphasizes the investment on the development of science and technology. At the same time, the donor-recipient relationship in the Official Development Aid (ODA) situates Korea as an emerging country. In order to understand the national contexts of Korea and Tanzania, this section of the chapter briefly examined national economic and S&T status of each country using statistical data and country categorizations. Because this study focuses on the case of university collaboration between Korea and Tanzania, the following section discusses previous studies regarding university research collaboration.

Literature Review

Previous studies pertaining to university research collaboration have examined the following issues: macro-level and structural factors affecting research collaboration, micro-level and individual factors influencing the collaboration, and the framing issues regarding various types of collaborations. As for cross-national collaborations, Clark (2010) argued that government policies driven from the knowledge economy encouraged international university-university collaborations in the US. Reviewing the guidelines of research proposals funded by National Science Foundation (NSF) and National Institute of Health (NIH), the author showed that the major funding agencies in the US promoted international university-university collaborations. By suggesting S&T policy as a key driver of university-university collaborations, Clark (2010) demonstrated how macro-level structures influence S&T collaborations across national boundaries.

Studies regarding barriers of research collaboration have also examined other structural factors. That is, despite policy driven efforts that promote national and international academic collaborations, high communication costs that are resulted from physical, linguistic, and institutional distances among researchers hinder collaborations (Lee and Bozeman, 2005; Ponomariov and Boardman, 2010; Kalawong, 2016). Using a case study of a network of six universities located in Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia, Kalawong (2016) claimed that dissimilar bureaucratic systems and languages hinder international academic collaborations. Lee and Bozeman (2005) argued that, to reduce communication costs, academic researchers tend to collaborate with others who are located in immediate distance. Landry and Amara (1998) suggested another obstacle: transaction costs for initiating, coordinating, monitoring, and enforcing collaborative performances based on contracts. The authors argued that transaction costs encourage informal rather than formal collaborations among academic researchers. According to Ponomariov and Boardman (2010) university research centers increased the productivity of research collaborations by reducing such transaction costs. The strength of previous studies regarding barriers of national and international research collaboration is that they discuss embedded structures of research collaboration. However, structural approaches do not show the role of micro-level actors engaged in international research collaborations.

By contrast to studies focused on S&T policies and structural barriers, Wang (2016) identified individual-level influence on research collaborations. To articulate the impact of the size and the strength of an individual's collaborative network on the quality of his or her research, Wang (2016) examined the relationship between the total number of citations, the number of coauthors, and the frequency of collaboration during a five-year period between 1980 and 2009. In this study, the total number of citations referred to the usefulness of scientific knowledge, the number of coauthors indicated the size of collaborative networks, and the frequency of collaboration referred to the strength of the collaborative networks. Analyzing the panel data of 1,042 U.S. academic scientists in the fields of biology, chemistry, computer science, earth and atmospheric sciences, electrical engineering, and physics, Wang (2016) showed that the number of citations increased as the size of network increased to 58 co-authors. After that threshold, the number of citations decreased. Similarly, frequent collaboration increased the number of citations at first, but later, it hindered the quality of research. Even though this study is limited in the selected fields, the author showed the individual-level influence on research collaborations. While the study of Wang (2016) is based on quantitative data, my study is qualitative and offers more nuance into the power dynamics between theses collaborators.

The summary of a workshop on Examining Core Element of International Research Collaboration organized by National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine in the US addresses the direct engagement between S&T policies and individual actors. Complementing studies pertaining to obstacles to domestic and international academic collaborations, the summary stressed the importance of framing issues regarding university collaborations across national boundaries (NAS, 2011). During the workshop, domestic and international experts on international research collaborations discussed the relevant issues such as cultural difference, research ethics, risk management, intellectual property, and export controls. For example, as for cultural issues, Dr. Riall Nolan, a Professor of Anthropology at Purdue University, suggested the importance of understanding the forms of collaborations by identifying three basic forms of international university-university collaborations: Predominant capability, Complementary partnerships, or Technical Assistance (NAS, 2011). According to the summary of a workshop (NAS, 2011), "predominant capability" refers a partnership between universities processing the highest level of knowledge in a specific field, "complementary partnerships" refers the relationship between universities that supplement each other's weakness, and "technical assistance" refers a partnership between universities in helping relationship. By framing cross-national university collaborations at the ground-level, the summary shows how individual actors and structural policies interact. In other words, through the workshop, micro-level actors suggest policies that influence their collaborative activities.

The summary of a workshop also included the perspective of Tembeka Mpako-Ntusi, a Director of Research at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) in Cape Town, South Africa. She said: "In the case of South Africa, the historical issues of race, past intimidation, and power imbalances play a role" (NAS, 2011, 23). That is, national context influences the relationship between collaborative partners. According to Koehn and Obama (2014), even though international university-university collaborations between North (mainly in Europe and North America) and South (mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa) have pursued equal relationship between partners by sharing the recognition and effect of collaborative projects, in reality, achieving equal relationship is difficult for cross-national collaborations between developed and developing countries. While the summary of a workshop illustrates the relevance between structures (i.e., S&T policies and historical issues) and agency (i.e., individual participants in a workshop), it fails to provide the detailed description of international collaborative projects. Instead, the summary only offers an abstraction of the macro/structural forces and the micro/individual experience. That is, the framework of the international collaboration suggested by the summary do not take into account the nuance that occurs through the examination of individual case of Korea, a country that is situated neither center nor periphery in the process of research collaboration (Hwang, 2008).

This section investigated previous studies pertaining to academic research collaborations. The previous studies have focused on the difficulties and influences on collaborations among universities within a same country or from countries with similar economic and linguistic conditions. In addition, the NAS summary of a workshop suggested that cultural and power issues prevail in international academic research collaboration between developed and developing countries. While previous studies have shown either macro-level structure or micro-level agency, or the abstraction of macro- and micro-level issues relevant to university collaborations, none of them has offered the in-depth engagement of both structure and agency. Investigating international collaborative projects in a Korean university with a Tanzanian university, this study focuses on the close relationship between national and institutional structures such as economic, social, and cultural capitals and individual agency such as personal aspiration in the process of cross-national knowledge sharing.

Theoretical Framework

By situating micro-level academic research collaboration in broader social contexts such as national and institutional structures, this study investigates the relationship between structure and agency with Bourdieu's concepts of symbolic power and habitus. According to Bourdieu, society consists of individual and group agents, but symbolic powers, such as economic, social, and cultural capitals limit their activities within society. Bourdieu (1986) defines capital as a form of social structure consists of both accumulated labor of individuals and their social energy.

The social space consists of agents and groups while economic and cultural capitals determine the social class of those agents and groups (Bourdieu, 2012). That is, symbolic power of capital is in dialect with agents within the society continuously shaping each other. Bourdieu also (2012) suggests that not only does social structure determine individual or group agency, but also that agents continuously build the social structures through habitus. Here, habitus is defined as a social space generated historically through interactions of objective probabilities (structure) and subject aspirations (agency), it is flexible, and this flexibility strongly structures the rules and regulations of society (Bourdieu, 2012).

Research Design and Sites

To examine a collaborative project in Korea with Tanzania, I selected a mechanical engineering laboratory in Korea that conducts joint research projects with Tanzania on energy and sustainability. I had informal conversation with 30 Korean graduate students who I met in a Korean graduate student organization in a research-based university in the US and identified one Korean laboratory by asking the students whether there is any laboratory collaborating with developing countries. To prevent possible disclosure of interviewees, I removed personal identifiers in this chapter.

The Korean research team that I selected conducts research on materials and manufacturing that includes rapid prototyping, micro machining, nanocomposite, and functionally graded materials. A joint research project of the team with a Tanzanian university centers on the implementation of a joint research center, which has been funded by the Korean Ministry of Science and ICT for four years. The center aims at developing, educating, and commercializing innovative appropriate technologies that are suitable for Tanzanian environment. The National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF Korea) approved the collaborative project in April 2017, and the Korean research team began operating a research center in the Tanzanian university in collaboration with local professors, students, and members from Non-Government Organization (NGO). The project is scheduled to end in 2020. During my fieldwork, I observed interactions including laboratory and field experiments, meetings, and conferences among participants engaging in the joint research center, and took detailed notes on my observations based on a protocol aligned with my research questions. In particular, fifteen participants including directors, professors, staff members, and students who have been engaging in the joint projects were observed and interviewed.

Findings

Economic capital

The economic capital for the joint research center has emerged along with national science and technology agenda. In August 2011, the term “technology sharing” occurred in Korea as the key agenda for the development of national science and technology by the National Science and Technology Commission (NSTC). Based on the national agenda, in 2012 the Korean government developed the Korean

model of Official Development Aid (ODA), which included appropriate technology as means of technology sharing with other developing countries. To promote technology sharing between Korea and developing countries, the Korean Ministry of Science and ICT has established local science and technology centers in universities in Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Vietnam since 2015.[2]

A Korea-Tanzania joint research center is one of the centers that have been implemented and operated in a Tanzanian government funded university by the Korean Ministry of Science and ICT and NRF Korea. For the project, from April 2017 to December 2020, the Korean Ministry of Science and ICT has supported two billion KRW (approximately 1.8 million USD) and a Tanzanian university has provided research space including land and buildings.[3] The human resources of the center consist of the Korean principle investigator (PI and a Korean director), a local Korean director, three Korean local staff members, three Tanzanian staff members. In addition to staff members, Korean graduate students advised by the Korean PI and members from a local NGO are actively participating in the research programs organized by the center.

As economic capital, financial supports of the Korean government both promote and constrain individuals. As a promoter, financial supports from the Korean government has initiated the center and gathered individuals who are interested in the field. However, at the same time, financial limits constrain individual activities in the center. A director J said: “I think this collaboration will be more successful if we conduct a number of projects that are needed in Tanzania.”[4] In other words, the director believes that the sustainable development of the center requires the combination of different projects rather than focusing on one project. He also said, “But, 500 million KRW for one year is not at all enough for conducting several projects that bring the synergetic effect.”[5] To overcome the financial limits that constrain activities of the center, the director claimed that he has been actively applying for the other sources of funding. The director argued that the center must generate profit for at least fifty percent of the operation fee in order to sustain after 2020. Both Korean and Tanzanian participants also acknowledged the importance of acquiring financial support from the Tanzanian government for sustaining the center after the termination of the financial support from the Korean government.[6]

2 See https://www.gnsat.or.kr/index.do.

3 See https://www.gnsat.or.kr/index.do

4 Director J, June 23, 2018.

5 Director J, June 23, 2018.

6 Directors and Tanzanian professors.

Social capital

From the view point of participants, social capital played vital role for the emergence of the project. A director H mentioned that many professors, students, and missionaries come to his office and discuss their project with developing countries because his research team has been collaborating with developing countries for several years.[7] As the team is well known as conducting projects with developing countries, any information regarding developing countries such as relevant research projects, businesses, and human resources is naturally gathered in his office. According to the interviewees, human resources of the Korea-Tanzania joint research center are also gathered through social capitals they have.[8] For example, a director J said that he met a director H through a mutual friend. In 2010, J and his wife provided solar lamps to approximately 700–800 Korean missionaries suggesting possible businesses ideas such as selling solar lamps for fund raising. Later in 2013, one of the missionaries received their solar lamp contacted him and his wife and asked if they could build a solar panel on their local building so that the local church can start businesses.[9]

The director J built a small solar panel on the roof of the missionary's building and set up six micro businesses such as a restaurant, a hair shop, and a copy center. The owners of the businesses were local people and that was the first business center they built up in Tanzania. Their solar panel and business were on the local news and people contacted and asked them to set up the second and third business centers in other locations. When his wife went to Korea and gave a speech about their work in Tanzania, a Korean professor K told her that the Korean government is looking for a specialist who can serve as a Korean local director in Africa. A Korean professor K then connected J, who is interested in building solar panels in Tanzania and H, who is interested in collaborating with developing countries. The directors did not know each other, but they had a number of mutual friends.[10] According to the director J, "other friends told me that the director H is really a decent and hard working person. That's why I decided to apply for this project and work with him."[11] In this saying, the director J addressed the importance of meeting a trust worthy person to work with using social capitals he possesses. In a similar vein with the director H, the director J obtained crucial social capitals in advance to begin working in the local center.

7 Director H, April 25, 2018.

8 All interviewees.

9 Director J, June 23, 2018.

10 Director J, June 23, 2018.

11 Director J, June 23, 2018.

Cultural capital

As for cultural capital, the interviewees said that social norms are cultural barriers for collaborating with each other. According to classical sociologists, social norms are informal rules that govern people's behavior (Durkheim, 2014 [1895]; Parsons, 1937; Coleman, 1990). One of the local staff members argued that unspoken rules of Korean and Tanzanian society often conflict when operating the collaborative projects. The most typical example was the speed of the work. Both Korean and Tanzanian participants claimed that the working speed of their partners often cause troubles. For Korean participants, the progress of the project was too slow in Tanzania, and for Tanzanian participants, the progress of Korean people was too fast. While working on the engineering part, both Korean students and Tanzanian technicians complained that collaboration is difficult because the expectations regarding the working speed is different in each country.[12]

Another typical example was the payment. According to the local staff member, local people in Tanzania are accustomed to the pre-payment. However, the Korean government, the sponsor of the project, is more used to the post-payment with receipts. Therefore, when the center paid for the catering for the meeting with local officials, the local staff member claimed:

> These local people, they are accustomed to work certain way. Now [our center is] creating an environment where people think 'oh if we work with them, they will pay you after a certain number of days.' It's not good mood. So I tried to call them and explain. I tried to make it very clear that we would pay earlier if we could. I understand because we are working on Korea type of situation so it's different. So these types of situation and rules, at some point, we need to find a way to balance between ours and Korea for stability.[13]

The above passage suggests that the different payment culture of Korea and Tanzania generated un-welcomed environment for Korean people working in Tanzania. As a local staff member, who understands both Korean and Tanzanian cultures, the interviewee explained the frustration and concerns.

In addition to the payment culture, historical experience, as cultural capital, created tension between local officials and Korean collaborators. To implement solar panel and smart-meter systems in a local village with low accessibility to electricity, the joint research center had to report their work to the local district office, and the local officials assumed that Korean collaborators would sell Korean batteries for the solar panel once the project is over. The tension decreased when the Korean local director told them that the center is using batteries from any country that performs

12 Korean students, Korean staff members, Tanzanian technicians, Tanzanian staff members.

13 A Tanzanian staff member, June 23, 2018.

better for the Tanzanian local environment. With regard to the assumptions that are unfavorable to Korean collaborators, the local staff members said as follows:

> It's very difficult when you are trying to bring something which is from Korea to here because the norms are very different … People sometimes don't want to use something totally different from what they expect. They have a lot of assumptions towards it. I felt those assumptions when we went to the district office. We had district officials questioning our motivations. Because [officials in the district office] don't understand, they think there's conspiracy behind it. You know, that's very difficult. Now I'm in between because I actually know how these [solar panels and smart-meter systems] are going to be helpful, but I should understand how these people feel because of how we've been traditionally raised, you know. That's very difficult so I'm trying to explain this situation to the Korean staff members and engineers [working for the center] by [saying that,] 'actually, I understand what Tanzanian officials are saying.' But, I also work in the center so I actually understand what we are doing [with Korean people]. I'm kind of cut in the middle.[14]

In the interview, by addressing why he should understand how these local officials feel—because he understands how they have been traditionally raised—the local staff member who serves as a gate keeper between Korean people and local officials asserted that historical experience explains the assumption of local officials.

As shown in the cases of working speed, payment cultures, and unfavorable assumptions, social norms and historical experience as cultural capital cause conflicts and frustration in the process of cross-national knowledge production. However, common historical experience, shared cultural capital in other words, produces favorable environments for the collaborative projects. For instance, a professor from a Tanzania university said:

> We are very happy when we collaborate with countries like Korea because Koreans remember when they were like us. When your parents were growing, it was just like Tanzania. The gap [between Korea and Tanzania] is not as big as, for example, the US and Tanzania. Of course we are collaborating with the US. But none of them remembers when they were like us. It was long time ago. Koreans remember. This is important.[15]

Above passage highlights the importance of shared experience as people from economically and technologically developing countries for collaboration. The interviewee suggested that this cultural experience leads Korea as a unique collaborative partner for Tanzania and thus creates favorable environment for collaboration.

14 A Tanzanian staff member, June 23, 2018.

15 A Tanzanian professor, June 29, 2018.

Habitus

The process of cross-national knowledge sharing occurring in the Tanzania-Korea joint research center is the habitus that contains the continuous interactions of structure and agency. While economic, social, and cultural capitals influence behaviors and minds of participants engaging in joint research projects, the participants strongly asserted that they are willingly engaging in the project. When I asked whether it was his decision to conduct collaborate projects, director H said:

> Yes, I don't have to do this. As you know, in terms of the journal paper publication, the Tanzanian project is not that helpful for me. But, it is fun. I like conducting this collaborative project.[16]

According to the director, less publication may be disadvantage to his career because the number of publications determines the success and failure of researchers in Korean universities. By mentioning that it is optional for him, the director emphasized his personal will to sustain the project.

In addition to individual aspirations of participants, the engagement of local village people shows the flexibility of the knowledge sharing process in the project. During the implementation of solar-panels and smart-metering system in the local village of Tanzania, the participants address how they engage the local knowledge in the village. One of the Korean students who participated in the project said:

> A local staff member taught me that internal switches in our smart meters are troublesome in a local environment. According to a local staff member, in a local village, technicians must climb up the telephone pole whenever the switches turn down. Before I heard this from a local staff member, I've never thought about this kind of inconvenience. So I removed all switches in the smart-meters.[17]

The above interviewee suggested that the production of smart-meter for the Tanzanian local village could not be successful without the local knowledge from a local staff member.

The team also encouraged local villagers to share their knowledge in the process of technology development. The following excerpt is what a Tanzanian staff member argued:

> We tell people that this is a smart meter and this is still in development so many features can be added. I think, taking parts on developing such technology can have a greater impact for local people because it is something that they want to be this way. It will be

16 Director H, April 25, 2018.

17 A Korean student, June 18, 2018.

> very beneficial because local people [who will use the technology] will cut it to what they need more. But other meters [that are installed in other villages,] are not anything special, but it's just a meter.[18]

The above interviewee claimed that the engagement of local village people in the process of technology development leads to the greater social impact by incorporating ideas from the users. In addition, the interviewee addressed the convenience and uniqueness of the technology developed in the project when he mentioned the active involvement of local villagers. The interviewee also suggested that

> People [in the local village] are commenting on what they want to do because they know what's in processing. They are like 'Will smart meter do this and that?' So they ask, but they kind of like giving their opinion of what they want. … They were fascinated.[19]

Because the smart meter they developed and installed in the Tanzanian local village was new to the villagers, the interviewee suggested that the local villagers were curious and fascinated. The interviewee's words also showed that the fascination of local villagers resulted from the flexibility of the knowledge-sharing process.

Conclusion

The detailed description of the emergence and development of cross-national research projects with Bourdieu's concepts of symbolic powers and habitus identified the relationship between structures and individual agency in the process of cross-national knowledge sharing. In particular, the close investigation of the joint research projects, interactions between research teams, and interviews with participants contributed to identifying economic, social, and cultural constraints or parameters as well as individual aspiration that shape the cross-national knowledge sharing.

In the collaborative project between Korea and Tanzania, financial supports from the Korean government initiated the project and gathered human resources while the limited budget constrained individual activities. At the same time, relevant information and human resources gathered through social capital possessed by participants. As for cultural capital, while working speed, payment system, and unfavorable assumptions created barriers between Korean and Tanzanian participants, shared historical experience generated friendly atmosphere. Finally, individual aspiration and local engagement suggested that the process of cross-national knowledge sharing occurring in the joint project is the habitus that structure and agency continuously influence each other.

18 A Tanzanian staff member, June 23, 2018.

19 A Tanzanian staff member, June 23, 2018.

Because this chapter only discussed one case of the joint research centers, generalization of the case will cause problems. However, by situating the joint research center and the Korean and Tanzanian participants in broader social contexts, this study implied that the sustainable relationship between Korea and Tanzania requires the balance between structure and agency. The joint research center would not emerge and develop without the combination of structural supports from the Korean and Tanzanian governments, individual networks, and wills. Furthermore, the cross-national knowledge sharing is not sustainable without the balance among economic-, social-, cultural-capitals, individual aspiration, and the local engagement.

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12

Mafan: Community Formation and Dynamics of Nigerian-Chinese Interracial Interaction in Guangzhou City

Kudus Oluwatoyin Adebayo

The notion of *mafan* or troublemakers is one of the main organising frames with which the identification of Nigerians subsists in Guangzhou, China. This chapter situates this identification in the processes of the constitution of Nigerian community and highlights how interracial interactions of Nigerians with Chinese people have been shaped by three key issues: transformations linked to the socio-historical phases of migrant community formation; episodic civil disobedience and public disturbances that the host society considers threatening of social order, and African image remaking struggles informed by the problem of criminality and subsequent attempt at evolving dissociative boundary that thrives on intra-group Othering of Nigerians by other Africans in the city. The chapter advances our understanding of the universe of rarely discussed historical, social and political circumstances surrounding African presence in Chinese cities.

Introduction

How have the socio-historical processes linked to the congregation of Africans shaped the dynamics of Afro-Chinese interactions in China? Focusing on the notion of *mafan*[1] or troublemakers as one of the organising frame with which the identification of an African community subsists in Guangzhou city, I argue that contemporary Afro-Chinese interactions cannot be understood without considering how African communities are constituted in Chinese cities. Specifically, I argue that interracial interactions of Africans with Chinese people in Guangzhou have been shaped by three key issues: transformations linked to the socio-historical phases of migrant community formation; episodic civil disobedience and public disturbances that the host society considers threatening of social order, and African image remaking struggles informed by the problem of criminality and subsequent attempt at evolving dissociative boundary that thrives on intra-group Othering.

1 Simply means "trouble" in Chinese.

The increased visibility of African bodies in China, especially in the city of Guangzhou, has made "Africans in China" an attractive topic of interest. Several studies exist on the broader economic and legal manifestations and implications. Some provided in-depth explorations of African trading activities and networks (Bertoncello and Bredeloup, 2007; Cisse, 2015; Lyons, Brown, and Li, 2012; Marfaing, 2019; Marfaing and Thiel, 2015; Yang and Altman, 2011) and experiences of documentation issues, profiling and navigational tactics of African traders at China ports of entry (Bodomo, 2015; Haugen, 2019; Lan, 2016a, 2017a; Mathews, Lin, and Yang, 2014). Besides, focus on the cultural consequences of African presence is growing, owing to the spread of Afro-Chinese intercultural relationships through diverse and intersecting forces of mixed-marriages (Joseph, Yun, and Teya, 2017; Lan, 2015; Zhou, 2017), people-to-people encounters and dynamics (Zhou et al., 2016). Moreover, more recent studies delved into the racialised construction of Africans and how institutional practices of the Chinese state presently condition their targeting and policing, illegalization and discrimination (Haugen, 2019; Huang, 2019). While these studies explain important and current Afro-Chinese interactional moments, practices and relationships in China, they are unable to account for how migrant community formation processes have historically shaped these conditions.

This study, therefore, documents and analyses the social and historical trajectories of formation of the Nigerian community and the emergence of *mafan* as an identificatory category within which interracial interactions between Nigerians and Chinese people became defined in the broader African community in Guangzhou, China. Adopting the notion of *mafan*, a term that Nigerians frequently encounter in their interaction with Chinese institutions and peoples, I also explain how the socio-historical context and dynamics of civil disobedience and intra-African struggle to represent itself and remake its image as a model migrant community contribute to the identification of Nigerians as troublemakers.

In exploring *mafan* in the context of the interaction between Nigerians and Chinese in Guangzhou, I conceive the term as an "identification" category in the sense of Brubaker and Cooper (2000). Conceptualising *mafan* as an identification takes cognizance of who is doing the identifying without presupposing that an internal sameness, distinctiveness or bounded groupness would result from the process of identifying. Following Brubaker and Cooper (2000, 14), I further stress its situational and contextual character and seek to understand how it emerged and has crystallized under specific historical and socio-political circumstances.

The study relies on ethnographic and interview data collected in Guangzhou city in 2017 from Nigerian migrants and Chinese people. After this introduction, I discuss the context of the presence of Africans in China, with a specific focus on their population and profile, experiences and challenges in Guangzhou. Next, I describe the methodology in detail and then follow up with the presentation of the findings where I trace the evolution of the Nigerian community over two migration waves. Here, I describe the process of community formation and analyze the critical transformations that inform the identification of Nigerians as troublemakers. The last section concludes the chapter.

This contribution sheds light on how Nigerians became *mafan* in China, a group that is not only heavily policed but Othered by intra-African dynamics of relations. It also advances the literature on the African presence in China beyond the dominant discussions of African trading, race, and illegality. Moreover, it responds to the scholarly invitation, which calls to interrogate the processes that are critical for making sense of the contemporary formation of Africa's new diasporas in East Asia.

Africans in China

One protracted issue in the field of "Africans in China" studies is the lack of consensus on the population of Africans in major Chinese cities. The unavailability of accurate official statistics in cities like Guangzhou where many Africans visit and reside has permitted conjectures and speculations with figures running between 20,000 (Castillo, 2014; Haugen, 2019) to over 100,000 (Bodomo and Ma, 2012; Wang, 2015). In the absence of both credible data source on inflows and mechanism for determining the size of undocumented Africans, it may take time to resolve the issue of how many Africans are in China. Nevertheless, scholarly views converge on the position that Africans are key participants in China's 21st century migration reality, especially in big trading cities (Bodomo, 2010; Pieke, 2011). In Guangzhou especially, three main groups are noticeable: those who attempt to live in Guangzhou; those who recurrently visit the city; and those who pass through it—the majority (Castillo, 2015). Also, African migration to China is a male endeavor, dominated by young and middle-aged men from Nigeria (Bodomo and Pajancic, 2015; Liang, 2014).

With a growing presence, however, Africans have become targets of legal reforms and are more susceptible to increased policing and surveillance, even though they were initially considered a positive force for local economic growth (Haugen, 2019; Huang, 2019; Lan, 2015). Most of them have problems renewing their visas and usually end up overstaying as a result (Bork-Hüffer and Yuan-Ihle, 2014; Haugen, 2012, 2015; Lan, 2017a; Liang, 2014). The reason for this, observes Liang (2014, 1), is that "the influx and settling of large numbers of African immigrants in Guangzhou have caused problems of illegal residence, illegal immigration, and illegal employment (also known as "the three illegals")." The "triple illegal" or "the three illegal" or *san fei* immigration regime in China is a fallout of nation-state's continued and cumulative responses to the presence of foreigners (Haugen, 2015). As a result, many Africans experience social and structural discriminations, racism, and stereotypes. Africans experience institutional discrimination and negative perceptions in China, from the port of entry up to where they work and live.

To be precise, Bodomo (2015), in studying the interaction and discriminatory encounters of regular African visitors to China, reports that African travellers reported cases of tension, conflicts and unpleasant experiences. Likewise, Bodomo and Ma (2010) find that law enforcement officers single out Africans for routine visa checks. Whereas billboard notices advise all foreigners to carry a passport, Africans experience overwhelming stoppages, interrogation and harassment, both publicly in the streets and during private moments in the restaurants (Bodomo and Ma, 2010). Some scholars allude to the problem of increased raids targeted at Africans by "foreigner police" (Bork-Hüffer and Yuan-Ihle, 2014), with public security practices contributing to their deepening construction as *san fei* (Huang, 2019). Within places of residence, raids over visa are also frequent in African dominated neighborhoods (Haugen, 2019; Zhou et al., 2016).

At the local level, negative perceptions and attitudes drive social discrimination against Africans. Chinese people are finding it challenging to accept African migrants even though they acknowledge their presence (Le Bail, 2009). Everyday Chinese people maintain ambivalent attitudes towards their African visitors even in cities where a lot of economic interactions and space sharing occur between them (Adams, 2015; Zhou et al., 2016). As shown in Zhou et al. (2016), Chinese people hold negative stereotypes towards Africans regarding physical attractiveness, personality traits, and abilities. Also, 56% of surveyed Chinese people view Africans as violent, and nearly three-quarters believe that black people had unpleasant body odour.

Furthermore, some studies highlight the challenges of racism experienced by Africans in China. Zhang (2008), for instance, mentions that Chinese people direct psychosocial xenophobia against Africans. African teachers working in rural China complain about latent racism (Pelican and Tatah, 2009). In a critical comparative exploration of campus racism and contemporary internet racism against Africans, Cheng (2011) also discovers that Chinese freely deploy extreme racist constructions and comments towards black people. As shown in the following quotes, the constructions range from fear to utter disgust about African presence:

> "It is a racial invasion!"; "Public safety is gone!"; "Are they becoming the 57th ethnic group?" (officially the government identifies 56 ethnic groups in China); "China is not a camp for refugees; our resources are already scant"; "Not obeying law and order is their nature, not to mention their body odour!"; "Go home you African dogs! You are here only to share our businesses and our women!" (Cheng, 2011, 567)

Hence, in the view of everyday Chinese, a black person remains a racialised 'Other.' Africans are disparaged using labels such as *hēi gui* (black devils) and *aizibing* (AIDS) while *feizhou* (evil continent) is used to describe the African continent (Sautman, 1994). Besides, the media projects racism and constructions that demean Africans (Cheng, 2011; Hood, 2011; Le Bail, 2009). Le Bail (2009) argues that the Chinese media has not helped in improving the relationship between the local population and African migrants. Moreover, conflict potentialities are present in Guangzhou due to adverse media reporting about Africans regarding differences in lifestyle, public health hazards and threats, and social problems (Zhou et al., 2016).

Thus, African migration to China is real and complicated. As shown in the preceding paragraphs, extant studies reveal the complications in African settlement in Chinese cities, from their living conditions, trading activities in different Chinese spaces to encounters with their host community. However, most of the previous studies did not reflect on how the processes and circumstances of community formation have shaped Afro-Chinese interaction. This study sheds light on the broader dynamics of interracial interaction by tracing the historical and social trajectories of Nigerian community formation in Guangzhou. Through the notion of *mafan*, I intend to show how Nigerians became an Othered migrant group in the city and the ways that this Othering is shaping visitor-host interactions.

Methodology

I adopted an ethnographic qualitative design and conducted fieldwork over two months in two separate visits to Guangzhou in 2017. Guangzhou is a megacity and a major port city in China's Guangdong province, located in the Southeast of the province and to the north of the Pearl River Delta, bordering the South China Sea and adjacent to Hong Kong and Macau (The People's Government of Guangzhou Municipality, 2010). The concentration of Africans in the city informed the choice of this location.

Primarily, I conducted observations in various settings, mainly in Yuexiu and Baiyun districts of Guangzhou, where many Nigerians work. The in-depth, key informant and life history interviews, informal conversations and a mixture of participant and non-participant observations were applied to collect relevant data. In all, I interviewed a total of sixty-nine (69) participants: Nigerians (52) and Chinese (17). While Nigerian participants included short- and long-term residents, community leaders and a Nigerian embassy official, three groups of Chinese participants were involved—shop owners, property agents, and regular people. Two of the Chinese participants were married to Nigerian men at the time of data collection.

I conducted most of the interviews in English language and pidgin (localised English that is widely spoken by Nigerians). Two Chinese university students conducted interviews with Chinese participants. I reviewed the information as acquired to ensure that informational gaps were identified and promptly filled. However, it was difficult to interview people outside their work hours as many live outside the city and only come into Guangzhou for work. Also, because of time constraints and the problem of convenience, interviews with some Nigerian shop owners were done in the presence of others—customers or acquaintances. When I suspect that the presence of others affected a response, I did an informal follow-up discussion to seek clarification when the participants were alone. Female participants, who are a hard to reach group, were connected through churches and interviewed after church services—either within the church space or at a nearby restaurant.

Interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and processed alongside the field notes for qualitative analysis. I processed transcripts using NVivo 11, after which I conducted thematic, content and narrative analyses. In doing thematic analysis, I conducted axial coding whereby new codes were created from the main variables in the research questions. Content analysis was carried out to explore sub-themes and unanticipated issues in the coded segments of the transcripts. Narrative analysis was done on in-depth interviews and life histories to develop a coherent narrative of the processes that inform the construction of Nigerians as *mafan* in Guangzhou city. Data presentation was done using summaries and direct quotations. All the names in the section that follows are pseudonyms.

Mafan in Nigerian Community

In 2017 when I visited Guangzhou, a lot of Nigerian migrants complained that the Chinese authorities have stepped up raids in a bid to drastically reduce their population in the city. Although this intensified policing affects members of other African communities, many Nigerians believe that the host society targets them for expulsion given their reputation as *mafan*.

In many markets where Africans interact with Chinese people, one of the first Chinese words that a newcomer would likely pick up is *mafan*. It is common to hear "you *mafan*!" from a Chinese shop owner who has spent the last few minutes haggling with an African over a product. Africans too can deploy the same vocabulary to suggest that the Chinese seller is not considerate with pricing. In this sort of interaction, *mafan* is an innocent enough word which is meant to keep business negotiation going.

However, for Nigerian migrants, *mafan* is a characterization that transcends business interaction. The word has a deeper meaning, with significant consequences for their social experience in the city. As an example, a Chinese shop owner believes that Nigerians "have moods, and [are] quite stubborn" (SO4/male/27) while Chinese housing agents perceive Nigerians as synonymous with trouble, in that "they don't quite get along well with their neighbors. Sometimes, they are just hard to understand" (HA5/male/35). In a more elaborate conversation, another housing agent says that when Nigerians rent an apartment and enter into an agreement:

> They come to me to complain, saying the electric fee is too expensive, one month later. I helped them to check and found that they didn't turn off the air-conditioner, keeping it on without being at home. But, they wouldn't listen to me and continued to complain… When they don't pay the fee on time, and I tell them to leave, they will be rude to me. (HA4/female/35)

In social settings where cross-cultural understanding is limited between migrants and their host, troubling circumstances are not unexpected. Unfortunately, interactions that Chinese people consider troubling have increasingly defined Nigerians as a group, with *mafan* constituting a shorthand for characterising them.

More importantly, many of my Nigerian interlocutors in the streets of Guangzhou think that the *mafan* characterization is more than the label imposed on them by Chinese people. They are of the view that, indeed, *mafan* routinely shapes the processes of social inclusion in the city. While interfacing with the institutions of the host society, in particular, the *mafan* label is used as a basis for dismissing Nigerians seeking one form of assistance or another, such that:

> [When] you are forced to tender document, they will be saying Nigeria *mafan*, Nigeria *mafan*. There is nothing that you want to do, it is always a problem, it gets to a stage that when you want to do registration, they say that they are no longer doing registration for Nigerians and that Nigerians should go back. (Adeoye/male/54)

Another Nigerian who has approached a Chinese police department for a housing registration also says that being perceived as *mafan* affected him:

> Assuming I am not a Nigerian, they will not take up to five minutes. I was there from morning till 3 o'clock. I was almost bursting into tears before they tried to help me. … But the first thing they said was Nigeria *mafan*, *mafan*; that Nigerians give them problems. [Also] the landlords usually say that if Nigerians rent an apartment, they don't pay much. …They think that we are bad people. (Salami/male/28)

Despite assuming an existential condition, it is nonetheless apparent that Nigerians did not wish to be labelled as troublemakers. As such, many of them have become accustomed to being selective of their interactions with Chinese people. They are deliberate in avoiding troubles, irrespective of whether social relations with the host community suffer. To reduce the possibility of being engaged as *mafan*, a lot of Nigerians limit interaction with Chinese to business affairs.

The point to stress, therefore, is that today, Nigerian-Chinese social relation (or lack of it) subsists within a strategically self-imposed interactional barrier. Staying out of trouble is indicative of the adaptive practice that Nigerians employ to adjust to their othering in Guangzhou city.

But what factors explain the identification of Nigerians as *mafan*, perceived and even treated differently from other Africans in Guangzhou? In the next section, I locate the answer in the historical and social circumstances of Nigerian community formation since the early 1990s and the transformations that occurred as a result of the influx of young Nigerian men who arrived in Guangzhou during the first half of the first decade of 2000s. Critical to this explanation are specific historical moments and interactional dynamics, which make the flows of Nigerians into China a problematic affair for the host society.

Evolution of the Nigerian Community in Guangzhou

Although the Nigerian community in Guangzhou has been in the making since the early 1990s, many Nigerians interviewed only began to feel the presence of a vibrant community from 2006 upward. Based on the information from long-term residents, past and current community leaders and other informed participants, two major waves of arrival of Nigerians are significant: the early and later waves of arrival. The early wave started in the early 1990s up to 2005, consisting of trickles and a slow congregation of predominantly Igbo people of South-eastern Nigeria. Many of these early arrivals came to China from other Asian countries, settled in other Chinese cities and later moved into Guangzhou from there. The later migration wave, which began in 2006, features the influx of young Nigerians who migrated to China directly from Nigeria. This later wave, in particular, introduced social problems which strained the relationship of Nigerians with the host society.

The entrepreneurial drives of the first comers in the 1990s influenced the formation of the Nigerian community in the early period. As with other accounts on the presence of Africans in Guangzhou (Bertoncello and Bredeloup, 2007), changes in the economic circumstances of Asia around the late 1980s triggered the movement of Nigerians into mainland China. In the 1980s and 1990s, Nigerians moved to South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Japan in search of work and for business. As a Commonwealth territory, Hong Kong served as a transit space for most flights from Nigeria to Asia. Hong Kong was also visa-free to Nigerians at the time and an important centre of commerce and trade that attracted business people and fortune-seekers. Igbo businessmen from popular markets in Southeast Nigerian were a dominant group in Nigeria-Hong Kong trade, although Hausa traders were involved as well.

However, as the economy of Asia began to decline, the role of Hong Kong also changed in the social and economic affairs of Nigerians travelling to East Asia. For those visiting Hong Kong for business, the cost went up, and business was becoming unprofitable. Also, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and other nearby Asian countries were deporting Nigerians as a result of the economic downturn. Many of these deportees ended up in Hong Kong. Rather than return home, these deportees took advantage of their status as Commonwealth citizens to stay back in Hong Kong in the hope of finding work. Unfortunately, many were unable to secure work, "doing nothing, virtually doing nothing" (Baron/male/50). Their condition remained mostly unchanged for most of the mid-1990s when mainland China emerged as a viable economic space.

One of the earliest stories recorded of Nigerian presence in Guangzhou was a man named Smith who arrived in 1990 to teach English. The accounts of participants who had lived in the city for more than two decades corroborates the story of Smith as the first person from Nigeria to settle in Guangzhou.[2] Mr Smith was well-known at the time as he later married a Chinese and learned to speak Chinese. The second person, called Eugene Madu, came in 1992 to set up a business consultancy service.

However, it was the discovery of motorcycle business after the arrival of one IK Okani in 1995 that made a significant impact on the eventual influx of Nigerians into Guangzhou. According to one account, Mr Okani went to Hong Kong after a factory accident in South Korea where he had worked up to 1994. Mr Okani was forced to move on because he was unable to find another work. Without money to start a business in Hong Kong, he decided to cross over to mainland China, Guangzhou in particular. Upon arriving in the city, the massive presence and use of motorcycles in the streets attracted Okani. Given his experience in the motorcycle parts business, his first decision was to locate the motorcycle plant and explore the possibility of procuring second-hand motorcycles. This interest led him to a large motorcycle impounding site in Sanyuanli area.

Given the enormity of the motorcycles at the site and Okani's limited financial capability, he invited Smith and Eugene to partner with him. Having managed to reach an agreement with the responsible local authority, these partners connected merchants in Nnewi, a famous commercial centre in Southeast Nigeria where motorcycle sales was a big business at the time. The arrangement was to load "turn by turn; this person will load today; another person will load tomorrow" (Baron/male/50).

As work started with the loading of containers, these partners began to face some problems with their Chinese workers. The challenge was that they lacked the skills to fill up shipping containers: they were loading up 60 motorcycles in containers that can take up almost 200 if dismantled. With the permission of the local management, they decided to replace the Chinese workers. However, where will replacement workers be found?

At the same time that Okani and others were setting up the motorcycle business in Guangzhou, the number of Nigerian deportees in Hong Kong was growing. Many of those who managed to cross to mainland China stopped in Shenzhen, an industrial city just two hours away from Hong Kong and three hours to Guangzhou. Okani and his partners took steps to tap into the labor of unemployed Nigerians in Shenzhen by spreading the news of job availability in Guangzhou, and the young men responded. While the wage was little, about RMB50, it attracted many more Nigerians, including those floating in Hong Kong. The motorcycle business sustained many Nigerians in Guangzhou from 1997 to 2000. The area around the mo-

2 Chima/male/48; Akingbola/male/50.

torcycle loading site in Sanyuanli will later be dubbed *Igbo Ezue*, which means the "Igbo have gathered" (Baron/male/50).

Apart from trade in second-hand motorcycles, textile and fright businesses also shifted gradually to Guangzhou. The shift was made possible because of the availability of textile compressing machine and the founding of two major fright companies, one owned solely by a Nigerian while a Nigerian-Chinese partnership led to the formation of the second company. The availability of compressing machine in mainland China enabled small Nigerian businessmen to make purchases using a "groupage system"[3] which was hitherto only available to them in Hong Kong. The establishment of the shipping companies, especially, made it easier to transport goods to Nigeria.

So, with transformations in previous migration destinations in Asia, migrants' impoverishment, entrepreneurship and business collaborations among Nigerians, and between Nigerians and Chinese people, Guangzhou was feeling the presence of Nigerians. As connoted by the *Igbo Ezue* construct, Nigerians from Southeast Nigeria were gathering, and their presence was becoming evident in the communities they have taken residence. It is worth noting that during this early phase of inflow, many accounts[4] holds that it was relatively easy to extend visas and prolong one's stay in Guangzhou.

Building Community Structure and the Crisis of Later Arrivals

By the year 2000, some early arrivals mobilised to establish a structured Nigerian community association, also known as the Nigerian Union,[5] to manage the influx of Nigerians. The old-timers believe that a vibrant and functional community association might help to solve emerging social problems, including visa overstays and arrests. In collaboration with the Nigerian embassy in Beijing, one Basil Ukaere was nominated to lead the Nigerian community. Mr Ukaere ran the community for four years and handed over to an interim community executive. Another election in 2006 produced Mr Okechukwu Uche as community head. According to informants' accounts, the Uche regime was smooth for the most part, up to the point that his relationship with the authority of the host community became sour.

3 The system whereby textile dealers from Nigeria buy in bits, after which a number of them assemble their merchandise in a warehouse and then ship to Nigeria.

4 Interviews with Mr Emma Ojukwu, Ademola Olagunju, Mr Basil Ukaere and Mr Elochukwu, Guangzhou, 2017.

5 This name is generic as the actual name of the organization has changed more than once. Before the Nigerian Union was set up, Nigerians have established state, local government and village level associations.

There are conflicting accounts of what transpired. One account holds that Mr Uche challenged the host community over what he believed was exploitative immigration policy. As the population of Nigerians swelled, more and more people were overstaying their visas. When arrested and imprisoned, the majority of overstayers rely on community assistance to fund their deportation, and many often languish in Chinese prisons when community effort was not enough to raise needed funds. Mr Uche was said to have protested against the mandatory imprisonment and compulsory payment of RMB5,000 fine for overstaying. As one community head explains:

> Okey [*Okechuckwu*]...said no, that they should scrap the fine entirely and leave the ticket so that the community can assist those in the prison rally round and help to buy a ticket; [that] this fine is too much; it is bearing much on us, on the people. (Baron/male/50)

Baron speculates that since the community was forthcoming with the deportation money, the Chinese authorities could not forgo such a revenue. "They did not know how to lose that money," he says (Baron/male/50). Rather, more and more people were being rounded up, jailed and made to pay overstay fees. Mr Uche's position against the host community was radical, at least when compared with the strategy of Mr Ukaere who said he negotiated with the police on a case by case basis—instead of calling for a major change to the Chinese immigration rules.

Another version of the story states that Mr Uche was operating an illegal church. However, as one informant interprets the situation, there was a conspiracy that made Mr Uche a target. Mr Uche, he explains, was set up by people who "reported" him to the authorities: "they said he is a pastor, he is running a church...and the reporting was done by Nigerians as an allegation to set him up" (Emeka/male/45).

Irrespective of the version one believes, the outcome was the same for Mr Uche: he was arrested, imprisoned for a few months and then deported to Nigeria. Alternatively, as put by an informant "they used an upper hand on him to tell him you are only a community leader, but we are the people, we are the police" (Baron/male/50). At that time, Uche's family was in China, and he had valid papers.[6]

Following Mr Uche's ouster, there was a lull in community activities. By 2007, Nigerian embassy officials who revisited Guangzhou from Beijing conveyed another meeting. This meeting was the first to be attended by the man who would usher in the reformation phase of the Nigerian community, Mr Emmanuel Ositadome Ojukwu—or Emma Ojukwu for short. There, they nominated Mr Ojukwu as an interim community head, a position he held for three years until the election of 2010. Mr Emma-led interim cabinet needed to confront a rising population of Nigerians,

6 An account has it that in the past, Mr Uche overstayed his visa but only managed to regulate it after residing illegally in China for some years.

and the range of social problem baggage that accompanied the arrival of predominantly young men. As one community leader describes the situation, the later arrivals were audacious:

> [In] 2005/06...people were dealing on...drugs and...forming cultist groups. They formed Aye; they formed Bagga and [cult groups with] so many names. ...Each of the cultist groups brought criminals from Nigeria to strengthen their groups and secure drugs business. They fund the transportation of [member] to come to China and join them. (Mr Ojukwu/male/45)

During this period, "people's 'f**k ups" were "treated" in public restaurants with a machete (Okocha/male/37), and restaurant owners were forced to pay "protection fees" using open threats. Also, drug traffickers were being gutted to retrieve swallowed drugs, and deep freezers were converted into storages for human carcasses.[7] Similarly, phones and money were being "obtained" in the open streets, while imported Nigerian cultists groups fight for supremacy on a foreign soil (Anichebe/male/38). Those involved in drugs and cultic activities were said to have transformed Guangyuan Xi Lu into a terror zone where daylight robbery and macheting became part of the everyday experience of Nigerians and the host community.

Consequently, Nigerians and the Nigerian passport were taking a hit from the host community. In order to make it difficult for Nigerians to stay in Guangzhou, the authorities made it tougher to extend visas on the Nigerian passport and conducted regular crackdowns on areas with a high presence of Nigerians.

Some Responses to the Crisis of Late Arrivals

Efforts to mend the relationship between the Nigerian community and their Chinese host took the shape of reforms which were instituted and steered by community leaders. Apart from seeking and obtaining the support of the local authorities and the government of Nigeria through the Nigerian embassy in Beijing, they reorganised the Nigerian Union and negotiated the expansion of access of Nigerians to market spaces as a way to enable them to set up businesses regardless of their visa status. Community leaders packaged access to business spaces as a mechanism to promote productive activities and reduce criminality among Nigerians in the city.

Also, by 2014, the dream to extend official Nigerian consular service with a physical presence in the city was achieved. Furthermore, to cut down on the population of Nigerian overstayers and the financial burdens of overstay, the community heads collaborated with the Nigerian consulate to negotiate an "amnesty" agreement with the host community. Typically, those arrested and facing deportation

7 Interview with Mr Ojukwu, Guangzhou, 2017.

because of immigration offences spend between a month and three months—some spend a year or more—in Chinese jails. While incarcerated, they are expected to pay RMB10,000 fines for overstay, and then raise money to procure return tickets, without which they will remain in prison. The amnesty mechanism was used to secure a reduced or no prison sentence—depending on the case—and made it possible for those willing to return voluntarily to do so by paying reduced overstay fees.[8]

By far the most critical project pursued during the reformation phase was the formation of a vigilante group known as "the Peacekeepers." The primary task of the group was to deal with the criminality problem. With drugs and robbery becoming emblematic of Nigerians' presence in the city, the community leadership recruited volunteers who tracked and seized culprits, some of whom were handed over to the police. It was a significant community clean-up performed on Nigerians by Nigerians outside the Nigerian borders.

Despite the improvements and stability that occurred during the later phase of arrival, the Nigerian community would fall under a strain that challenged its internal resilience, survival and capability to manage its members. By 2014 especially, the euphoria of the past achievement was waning. Many community members were looking forward to another transition through an election, which never held—and remained so after the researcher exited the field.

The Nigerian community, which one prominent community member tagged as being "...in turbulence right now" (Glover/male/34), was mainly characterised by political and constitutional stalemates, social-relations crack, internal disaffections, and community-wide apathy. The community structure descended into an arena of politicking where personal interests ruled and migrants formed alliances along ethnic lines.

Public Disturbance, Intra-African Dynamics and *Mafan* Identification

As the Nigeria community was experiencing internal problems, the construction of Nigerians as a *mafan* population—distinct from other African communities—was gaining ground. Primarily, the host community and other Africans were associating Nigerians with public disturbance. Central to this "public disturbance" discourse are the public protests and matters of criminality that challenged the orderliness of Guangzhou.

The first incident happened in July of 2009. Following the death of a Nigerian who jumped through the window as he made to escape visa check, Africans staged a protest with many Nigerians participating (Branigan, 2009). Almost three years later, in 2012, there was another protest. This time, a Nigerian man died while in

8 The amount mentioned varied, between RMB3,000 to RMB5,000.

police custody. A predominantly Nigerian crowd surrounded a major police station in the city to demand justice against police brutality. Through these unprecedented events, Nigerians openly questioned the power and legitimacy of the host community to deploy violence and cause deaths in the name of immigration control. The incidents established the prominence of Nigerians as a migrant population while, at the same time, bringing their presence to public awareness but in a manner that projected them as peculiar troublemakers.

Interestingly, the capacity of Nigerian migrants to challenge China's pristine orderliness did not end with the protests. In 2013, a high-profile drug-related raid in the famous Lihua Hotel in Yuexiu district (also called Dragon Hotel in the community) led to the arrest of 168 suspects, the majority being from Nigeria (Global Times, 2013). One participant describes the Dragon Hotel as space over which criminally-minded Nigerians exercise considerable dominion until the raid (Adeoye/male/54). Although the police arrested other nationalities in the raid, including other Africans and Chinese people, Nigerians grabbed the headlines. This drug-raid in particular and other criminalities quickly brought Nigerians to the centre stage and amplified their *mafan* status. Reflecting on the audaciousness of Nigerians, a Nigerian with over ten years of continuous presence in China expresses a shock, that:

> Only [a] Nigerian that you hear will kill someone by pushing a lady from upstairs, throwing her through the window—a skyscraper. Only Nigerians have come to this country and demonstrated against the Chinese government in China. … The Chinese will never do that; they [Nigerians] blocked a road. It is only a Nigerian that came here and formed a drugs cartel; they took over the whole hotel and formed mafias. (Muritala/male/54)

While the protest and drug burst did not easily constitute similar actions, in both content and orientation, they led to a similar outcome in that they jointly upheld the perception of Nigerians migrants as *mafan*. For instance, the Chinese media quickly learned to make a distinction among African groups in the city, thus unmasking and making Nigerians more visible. Unlike the 2009 protest, when the media used the word Africans, the local Chinese media specifically mentioned Nigerians when they reported on the protest of 2012. This naming is a significant shift because, in the past, issues involving black people were reported as involving Africans rather than mentioning specific nationalities (Pang and Yuan, 2013).

More critical, however, is that other Africans who felt that the activities of Nigerians were tainting their identity began to align with an African identity that excludes Nigerian migrants. Other Africans blamed Nigerians for spoiling the reputation of all Africans because of their involvement in drugs business and public protest (Lan, 2016b). One Ugandan told a researcher that he stopped associating with Nigerians because of how they shout, drink and fight and the same Ugandan said that Chinese people withdrew from him following the protest of 2009 because they

assumed he was a Nigerian (Lan, 2017b, 135). In short, other Africans did not wish to be identified as or get mixed up, with Nigerians (see Pang and Yuan, 2013).

Back in the Present: Nigerian's *Mafan* Identification

In describing what it meant for them to live in Guangzhou as Nigerians in 2017, many participants insist that Nigerians were treated differently because of their country of origin and past actions. With statements such as "Nigeria's name is always bad" (Favour/male/35) and "Nigeria has been cast" (Salami/male/28), participants affirm that an entrenched nationality-based blemish exists which impact on the lives of Nigerians in China. As Nonso surmises:

> They [i.e. Chinese] don't use eyes to see us; they do not like us. Once you are not from Uganda, Tanzania…they do not pity us. Once you are a Nigerian, they will put eyes on you; they will focus on you. (Nonso/male/33)

In the build-up to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October 2017, the police stepped up the eviction of foreigners, mostly black Africans, in places like Xiaobei. Before their eventual forceful eviction from the rented apartments, three Nigerian participants have lived in Xiaobei for over a year, working and attending school in the city. At different times, while on their way home from work, the police conducted random checks on them by collecting urine samples. They said that the police wants to know if they had traces of drugs in their urines.[9] When the police visited Isiche (male/33) in the apartment he shared with a Senegalese; he says that "as they entered my house, I brought out my passport. They said this one is NG, as in, one of the police guys said 'this one is NG,' which is Nigeria." Isiche complained about how he was treated differently during arrest and at the police station, as compared to his Senegalese roommate who had harbored someone "illegally" in the apartment. While having similar legal standing, only him "the Nigerian" was eventually evicted from the apartment. One community leader insists that in the city today, Nigerians are demonised because of the crimes committed by a few, and the host state uses this to justify the unfair treatment of Nigerians (Baron/male/ 50).

While the image of Nigeria has not always been bad; today, "they look at Nigerian like you are nobody!" (Akingbola/male/50). Some participants frequently fingered those they called "bad eggs" as the source of the community-wide stigma that Nigerians experience, with claims that even as many Nigerians have established profitable businesses in the city, paid taxes and maintained clean records, the authorities still perceives everyone as the same. Thus, in Guangzhou today, the vast

9 Isiche/male/33; Moses/male/26.

majority of Nigerians believe that "there was something about Nigeria/Nigerian identity" that is stigmatising and damaging to individual and community wellbeing.

Conclusion

Based on the central question raised in this chapter, which is to understand how the processes linked to Africans congregation shapes Afro-Chinese interactions in China, we observe that how the Nigerian community evolved provides insights into the dynamics of their interactions with Chinese people. We also see that as a distinct group of Africans in Guangzhou, Nigerians struggle with being perceived as troublemakers. Despite over two decades of presence and intense interactions between the visitors and the host community, *mafan* continues to animate a perceptual undercurrent that projects Nigerians as criminals; to be suspected, feared and managed.

In the fashion that Brubaker and Cooper (2000) articulate, *mafan* is a categorical model of identification that emanates from the process of categorising by others. We see how the historical and social circumstances specific to the visiting and host communities permit the construction of *mafan* along nationality lines. This label is further entrenched in a processual manner through the everyday constructions that the host society and non-Nigerian African migrants deploy in Guangzhou city. Besides, the dissociative dispositions of non-Nigerian Africans are remarkably evocative of Andreas Wimmer's (2009) boundary-making thesis. Wimmer argues that in a bid to cross into "the mainstream," groups struggle over the boundaries of acceptance and rejection. When certain categorising identification becomes stigmatised, they struggle to renegotiate their membership, including through distancing. With *mafan* burden, other Africans are remaking the boundaries of "African" in a way that excludes Nigerians. Such re-categorising act demonstrates the utility of shifting away from the assumption of homogeneity and towards a more nuanced understanding of experiences of Africans in China.

Future studies can identify how other African communities are constituted. This endeavor is particularly useful for understanding the universe of rarely discussed historical, social and political circumstances surrounding African presence in Chinese cities. With possible future flows of Africans, such understanding will, in specific and comparative senses, advance the discursive space of Afro-Asian encounters, as well as the literature on contemporary diasporization of Africans in the Asia region.

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13

Implications of Zimbabwe's Re-Engagement Policy on its Bilateral Relations with China

Eve Zvichanzi Nyemba, Prolific Mataruse, and Donald Peter Chimanikire

While Zimbabwe and China have been friends for centuries, little is known about the implications of Zimbabwean efforts to rebuild its former relationships with the West on its friendship with China. This chapter is based on a study sought to investigate this through in-depth interviews with key informants and documentary search. Data were analyzed using thematic and discourse analysis. Findings pertain to that, in light of the military assisted transition in Zimbabwe, both countries at state level have shown keen interest in not only maintaining but in solidifying their ties. However, important caveats to this emanate from a public opinion that is decisively anti-Chinese, thereby placing some demands on the need to strategically transform the relationship. Zimbabwe's dual task of promoting a win-win cooperation whilst proving its readiness and capacity to do business on a changed basis are identified as the major strong points for preserving an enduring friendship. Zimbabwe's Second Republic is not abandoning old friends. She is nurturing and consolidating those friendships. However, she is also re-engaging with those nations she has had differences with in the past as well as exploring new investment frontiers and partnerships.

Introduction

This chapter is a study into a critical moment in China-Zimbabwe relations. Zimbabwe seeks to re-engage with the West from years of isolation. It is critical to analyse the implications this rapprochement will have on relations with China. The chapter first describes the methodology used in the study, then briefly discusses the history of Sino-Zimbabwe relations. This is followed by an outline of Zimbabwe's crises, isolation and adoption of the Look East Policy. The study assesses facilitating and inhibiting factors towards re-engagement. The main research question is: Will China remain Zimbabwe's strategic economic, military and political ally? The chapter will end with a discussion of two important findings: the link between friendship and desperation and the importance of the change of government in Zimbabwe for China-Zimbabwe relations. The study recommends strategies to promote re-engagement and deepening of Sino-Zimbabwe co-operation.

Methodology

Using a case study design, the study adopted a qualitative methodological approach drawing on primary and secondary data sources. In-depth interviews with key informants and documentary search were employed as data collection methods. Interviews with Zimbabwean politicians, diplomats, academics and citizens were conducted. The responses were subjected to thematic analysis from which the main themes discussed in this chapter emanated from. Discourse analysis was applied to texts in newspapers, journals and the way interviewees had couched their responses to questions posed in interviews. These qualitative methods provide an in-depth grasp with issues that are in a state of flux and from which the tentative conclusions reached here form a basis for ongoing research and monitoring of developments in China-Zimbabwe relations.

Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of any given country can legitimately be considered to be a standard for evaluating international events as well as responses to those events. In another sense, it is also a strategy for the attainment, protection and promotion of domestic policy goals at the bilateral, sub-regional, regional and global levels. A country's foreign policy is usually motivated by a country's national interests.[1] As such, every country forges ties with other countries on a bilateral or a multilateral basis, with which it shares common interests (Centre for Peace initiatives, 2005). In general, principles which guide a country's foreign policy are derived from the manner with which that country attained its national sovereignty. In the case of Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and some other African states, one would have to take into account principles which guided the diplomacy[2] of the armed struggle for the national liberation. These principles can be loosely stated as follows:

1 Roskin (1994, iii) defines the national interest as a "composite declaration derived from those values a nation prizes most."

2 Sir Robert Peel in Berridge (2005) defines diplomacy as the "great engine used by civilized society for the purpose of maintaining peace." Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was fought using a two thronged approach which included military warfare and diplomatic negotiations which culminated in the signing of the landmark Lancaster House Agreement on 21 December 1979. This brought an end to the Second Chimurenga War/Rhodesian Bush War leading to the creation of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

a) sanctity of the right to life and self-determination and defence of national sovereignty;
b) equity in the distribution of national wealth;
c) anti-imperialism;
d) equality of sovereign states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states;
e) justice in the international division of labor as well as in the distribution of gains from international trade;
f) peaceful resolution of internal and international conflicts; and
g) elimination of poverty, under-development and obstacles to self-sustaining development (Kitikiti, 1993, 2).

Zimbabwe's foreign policy objectives include safeguarding and enhancing the security, prestige and image of the country and the quality of life and security of its people by engaging with other countries at various levels in order to influence their behaviour whilst creating and maintaining an international environment conducive to the attainment of these goals (Chimanikire, 2003, 180–181). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) ceased financial assistance to Zimbabwe in the late 1990's and this contributed to its foreign currency crisis. Zimbabwe's traditional trading partners in the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) also drastically scaled down on business with her or stopped completely. These traditional partners even imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, leading to an aid freeze by Western lenders, thereby causing an economic crisis and foreign currency shortages. The political hostility between Zimbabwe and the West was triggered by Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP)[3] in 2000 (Chimanikire, 2016, 95).

Economic Crisis, Isolation and Over-Dependence on Imports and a Strong US-Dolllar

This section discusses Zimbabwe's fall from grace; its change of economic fortunes that led to the dynamics of dollarization. The section highlights the various multilayers of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its multi-roots. This is why the first point of discussion is on what constitutes the Zimbabwean crisis. The question to be answered takes for granted that there is a crisis in Zimbabwe. Those two issues are contentious issues from the political divide that separates Zimbabweans. There is insistence from the state that there is an exaggeration of Zimbabwe's problems ema-

3 The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) launched in July 2000 by the Government of Zimbabwe sought to compulsorily acquire land from white commercial farmers for redistribution to poor and middle-income landless black Zimbabweans. However, the FTLRP was politically motivated, violent and chaotic, benefiting only a few, worsening poverty, unemployment and food insecurity (Human Rights Watch,2002).

nating from bad publicity and a demonizing discourse. The opposition and those that claim to be both independent activists and media treat the matter as a self-evident crisis. In one case, a CSO called itself the Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe. What crisis? Which crisis is being looked at? Are there many crises and if many can they be discussed in isolation? The interest in this question is on the economic demise of Zimbabwe. That crisis has many roots and many other crises that it has given rise to which have further implications on China-Zimbabwe relations.

Zimbabwe like most postcolonial states was born from crises and carried into independence some of the crises. According to Bond and Manyanya (2002), part of this crisis was a debt carried over from the colonial government, lingering land imbalance issues, the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), a governance crisis, violent modes of rule and international isolation. In many ways, the economy of Zimbabwe suffered from a political crisis that was historical as well as it is contemporary. Hammar et al. (2003) are convinced that the manifestation of the troubles in Zimbabwe featured in narrower and authoritarian definitions of land, nation, citizenship and the state. The land reform, war in DRC and gratuities to war veterans and an ill-advised and poorly implemented ESAP drained the government of money and killed the manufacturing industry. Perhaps no other day is as significant as the 14th of November 1997 when Zimbabwean markets crashed and the Zimbabwean dollar lost 71.5% of its value against the dollar.

Since 1997, the country's economy has struggled with the peak being 2008 and the 2018–2019 period. Of the 2 million jobs targeted for creation in 2013 under the ZIMASSET policy after assessing the 2015, 2016 and 2017 budget one notes that due to the continued shrinking economy there is no strategy to reduce unemployment or to create jobs. In fact, companies have closed down, retrenched workers, halved salaries, put workers on unpaid leave, and in many instances workers have gone for months without being paid. However, it is important to note that during the power-sharing government[4] of 2008 to 2013 the economy had been stabilized by adopting sound economic policies and the use of the United States Dollar ($US).

A challenge for Zimbabwe has been an over-dependence on imports, against the background of the strong US dollar and a weakening South African Rand, which has undermined the economy's competitiveness over both the domestic as well as export markets. This is against the backdrop of an economy that has incessantly slowed down since 2012 when GDP growth was 10.6% to 0.4% in 2016 with mixed projections of growth in 2018 as a result of normal to above normal rains in the

4 The Global Political Agreement (GPA) was a power sharing agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). It was designed to bring closure to the political contestation and violence surrounding the re-run of the presidential election in 2008. The GPA led to the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) on 13 February 2009 which ended with the victory of ZANU PF in Zimbabwe's 2013 Harmonised Elections.

2016 to 2017 agricultural season which increased the country's agricultural yield at a time other vital sectors such as mining, manufacturing and exports continued to give overall negative results (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2017). As a direct result the expected 2017 GDP growth rate was revised down in the 2017 National Budget from an estimated 2.4% to 1.7%. Cash shortages in 2016 as a result of sustained low production, a high import bill at 5 Billion and the slow-down in the Chinese economy, animated the politics. This brought back the 2016 debate of randization (adoption of the Rand as base currency) or the Chinese Yuan. However, the use of the bond notes and coins in the beginning of the second quarter of 2016 has prevailed albeit rejection in the market for the preferred use of the US$. Since 2016, the cash crisis resurfaced reintroducing the spectre of long queues reminiscent of 2008 and causing civil unrest. The assumption of power of Mnangagwa has seen the worsening of Zimbabwe's economic outlook.[5]

In June 2019, the "Zimbabwe dollar"—in the form of bond notes or coins or RTGS was declared the sole legal tender[6] (Newsday, 2019) through a government decree. It still lacks legitimacy or acceptance with the people. Money changers can be seen holding swathes of cash mostly Rand's, US$, and bond notes. The adoption of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Transitional Stabilization Program in 2018 has not eased the economic quagmire Zimbabwe finds itself in. Their major driving thrusts, Zimbabwean re-engagement with the global credit market, improving the ease of doing business in Zimbabwe and increased consultation and transparency of fiscal measures may continue to inspire government policy. A simultaneous drive to stop Zimbabwean isolation is anchored in a debt repayment strategy and reengagement with international credit facilitators such as the International Monetary Fund.

Brief History of Sino-Zimbabwe Relations

China-Africa relations date back to the ancient times, gradually progressing based on common historical experiences. Zimbabwe-China relations can be traced back to the Ming and Qing dynasty when the Chinese established ties with the Munhumutapa Empire of the famed Great Zimbabwe stone towers, based on trade and cultural exchange over 600 years ago. The relations were strengthened during the liberation struggle, in the 1960s, when China offered strategic and uncondi-

5 In view of the worsening economic outlook, "the revised 2019 GDP growth is expected to be negative and even below the -2% projected under the SMP (Staff-Monitored Programme)," (Kuwaza, 2019).

6 "In a Statutory Instrument…Zimbabwe's Finance minister Mthuli Ncube said: 'The British pound, United States dollar, South African rand Botswana pula and any other foreign currency whatsoever, shall no longer be legal tender alongside the Zimbabwe dollar in any transactions in Zimbabwe…'" (Newsday, 2019).

tional military support to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) which fought alongside the Soviet assisted Zimbabwe African People's Union Patriotic Front (ZAPU) to dislodge Ian Smith's Rhodesian colonial government. Li (2007) argues that from the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), China-Africa's policy was heavily influenced by ideology. He notes that China placed itself on the frontline of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and revisionism in the Third World thus linking its ideological stand with its foreign policy. Burke and Eddinger (2008,1) note that the Zimbabwe-China relations were further strengthened and developed after the rebuffing of engagement policies between ZANU and Russia during the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe, precisely in 1979. Here Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF sought an alternative source for the supply of weapons and training of their soldiers after the sour turnout of events with Moscow, Russia. After Zimbabwe got its independence, China established diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe.

ZANU PF won the elections in 1980 with a landslide victory and has since then, been the ruling party in Zimbabwe. Formal diplomatic relations between the two states were established on 18 April 1980 in Zimbabwe as a method of modulating Zimbabwe's historically structured dependence on the West (Patel in Chan and Patel, 2006). Zimbabwe, however, focused more on her relations with the West. In 1992, Zimbabwe began to strategically realign her foreign policy to focus on solidifying relations with China as she anticipated that the global power shift in economic relations would lead to future trade, investments, joint ventures and tourists coming from the East.

After the imposition of sanctions in February 2002 by the European Union[7] on the Zimbabwean government, FDI inflows began to decline, thus donor assistance also decreased therefore leading to Zimbabwe's quest for alternative partners (Burke and Eddinger, 2008). In 2006, Mugabe the then President of Zimbabwe announced that Zimbabwe was, "returning back to the days when our greatest friends were the Chinese" and he declared: "We look again to the East, where the sun rises and no longer to the West where it sets." However, it is vital to note that Zimbabwe seemed to turn to China mostly when in trouble. The official Look East policy was formally

7 On 18 February 2002, following the expulsion of the EU head of election monitoring mission, the Swedish diplomat Pierre Schori accused of interfering with the elections, EU introduced restrictive sanctions on President Mugabe and some senior government officials from travelling in and around Europe and freezing of personal assets and bank accounts. Other sanctions by the EU included an arms embargo and suspension of cooperation with Zimbabwe under article 96(2) (c) of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. The USA sanctions included the 2001 *Zimbabwe Democracy Recovery Act (ZIDERA)*, the 2018 *ZIDERA Amendment Act*. Countries like Australia and Canada also placed sanctions on Zimbabwe (Nyemba, 2015).

adopted by Zimbabwe in 2003 after the deterioration of her relations with the West over the implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP).[8]

Chun (2014, 1) poses two possible and parallel interpretations of the relationship between China and Zimbabwe, the first being that Zimbabwe is often viewed as a microcosm of China-Africa relations due to its economic and resource elements. Conversely, this alliance is portrayed as an example of China's support of a pariah regime without any consideration of human rights and good governance. Engagements between China and Zimbabwe are unique in that they are a momentum driven by two elements, thus the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the West and the re-engagement policy by China (ibid.). Operation Restore Legacy, a military operation which culminated in the deposing of Robert Mugabe from power in 2017 has put into question the future of Zimbabwe-China relations as the new administration in Harare has accelerated efforts of re-engaging the West.

Local Perceptions of China-Zimbabwe Relations

What has been clear is that China-Zimbabwe relations have continued to thrive during the crisis time although interviews indicated two issues worthy of discussing at length. The unpopularity of Chinese presence outside the Zimbabwean ruling party and the economic ramifications of a military takeover of government code named Operation Restore Legacy.

Friendship and desperation: Unpopularity with masses

During the crisis in Zimbabwe, China made important contributions to the economy and politics of Zimbabwe although these were accompanied by a strong anti-Chinese populace. In this section we bring out three major findings from the field research about what China did; what people think; and how desperation has impacted Zimbabwe-China relations.

What did China do for Zimbabwe during the crisis? Interviewees thought correctly that it is clear the Chinese have done some big things for Zimbabwe including assisting the Harare Municipality with a loan and technical assistance for its water system at a water treatment cite called Morton Jaffrey Waterworks. The Chinese are also cited as the key actors in the maintenance and expansion of electricity production at Lake Kariba. It is also common sight to see Chinese citizens and business people supervising some construction work in the cities, towns and rural areas. The Chinese are also seen in controversial and non-controversial mining areas and rural areas where there are doing mining exploration and excavation. In universities,

8 The Look East Policy, focused primarily on relations with China, especially, and with Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Iran (Patel in Chan and Patel, 2006).

mainly through the Handburg Institute and the Confucius Institute, Chinese scholarships for students in the humanities and sciences have been given to go and study in China and in turn Chinese students have visited Zimbabwe. There has also been set-up at the University of Zimbabwe, a Confucius Institute whose role has been to teach the Chinese language and to share Chinese culture with Zimbabweans thus fostering common understanding between the two countries.

What do Zimbabweans think about what China did for Zimbabwe? Zimbabweans think that the full scale of Chinese activity in Zimbabwe is mostly speculation and given on a need to know basis. It is argued, for example, by Christine, an academic at the University of Zimbabwe, during an interview that:

> It's clear the Chinese are doing a lot but I have a feeling we are not in the know about what it is. Is it legal and is it in our interest?

This discourse of the opacity of Chinese activity in Zimbabwe was repeated by all interviewees. Apart from a few newspaper reports there really exists little to no official announcement as to China's activity in Zimbabwe.

The result of this is that it has nurtured anti-Chinese feelings and given rise to the emergence of five conspiracy theories. In no particular order, the first theory is that the Chinese presence is invasive and this might be leading to a second colonization of Zimbabwe and Africa. The incentive for the recolonization of Africa would be the same for any suitor, be it European, American or Chinese. Rocha (2007, 18) argues that "historically, the availability of cheap raw materials and the prospects for huge returns on investment, particularly from the exploitation of natural resources, has always provided an incentive for the expansion and deepening of political and economic ties with Africa." The presence of an abundant natural resource base and low-cost and hardworking labor force, makes Zimbabwe an attractive destination for the ever expanding industrial China.

The second one is that the Chinese are colluding with political leaders to loot Africa and siphon resources in a neo-colonial arrangement. Zimbabwean opposition leader of MDC Alliance, Nelson Chamisa is on record for saying that the Chinese are "busy asset-stripping the resources of the country" (BBC News, 2018). In a shocking statement, Chamisa threatened to expel Chinese investors if he won the 2018 harmonized elections (ibid.) to stop the looting of resources. The third one is that the Chinese are involved in illegal activities in Zimbabwe and generally lie beyond the hand of the law as political leaders protect them. Kabemba (2012) notes that most employees from Chinese mining companies had reported gross labor abuses. They lamented that they were underpaid, forced to work long hours, endured poor working conditions and dangerous working environments without proper safety conditions. Some respondents complained of beatings at the workplace which constituted human rights abuses and unfair labor practices. Moyo and Mdlongwa (2015) note that the beatings were a form of "work related punishment."

The Chinese employers seem to operate with impunity despite evidence of violation of Zimbabwean labor laws as they are protected from prosecution by government officials (Longhi, 2012).

The fourth theory is that the Chinese have kept the ruling party in power through clandestine international financial support. According to the Zimbabwe Independent (2018) ZANU PF had received most of its funding for electoral campaigns, including the recently conducted July 31st 2018 Harmonized elections from the Chinese Communist Party. Capacity building by the CCP to ZANU PF in its electoral campaigns was provided in the form of training for ZANU PF leaders in mass mobilization strategies, financing the production of campaign materials in the form of T-Shirts, party regalia and other paraphernalia (Zimbabwe Independent, 2015). ZANU PF's US$200 million electoral campaign was not only funded by China but by the Democratic Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea (Bulawayo, 24 News, 8 June 2018). The fifth theory is that of Chinese-phobia. This kind of xenophobia though not violent in Zimbabwe centres on a notion of the stranger whose cultural ways such as speech, diet, work ethic and mere presence, elicit a negative response from the majority of the people. The language barrier exacerbated the negative perceptions of the Chinese by the Zimbabweans and militated against better working relationships between the two parties (Longhi, 2012).

Having assessed such theories, some interviewees felt that there is a link between desperation and friendship in China-Zimbabwe relations. Underlying the assertions of public thought about what China is doing in Zimbabwe is the conclusion that China was never Zimbabwe's first option or choice. In an interview with a Zimbabwean activist she argued that:

> China is a desperate measure for Zimbabwe regardless of claims of friendship. A look at the nature of friendship shows that we have run into Chinese hands at our moment of need only and are quick to leave that relationship as soon as we are stable.

A chronicle of China-Zimbabwe discussed earlier may give some value to this assertion. Zimbabwe's first sustained interaction with the Chinese during the wars of liberation was for military and economic support during the anti-colonial war. The Look East Policy was only effected when the West isolated Zimbabweans otherwise Zimbabwe had been cosying up to the West. During the Government of National Unity (GNU), the MDC was publicly anti-Chinese although the Chinese historical ally ZANU PF continued strong relations with China. It can be observed that in the discourse of China-Zimbabwe relations there is an element of the maxim, desperate times call for desperate measures. While, the Machiavellian creed of no permanent friends but permanent interests may explain the realist character of relations between states it maybe the challenge for Zimbabwe and China is to grow the friendship into a strategic partnership. A serious test for this relationship on whether re-engagement with the West shall introduce competition to Chinese monopoly of access to political leaders or be abandoned or reduced are the dynamics surrounding the military assisted transition in Harare.

Operation Restore Legacy: The ramifications of a military takeover

In the autumn of 2017 in November, Zimbabwe was engulfed in two major circumstances. A power tussle amongst the ruling elite in the ruling party ZANU-PF (China's ally) and an economy out of control on almost every indicator. The ruling party had long been involved in factionalist politics reported in independent press but denied in the official media. However, from 2014, the issue came to a head, first with the expulsion of Zimbabwe's Vice President Joyce Mujuru with a war of words with the then First Lady Grace Mugabe (Shandirwa, 2016). By 2017, another public feud featured the First Lady and a powerful Vice President with reported strong connections to the army, Emerson Mnangagwa. This was the factionalist war that was to directly lead to Operation Restore Legacy.

In 2016, a spat of protests had highlighted the civil strife emanating from the economic meltdown. By 2017, a stressed economy and factionalist politics resulted in Operation Restore Legacy. The soldiers aligned to one of the factions took to the streets and were joined by the public to demand the resignation[9] of then president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, on 14 November 2017, until the resignation on 21 November 2017 (Mail and Guardian, 2018). The terms usually settled in the state media for their political correctness were terms such as military assisted transition or the intervention of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (Share, 2017). The ones who had been treated as outcasts by the outgoing regime, including war veterans, suddenly came to power. But at the centre of this strategy was an economic concern—one which can be made apparent by understanding the changing configurations of power in Zimbabwe.

The power matrix in Zimbabwe shifted with the question who was supposed to replace Robert Mugabe and their mandate which was restoring the legacy of Zimbabwe's economy and glory. At the end of 2017, a new government that christened itself the "new dispensation" came to power (Chisaira, 2017). Obviously, its newness was critiqued as putting new wine in old skins, or same bus different driver. At the same time another newness was experienced in the opposition ranks with the death of their leader Morgan Tsvangirai from cancer soon after the inauguration of the new government. The element of newness and breaking with the past is an important dimension to understanding the economy and foreign policy choices after Operation Restore Legacy. New ways of thinking, new ways of organizing the country and new ways of international relations became a corner stone of the new dispensation.

9 Herein lay a very important attribute of Operation Restore Legacy. It was henceforth framed as not a coup with much debate and satire over terms such as "coup which is not a coup" or "coup/non-coup" or "modern coup" (Jason Burke, The Guardian. 21 November 2017).

The economy reacted negatively to the events of November 2017 in the change of government although there was optimism that the change in the guard at the Harare administration was a good omen for a bright future. The optimism was futuristic vision rhetorically dubbed as the first 100 days in office (Mugabe, 2018). Probably, an economic hard nut to crack was the liquidity crisis in Zimbabwe discussed in-depth earlier. The usual scape goat of the previous regime removed in Operation Restore Legacy was that the economy was suffering as a result of sanctions imposed from 2001.

The opposition Movement for Democratic Change stands accused by the state for inviting the sanctions by courting the wrath of the international community after allying with the white farmers who had been removed from farms during Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme. Zimbabwe was isolated in international relations, suspended and itself walked out of the Commonwealth of Nations organizations describing it as a club of colonies (Chan and Patel, 2006). It took on the strong western powers at international public forums such as the United Nations General Assembly annual meetings in New York. For various reasons that include subsequent international political and economic isolation and a contested reason over defaulting of monies owed to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Zimbabwe failed to access lines of credit. The EU and USA in turn argued that their sanctions were not hurting the economy as they were targeted. But as Operation Restore Legacy had indicated with its refrain that "we are targeting enemies around the President," this targeting is not always precise (The Herald, 15 November 2017). Zimbabwe had been dependent on international financial aid, and cutting key signatories and companies from carrying out business was a definite handicap on the economic performance of the country. Restoring Zimbabwe's legacy in the international corridors of power and finance entails refocusing the international relations.

A Pariah Seeking Re-Engagement

The Shifting of Zimbabwe's Foreign Policy

In a widely publicized statement The Herald of 19th December 2017, noted that Rtd Lieutenant-General Dr Sibusiso B. Moyo, Zimbabwe's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade expressed Zimbabwe's new foreign policy thrust as focusing on building diplomatic relations with past foes and present allies while serving Zimbabwe's interests in a climate of decency and decorum. He observed that current international politics in is not so much about ideological slants anymore. For him, that is more of interest to academics than statesmen whose interest is about what brings economic outcomes and therefore, touches the common person positively.

Given that both the United States and the United Kingdom are world powers, they can to some extent, choose or lose friends. But Zimbabwe does not have that luxury. Moyo admitted that Zimbabwe is a very small country with a massive budget deficit and suffocating debt overhang (ibid.). This reality, Moyo observed, seemed to escape the Mugabe government for a long time as it pursued the massaging of its burgeoning ego, which grew in tandem with Zimbabwe's expanding unemployment rate. That "approach to diplomacy was self-defeating," Moyo noted, and announced that this self-defeating diplomacy would be something of the past now (The Herald, December 19, 2017). Zimbabwe had changed its diplomatic course (ibid., December 14, 2017), Zimbabwe announced a bold and brave shift in its foreign policy.

Moyo observed that for about 15 years Zimbabwe's foreign policy had been pointing in one direction: eastwards. This was because Zimbabwe's deteriorating relations with the West and also because Zimbabwe approached diplomacy as if was still entrenched in the ethos of bipolar politics. During the Cold War one needed to be someone else's enemy in order to be another person's friend. But not in today's global politics; one can be everyone's friend. Zimbabwe's foreign policy was now focused on a pragmatic foreign policy that serves its national interests more than Mugabe's egotistic grandstanding at every international event whenever he rose to both national and international platforms, an approach as blind and self-defeating. Zimbabwe's foreign policy had been too inconsistent and appeared chaotic.

Zimbabwe's foreign policy was now focusing on creating jobs through attracting and harnessing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Zimbabwe emphasis is that its diamonds and platinum are not for plunder by foreigners but it seeks strategic partnerships to unlock the value lying idle under its soil. This new foreign policy framework was outlined by the President Mnangagwa on the Occasion of the State of Address and the Official Opening of the First Session of the ninth Parliament of Zimbabwe on the 18th of September 2018. He noted that Zimbabwe's goals were to be a Middle Income Economy with per capita income of US$ 3,500, increased investment, decent jobs, broad based empowerment, free from poverty and corruption by 2030 (The Daily News, Harare, September 19, 2018).

Zimbabwe's goals of re-engagement

Zimbabwe's goals for re-engagement that were enunciated by Moyo when he met with the former British Foreign Secretary, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, at Chatham House in April 2018 were to end isolationism, re-engage with friends from whom the country had become estranged, attain urgent economic recovery through opening up Zimbabwe to investments that are protected through binding international agreements such as the bilateral investment protection and promotion agreements (BIPPAs) and civil and political reforms. Moyo reiterated that Zimbabwe seeks transparency in government processes such as justice delivery, the tendering process and the fight against corruption. It seeks national unity which is blind to race, colour, ethnic origin and creed etc. Moyo highlighted that Zimbabwe sought to develop a disciplined public service in the uniformed services. Zimbabwe seeks re-engagement with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) so that it can get lines of credit. The government seeks readmission into the Commonwealth. To achieve reengagement, Moyo highlighted the commitment Zimbabwe is making towards compensation of former farm owners. However, it is important to note that in 2019, the British Minister for Africa, Harriett Baldwin, muted that her government did not envisage Zimbabwe re-joining the Commonwealth in the near future because of human rights violations during the August 1, 2019 shootings in the aftermath of the contested 2018 July 31 Harmonised elections which culminated in President Mnangagwa's victory.

Conditions set for re-engagement

Some of the conditions that were set out by the US Senate committee are specified in the *Zimbabwe Democracy Economic Recovery Amendment Act (ZIDERAA)* which was enacted by the US Congress in 2018. Conditions for re-engagement with Zimbabwe include: non-involvement of the Defences Forces in elections, release of provisional and final voters' roll, invitation of international observers (US, AU, SADC, and EU), impartial media access for all parties, compensation for white farmers for land, currency reform including the reform of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), and genuine reconciliation efforts, restoration of the rule of law, updating statutes in alignment with the constitution, upholding the constitution, economic reforms, transparency and accountability for all diamond revenue and an immediate inquiry into the disappearance of prominent human rights activists. The ZIDERAA (2018) stipulates that SADC and Zimbabwe should enforce the SADC tribunal rulings from 2007 to 2010, including 18 disputes involving employment, commercial, and human rights cases surrounding dispossessed Zimbabwean commercial farmers and agricultural companies. The EU's list of conditions outline that Zimbabwe should implement electoral law and security sector reforms, create a conducive environment for undisputed polls, put an end to the State's heavy-handedness in dealing with demonstrations and conduct investigations into human rights violations particularly, the August 1, 2018 shootings and the January 2019 protests and bring the culprits to book.

Facilitating factors towards for re-engagement

The government of Zimbabwe has begun to conduct land valuations to compensate former white commercial farmers RTGS$53 million (US$12 million) and that has been budgeted for in 2019 as interim compensation. An ad hoc Compensation Working Group comprising government officials and representatives of former farm owners has been created to establish the Compensation Quantum figure. These actions by the Zimbabwean government indicate a willingness to re-engage with the West. It is imperative, however, to note that compensation of former farm owners had actually been initiated by the Mugabe government. It seems that in Mugabe's later and final years in office, he had begun to realize that Zimbabwe could no longer live in autarky in a complex interdependent international environment. Keohane and Nye (2001) postulate that international politics is governed by relations of mutual dependence between countries in which the costs of breaking their relations or of reducing their exchanges are roughly equal for each of them. In a globalized international system, no state is an island. No state can avoid interaction with other countries, or choose a select group of nations to interact with as Zimbabwe has painfully discovered with her Look East Policy experiment.

Inhibiting factors to re-engagement

Zimbabwe has not met the requirements for new lending with IFIs and it is grappling with limited access to foreign exchange, rule of law and ease of doing business. According to the World Bank Flagship Report 2019, Zimbabwe ranks number 176 out of 190 countries in terms of the ease of doing business in the country. Zimbabwe ranks number 124 out of 137 countries on global competitiveness, (Global Competitiveness Report, 2018). These statistics show that it is quite challenging for investors to invest in Zimbabwe because of the bottlenecks they face when they seek to establish a business in Zimbabwe. These challenges coupled by the hyperinflationary environment, volatile political environment, policy inconsistency, excessive government interference in business, currency fluctuations, corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, a flawed justice delivery system among others, make Zimbabwe a very unattractive investment destination.

The estimated cost of paying for the compensation of white farmers by several farmer's unions in Zimbabwe is US$30 billion (PanaPress, 2019). This figure exceeds Zimbabwe's yearly budget by over seven times and this just shows what an uphill task the compensation of former farm owners is going to be. Another challenge has been the impunity of government officials for human rights abuses perpetrated during the August 2018, January and August 2019 protests. If justice is not served, it will be very difficult for Zimbabwe to implement successfully her reengagement policy. The contestation over the interpretation of sanctions is another inhibiting factor towards reengagement. The US denies that it imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, preferring to call them targeted measures affecting only 141 individuals and organizations, including Mnangagwa and Mugabe. Legitimacy challenges in the wake of disputed elections, negative perceptions from the international community on the military involvement in governance, violent crackdown on dissenting voices and renewed Sanctions in the form of ZIDERAA 2018 are other challenges that have been inhibiting Zimbabwe's drive for reengagement. China has joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in condemning the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by Western countries. The Chinese Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Ambassador Guo stated:

> Some countries claim that the so-called targeted sanctions did not have a major negative impact on the Zimbabwean economy and its people's livelihood. Such an argument is false as sanctions disrupt financial transactions between Zimbabwe and the outside world and disable Zimbabwe from accessing lines of credit from international financial institutions, which is essentially needed for the development of a country. (The Herald, September 5, 2019)

The continued engagement of Zimbabwe by other countries such as Russia, China, other Asian and Middle East Countries has slowed down the re-engagement process. These countries have offered a life line to the government of Zimbabwe, hence its continued violation of human rights. However, it is important to note that the aid and FDI provided by these countries have prevented the total collapse of the economy of Zimbabwe. China has been instrumental in the provision of humanitarian aid to Zimbabwe. In September, China donated US$13 million to assist with recovery efforts for Cyclone Idai victims (The Herald, 2019).

Implications on Zimbabwe-China Bilateral Relations

Zimbabwe's re-engagement efforts seem to not have affected Zimbabwe-China relations. The two countries have continued their cordial interactions as in the past. In 2019, Zimbabwe received a grant from the Chinese government to construct a new parliament building in Mt. Hampden. To depict the cordial relations between Zimbabwe and China, President Mnangagwa in a comment reminiscent of the Mugabe era, is on record for saying, "What kind of friend would you want other than China, they will build the most beautiful parliament in Africa for us?" (Chimba, 2018). The Chinese government has offered 1.2 billion to Zimbabwe to finance the rehabilitation of Robert Mugabe International Airport and Net One Phase 3. Other notable Chinese projects in Zimbabwe include; the Golden Peacock Villa Hotel in Mutare built by Anjin Investments and the National Defence College in Mazowe. In agriculture, the Chinese market is the largest consumer of Zimbabwe's flue-cured tobacco with over US$200 million worth of trade in the golden leaf.

The then acting Ambassador of China to Zimbabwe in 2019, Mr. Baogang noted:

> My country has done all these things to facilitate different projects in Zimbabwe because Zimbabweans are our dear friends, our fellow brothers and sisters. The ease of doing business has greatly improved under the new dispensation and that Zimbabwe

> should continue to visit China for more business deals. (The Daily News, 19 February 2019)

China is also supporting Kariba South, Victoria Falls Airport construction and the 1.5 billion Hwange Power Station expansion. The Chinese Ambassador to Zimbabwe Guo Shaochun in an exclusive interview with *The Herald* in June 2019 stated that

> The Kariba South Hydro-power Station Extension Project was successfully commissioned in March 2018. It has added 300 MW to the national grid. (The Herald, June 6, 2019)

The Chinese have gradually grown to be Zimbabwe's go-to friend on funding. The two countries during Mnangagwa's visit to China in 2018, elevated their relations from a party to party comradeship level to a comprehensive strategic co-operative partnership. Trade between Zimbabwe and China has grown to over US$1,2 billion annually with Zimbabwe exporting tobacco, cotton and various minerals.

Whilst China and Zimbabwe seem to have elevated relations, at least officially, it was shocking that media reports on 8 August 2019 stated that a Chinese government owned financial institution, China Everbright Bank, one of its largest investment arms across Europe and Africa, had placed Zimbabwe on sanctions casting doubt on Zimbabwe-China's so called "all weather" friendship (Moyo, 2019). Zimbabwe was placed by China under unilateral sanctions that are similar to those that it has been subjected to by the West. According to Munhende (2019), China Everbright Bank indicated that Zimbabwe was not able to able to "conduct business on any of its platforms even through counter party countries on its behalf."

Zimbabwe is not the only country that has been slapped by Chinese sanctions. Other countries on the sanctions list include Sudan, South Sudan, DRC, Burundi, Liberia, Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Venezuela and Serbia Albania, Belarus, Balkan Peninsula, Bosnia, Herzegovina, North Korea, Cuba, Montenegro, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Macedonia and Ukraine (ibid., 2019). This shift in China's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe and other developing countries could be an indicator that China is now taking a cue from the West on how to conduct its relations with countries on its lending list. From a realist perspective, it is in the interests of China to promote its interests rather than the interests of other countries.

Criticism of Sino-Zimbabwe Relations

China's support for a Zimbabwe, "a pariah regime" without any consideration of human rights and good governance has been criticized by Western countries. Reports of unfair labor practices, corruption, product dumping and counterfeiting, natural resource exploitation, tax evasion, externalization of foreign currency and fabrication of work permits for Chinese nationals have been conveyed in Zimbabwe's local media. Low quality cheap products labelled "Zhing Zhong" by Zimbabwean locals, have flooded Zimbabwean markets and seen the closure of local business leading to an outcry by Zimbabweans. In 2014, Anjin Investments and Jinan were caught in a storm over allegations of smuggling diamonds worth billions of dollars from Chiadzwa, casting a negative perception on China-Zimbabwe relations.

Chinese investments in Zimbabwe have been criticized because the business contracts and deals that are agreed upon and signed between the two countries seem opaque, largely benefiting the ruling elite at the expense of the masses (Shinn, 2009). Chinese financial assistance is mainly characterized by limited social and economic development for the local Zimbabwean. Most Zimbabwean locals have complained of the lack of infrastructural development by the Chinese in Manicaland, particularly in Chiadzwa were most diamond contracts were awarded to them by the Zimbabwean government. Ojakorotu and Kamidza (2018, 35) note that, "LEP has remained in haemorrhage with very little or nothing to show for the highly publicized romance between Zimbabwe and China." The Chinese have been blamed for the destruction of Zimbabwean industries and businesses as well as the hesitancy of investors to continue participating in Zimbabwe's economy (ibid.). Despite the criticism, it is without a shadow of doubt that without the Chinese intervention, the Zimbabwean economy would have totally collapsed. Despite the demerits associated with the Chinese presence in Zimbabwe, Chinese investments in Zimbabwe have in some way managed to keep a comatose economy alive, waiting for resuscitation.

Conclusion

It seems the economy, in particular the currency crisis, contains pointers to answers to the study's research question: Will China remain Zimbabwe's strategic economic, military and political ally? Emerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe's successor, in his inaugural speech, indicated that Zimbabwe was charting a new foreign policy framework by adopting a re-engagement policy with the West to promote economic recovery and growth. His mantra, "Zimbabwe is open for business," has attracted suitors from the West who are eager to harness the resources of the southern African Country. Findings suggest that both China and Zimbabwe are eager to maintain their cordial relations. Mnangagwa was one of the three African presidents to be invited to China on an official state visit in 2018. The new regime in Zimbabwe has shown interest in elevating its relationship with China from a party to party comradeship level between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and ZANU PF to a higher national strategic economic level. It remains to be seen if China is interested in elevating its relations with Zimbabwe from "being all weather friends" to an all-encompassing strategic partnership. Can Zimbabwe achieve its aim of becoming the largest recipient of Chinese aid in the region amid sanctions from China Everbright Bank? Can a mutually symbiotic relationship between the two nations be established? The new leadership in Zimbabwe need to demonstrate that they can reintegrate the state into the world economy as a serious player to attract the much needed foreign direct investment and initiate economic growth. Rather than being an event that began and ended in November 2017, Operation Restore legacy has to be seen as a continuing event of history. The political economy continuities make appreciating Operation Restore Legacy's ramifications on the economy more robust and grounded. The successes of Operation Restore Legacy on the economy are still futuristic, still a vision waiting to be worked out. Its basic principle in repelling lethargy and 'a business as usual' attitude remain fundamental attributes that though elusive are founded on a well-reasoned argument that Zimbabwe will develop economically when the leadership understands that if Zimbabwe is to work they must work and treat human capital as their greatest asset, not to be maligned but to be treated with respect. China needs to demonstrate that it is a strategic player that is interested in promoting win-win partnerships that Zimbabwe desperately needs. Zimbabwe' Second Republic is not abandoning old friends. She is nurturing and consolidating those friendships. However, she is also re-engaging with those nations she has had differences with in the past as well as exploring new investment frontiers and partnerships.

Recommendations

- Zimbabwe must learn from the past and honour its debts to China if it is to maintain its "all weather" friendship and elevated comprehensive strategic co-operative partnership.
- China needs to demonstrate that it is a strategic player that is interested in promoting win-win partnerships that Zimbabwe desperately needs to achieve economic revival.
- The Zimbabwean government must strengthen border controls for anti-smuggling of minerals and externalization of proceeds to China through informal corridors.
- Tax collection systems by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) need to be watertight to ensure compliance with local regulations by Chinese businesses.
- Commercial contracts should incorporate sufficient due diligence by parliament to ensure transparency in the tendering process between Zimbabwean officials and their Chinese counterparts.
- Zimbabwe must develop a clear strategy for its bilateral relations with China. Without a clear strategy, Chinese investments may perpetuate negative implications of geopolitical influence and unwarranted foreign debt to Zimbabwe as it has done in other parts of Africa such as Zambia, Djibouti and Kenya.

- Investment must be channelled projects that are self-sustaining or are of economic interest
- It is the duty of the government of Zimbabwe and parliament to ensure that control measures that safeguard national interests such as local employment, fair labor practices, local industry protection are adhered to. This will create mutually beneficial China-Zimbabwe co-operation.
- Zimbabwe must meet the conditions set by the USA, EU and China Everbright Bank if it is to re-engage with West whilst leveraging on existing partnerships.

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14

How Do Chinese and Other Asian Immigrants Fare in the South African Labor Market? An Examination of Inequalities in Employment Using Data from South Africa

Kevin J.A. Thomas

Although Chinese migration to Africa has been increasing, few studies have examined how well these immigrants are incorporated into African societies. This is partly due to the limited availability of data on their social and demographic outcomes. As a result, many critical debates about the role of Chinese immigrants in the transformation of African societies have remained unresolved. In this study, therefore, the analysis uses data from 2001 and 2011 South African census samples to provide one of the first nationally-representative analysis of the employment outcomes of Chinese and other Asian immigrants in the country. The results show that Chinese immigrants have higher odds of being employed compared to immigrants from major Asian sending countries such as India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Moreover, the study finds that Chinese immigrants have much higher odds of employment than African-born immigrants and local natives in South Africa. Added to this, the analysis implies that South African society is also experiencing new social transformations as a result of recent Chinese immigrants. Accordingly, it shows that Chinese immigrants have employment outcomes that match those of White South Africans, who are found at the top of the country's racial hierarchy.

Introduction

Recent Chinese migration flows to Africa have occurred in an era of significant expansion in China's interest in the region. However, the earliest evidence on these flows indicates that Chinese immigrants were arriving in substantial numbers as early as the seventeenth century (Park, 2009; Yap, 1996). The start of the most recent phase of these migrations started in the 1950s, and since then, Chinese migrants have been distinguished by their comparatively larger size and by the diversity of their countries of settlement (Lin, 2014; Mung, 2008). Today, estimates indicate that there are between six to eight hundred thousand Chinese immigrants living in approximately forty African countries (Lin, 2014; Park, 2009). In fact, the growing scale of these trends is indisputable. As a result, recent studies have raised new questions concerning how these immigrants are integrated into African societies. Some of these questions are related to concerns about their integration into African institutions, their relationships with native-born Africans, and their participation in economic activities. Of particular importance is the question of how well Chinese immigrants compete in African labor markets. Such questions have been answered extensively in research on other immigrant workers in Africa (Posel and Casale, 2003; Zuberi and Sibanda, 2004); however, for recent Chinese immigrants, the available answers are inadequate. In part, this is because limited progress has been achieved in the examination of the dynamics of their labor market integration as a result of a lack of data on their experiences.

One consequence of these empirical limitations is that critical debates about the role of Chinese immigration in the transformation of African societies remain unresolved. These debates revolve around two perspectives. The first suggests that Chinese immigrants are well integrated into African labor markets, are endowed with high levels of human-capital, and experience rapid increases in socioeconomic mobility (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009). Evidence for this is found in studies on their entrepreneurial successes, and in claims of their outstanding work ethic, and their ability to thrive in adverse conditions (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009). The second perspective, however, focuses on the implications of these new immigration flows for the creation of new patterns of inequality. Partly based on the work of critics, it suggests that the incorporation of Chinese immigrants is associated with transformations in normative patterns of inequality and negative shifts in the socioeconomic position of the disadvantaged (Power, 2008).

Assessing the relative merits of these arguments is fraught with difficulties, which extend beyond the weak empirical basis on which they are made. In some cases, these debates are centered on the outcomes of Chinese immigrants in newer African destinations of settlement that tend to attract highly-selected groups of immigrants (Esteban, 2010). Other studies, however, indicate that the evidence on Chinese socioeconomic success is less clear in more established destination countries in Africa (Esteban, 2010; Haugen and Carling, 2005). Beyond these issues, prior studies are also limited by their failure to understand recent Chinese immigration within the context of the larger migration flows to Africa from Asia. These movements have a long history and have resulted in the large-scale settlement of Asian immigrants in various African countries (Gupta, 1998; Oonk, 2006). Most previous studies are further constricted by their inadequate focus on ways in which Chinese immigrants are integrated into existing structures of inequality. To date, few studies have systematically articulated how the relative socioeconomic position of recent Chinese immigrants differs from those of disadvantaged minorities and marginalized populations in their destination societies.

Using data from the 2001 and 2011 South African censuses, therefore, this analysis fills these gaps in the literature by investigating the dynamics of labor market incorporation among Chinese immigrants in South Africa. Compared to other African countries, South Africa has a longer history of Chinese immigration as well as a substantial presence of other Asian immigrant groups. Focusing on measures of current employment status, the study empirically locates these immigrants within various patterns of disparity. First, it compares how Chinese immigrants fare in the South African labor market relative to immigrants from Africa and other Asian countries. Second, it evaluates the employment outcomes of Chinese immigrants to examine whether they match those of immigrants from other major Asian sending countries. Finally, the study examines what Chinese immigrant experiences imply for their relative social position compared to those of marginalized native-born populations in South Africa.

Background

Most scholars agree that the historical presence of the Chinese in Africa predates the arrival of Vasco da Gama on the continent in the late 1400s (Bräutigam, 2003; Large, 2008). However, few studies recognize that the next most significant stage of China's presence in Africa was associated with the beginning of Chinese immigration to South Africa. One of the first groups of Chinese migrants to permanently settle in the country were slaves and convicts who arrived in the Cape region in the middle of the 17th century (Park, 2009; Yap, 1996). More than two centuries later, a new economic nexus for these migration flows was initiated by the arrival of about sixty-thousand Chinese contract workers to work in the mines of Witwatersrand (Yap, 1996). While some of these workers returned home at the end of their contracts, many of them chose to stay in South Africa and establish what is now the oldest Chinese diaspora in Africa.

By the start of the modern phase of Chinese migration to Africa, the significance of South Africa as a country of Chinese settlement had been established. Beginning with rise of Mao Zedong in the 1950s, these new migrations were distinguished from earlier migrations by their almost exclusive involvement of state-sponsored workers sent to foster economic cooperation between China and newly independent African states. Among these migrants were more than one hundred and fifty-thousand skilled workers engaged in infrastructural development, agriculture, and technological transfer (Park, 2009). Another wave of Chinese migration to South Africa started in the 1970s and 80s with the arrival of approximately six thousand immigrants from Taiwan (Lin, 2014). By the 1990s, increased economic liberalization in China and the relaxation of its emigration controls, transformed the dynamics of Chinese migration to Africa and fueled the most recent wave of migration to South Africa. As a result of its increasing size, this new wave of migration is responsible for the arrival of the majority of the foreign-born Chinese population now living in the country (Lin, 2014).

Since the 1990s, Chinese migration to Africa more generally has mostly involved people migrating to the continent independent of the Chinese state. As is typical of traditional labor migration flows, these migrants include entrepreneurs, workers, and people with a diverse set of skills moving to countries such as South Africa to explore economic opportunities. Additionally, they also include migrants arriving directly from China and from the global Chinese Diaspora (Esteban, 2010). While these independent migrants, along with a few state-sponsored migrants, contribute to the growing presence of Chinese communities in Africa, reliable estimates of the size and composition of these communities are largely missing from the literature (Mohan and Kale, 2007).

Beyond South Africa's rich history of serving as a destination of migrants from China, the country has also served as a traditional destination for migrants from other Asian countries. Mass migration from India to the South Africa, for example, began in the mid-1800s with the development of a system of indentured servitude by European settlers who needed unskilled labor for their sugar and cotton plantations (Huttenback, 1966; Lemon, 1990). As a result, between 1860 and 1911, approximately 140,000 Indian laborers arrived in the country (Lemon, 1990). Towards the end of this period, this population also included free Indians who arrived to pursue economic opportunities in the country (Park and Rugunanan, 2010). In fact, much of the contemporary Indian population of South Africa includes the South-African born children of these older Indian groups. Contemporary migrants from India nevertheless continue to arrive in South Africa and have played a major role in the increase in number of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent in the country in the post-apartheid period (Park and Rugunanan, 2010). As the Asian immigrant population in South Africa expanded, however, it has not only included immigrants from India but also those from countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. Indeed, some estimates indicate that in small-sized South African cities, the number of immigrants from these two countries is more than double the number of recent Chinese immigrants living in these cities (Park and Chen, 2009).

Outside of Asia, the most important sources of immigrants to South Africa are found in Sub-Saharan Africa. With the removal of apartheid restrictions to the immigration of Black Africans, South Africa has now become the most important destination of international migrants moving within the continent. This central role of South Africa in African migration processes is typically understood in terms of its significance as the core attraction of the Southern African Migration System (SAMS) (Zuberi and Sibanda, 2004; Agadjanian, 2008). International migration in the SAMS primarily revolves around the movement of labor between South Africa and member states of the South African Development Community (SADC). Much of this mass migration of labor is driven by the economic opportunities created by the dynamism of South Africa's economy and the high levels of poverty found in

other Southern African countries (Adepoju, 2003). Yet, the strength of the attraction of South Africa extends beyond the borders of SADC. Recent configurations of migration to South Africa now include African migrants from countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone (Adepoju, 2003).

Notwithstanding the rich diversity of the immigrant groups found in South Africa, very few studies have examined group differences in immigrant incorporation in the South African labor market. What exists are studies that generally examine the unique experiences of specific groups. As such, they provide a limited basis for understanding how immigrants contribute to local patterns of economic stratification. Studies on the labor market incorporation of Chinese immigrants, for example, indicate that they have high levels of economic success, driven by their ability to own thriving businesses and their culture of hard work (Esteban, 2010). Other studies indicate that while some Chinese immigrants in South Africa have found success in the mining and manufacturing sectors, and exercise significant economic power over low-income South Africans (Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 2012; Lin, 2014), the majority of them have less favorable outcomes and face constraints to social mobility (Lin, 2014).

Compared to what we know about Chinese immigrants, however, there is limited research on the labor market experiences of other Asian immigrant groups. Scattered evidence suggests that Indian and Bangladeshi immigrants experience some measure of economic success by being employed in their own businesses. Research indicates, for example, that for every Chinese shop found in major and secondary towns in South Africa, there are at least one or two others owned by Pakistani or Bangladeshi immigrants (Park and Rugunanan, 2010). Whether or not this story of success extends to the overall labor market experiences of immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh however remains unclear.

Studies on the experiences of African immigrants in South Africa also provide mixed evidence on how well they fare in the country's labor market. On one hand, some studies indicate that these immigrants face high levels of xenophobia from local South Africans (Matsinhe, 2011), which can undermine their prospects for labor market success. Other the other hand, other scholars indicate that African immigrants have higher levels of labor force participation compared to South African natives (Zuberi and Sibanda, 2004). Although this suggests that African immigrants have been able to find some measure of economic success in the country, it is not clear whether their labor market experiences are more or less favorable compared to those of recent immigrants from China.

Despite the significance of understanding the labor market experiences of various immigrant groups, however, it is also important to understand the ways in which Chinese immigrants can contribute to existing patterns of social inequality. In Equatorial Guinea, for example, evidence indicates that Chinese entrepreneurs have contributed to the increasing wealth of the upper class while worsening the economic conditions of the lower class (Esteban, 2010). In South Africa, where access to opportunity has long been defined by racial and ethnic inequalities, few studies have examined how Chinese immigrants are incorporated into traditional patterns of social stratification.

Under Apartheid, the contours of these social inequalities were institutionalized by the creation of systematic barriers that denied native-born Blacks, Coloreds, and Asians access to opportunities in education and employment (Marx, 1998; Seekings and Nattrass, 2008). Officially classified as Coloreds during the apartheid era, the native descendants of early Chinese immigrants were thus caught up in this system of disadvantage and had a lower socioeconomic position compared to White South Africans (Christopher, 2002; Khalfani and Zuberi, 2001). Contemporary racial inequalities in South Africa continue to reflect this apartheid legacy, with White South Africans maintaining their socioeconomic advantage relative to their Black, Colored, and Asian counterparts (Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2001; Kingdon and Knight, 2004). However, research has not specifically examining how recent Chinese immigrants fit into these patterns of inequalities.

In summary, the evidence from previous studies suggest that recent immigrants from China are likely to have relatively different prospects of economic success in the South African labor market compared to other immigrants. Existing claims of Chinese immigrant success also suggest that these immigrants will have more favorable labor market experiences compared to native-born Africans. In combination, these propositions provide a basis for developing a hypothesis that predicts that Chinese immigrants would have more favorable labor market experiences compared to other Asian/African immigrants and native-born South Africans. To date, similar hypotheses have not been systematically assessed in African countries due, among other things, to the weak empirical basis on which it can be evaluated. In order to address this limitation, this analysis contributes to the literature by using new data on Chinese immigrants in South Africa to investigate these issues. In the process, it examines the question of whether their prospects of employment are more favorable compared to those of other immigrants. Additionally, the study investigates differences in the economic prospects of Chinese immigrants and members of five major South African race-ethnic groups. By addressing these issues, the analysis hopes to provide a more comprehensive picture of the labor market incorporation of Chinese immigrants in Africa and examine whether new inequalities are created by their labor market experiences.

Data and Methods

The best source of data for examining these issues is the South African Population Census. Accordingly, the analysis uses combined data from a 10% sample of the 2001 South African census and a 8.5% sample of the country's 2011 census, both of which are available in the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS-International) repository (Minnesota Population Center, 2018). Both the 2001 and 2011 census samples are important for several reasons. No other census in Africa identifies as many immigrants of Chinese origin as those found in these censuses. In fact, apart from these two censuses, there is arguably no other public data source that provides substantial nationally-representative information on the demographic, social, and economic characteristics of Chinese immigrants in Africa.

Using these data, the study's objectives are examined by focusing on the working age of population of South Africa, defined as individuals between age 15 and 64. Of this population, individuals who are inactive in the labor force, that is, those who are not currently looking for work, are dropped from the analysis to avoid potential biases in the estimation of employment rates. For the final sample of individuals who are active in the labor force, a dependent variable is constructed to measure whether or not they are currently employed (i.e., yes =1 and no = 0).

Immigrant status is measured using census information on respondents' country of birth. Using this information, three broad groups of immigrants are identified. The first, Chinese immigrants, consists of individuals born in either mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan. The second group, immigrants from other Asian countries, is defined as foreign-born individuals from other major Asian sending countries such as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. The third group, African immigrants, consists of individuals born in African countries other than South Africa. As part of the analysis, the employment outcomes of these three immigrant groups are compared with those of non-immigrants, who are defined as native-born South Africans. Subsequently, this group of native-born South Africans is further disaggregated on the basis of their race—that is, Black, White, Asian, Colored, and Other—in order to compare their outcomes with those of Chinese immigrants.

Measures of the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of members of all the main groups are also included in the analysis. These include census measures of age, sex (i.e., male or female), and marital status (i.e., married, single, or other). For each individual, the census also provides an indicator of family size. Apart from these measures, information is also available on respondents' highest level of educational attainment. This information is used to identify individuals who completed primary, secondary, and post-secondary schooling, as well as those with no schooling at all.

Logistic regression models are used to describe the association between current employment status and immigrant/native-born status. These differences are described in three stages. The first examines differences between Chinese immigrants, African immigrants, immigrants from other Asian countries (as a collective group), and native-born South Africans. The second focuses on differences between Chinese immigrants and their counterparts from three major Asian immigrant groups—immigrants from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Together with the Chinese, these three groups account for about 75% of the total number of immigrants from Asia in the two South African censuses. Finally, the third stage of the analysis examines how Chinese immigrants fit within South Africa's traditional system of social stratification. Accordingly, a final set of regression models are used to compare the outcomes of Chinese immigrants with those of native-born South Africans identified as either Black, White, Asian, Colored, or Other. In all three stages, the analysis first presents estimates of overall group differences using data the combined sample of data from 2001 and 2011. After this, estimates for each of the respective years are used to assess whether there were changes in these differences between the two periods.

Results

Before presenting the results from the main regression models, it is important to get an overall sense of the characteristics of individuals in the final sample. As such, summary characteristics of the major groups of immigrants and natives are presented in Table 1. These estimates provide us with a rare insight into how the demographic and social characteristics of Chinese immigrants differ from those of other individuals in South Africa. As Table 1 indicates, Chinese immigrants (N=1,384) account for a smaller number of individuals in the active labor force of South Africa compared to immigrants from other parts of Asia (N=5,906), Africa (N=139,788), or native-born South Africans (N=3,109,832). Other group differences are also observed in their respective demographic characteristics. For example, with an average age of 37 years, Chinese immigrants are the oldest individuals in the sample. In fact, close to 30% of Chinese immigrants are between the ages of 40 and 64, which is more than twice the respective percentage found in these ages among African immigrants (14%) and higher than those for other Asians and native-born South Africans.

While males account for 58% of all Chinese immigrants in the sample, the Chinese immigrant population is less dominated by males compared to the rest of the Asian immigrant population (83%) or African immigrants (67.2%). This difference stands in contrast to many previous studies which suggest that Chinese migration to Africa is driven by migrant workers, who are presumed to be males. Apart from this, the results show that Chinese immigrants have the highest percentage of currently married individuals in the sample. Moreover, they tend to live in families of around three individuals, but this does not substantially differ from the family sizes of other immigrants in the sample.

Among the most critical differences between Chinese immigrants and other groups in the sample are those associated with their socioeconomic indicators. Together with other Asian immigrants, Chinese immigrants have the highest levels of educational attainment in the South African labor market. Close to 30% of them have post-secondary educational credentials compared to only 8% among African immigrants and 6.1% among native-born South Africans. This indicates that Chinese immigrants in South Africa are not among the usual cadre of low-skilled migrant workers typically found in South Africa. Table 1 further demonstrates that

about 92% of Chinese immigrants in the South African labor force are currently employed compared to slightly more than 50% of native-born South Africans and 74% of African immigrants. In fact, the only group with similarly high levels of employment as Chinese immigrants are immigrants from other Asian countries.

Table 1: Summary characteristics of the migrant groups and native-born South Africans in the sample

	Chinese Immigrants	Other Asian Immigrants	African Immigrants	Native-born South Africans
Age (Mean)	37.3	35.3	33.3	34.9
Gender				
Males	58.16	83.11	67.20	50.00
Females	41.84	16.89	32.80	50.00
Marital status				
Married	73.77	60.02	61.40	47.01
Single	21.32	37.50	35.01	47.41
Other	4.91	2.48	3.59	5.58
Family size (Mean)	3.00	3.07	2.73	4.45
Educational attainment				
No schooling	4.41	3.71	10.32	7.81
Primary	4.33	5.28	19.66	17.40
Secondary	59.47	60.97	61.43	68.52
Post-secondary	28.18	27.43	7.95	6.11
Employed	91.91	90.55	74.15	55.25
N	1,384	5,906	139,788	3,109,832

Data Source: Combined data from a 10% sample of the 2001 South African census and an 8.5% sample of the South African 2011 census.

While the summary estimates presented in Table 1 are no doubt informative, they are limited in two important ways. First, they do not allow us to empirically determine whether gross group differences in employment are driven by inequalities in educational attainment and other demographic characteristics. Second, because they summarize information found in the combined census samples, it is difficult to determine whether these group differences in employment remained stable between 2001 and 2011.

In order to clarify these issues, Table 2 presents odds ratios from logistic regression models that examine the association between current employment status and the social and demographic attributes of individuals in the sample. Starting with estimates from the combined sample, Model 1 confirms that, on average, Chinese immigrants had the highest comparative odds of employment of the four major groups, even after social and demographic characteristics are controlled. In other words, the more favorable employment prospects of Chinese immigrants are neither explained by their higher levels of educational attainment nor by the fact that their demographic characteristics differ from those of the other groups. Specifically, Model 1 shows that the odds of being employed among Chinese immigrants were four and a half times higher than those of native-born South Africans. Moreover, although immigrants from other Asian countries and from Africa had higher odds of employment compared to native-born South Africans, these comparative odds were much lower than those observed among Chinese immigrants in the sample.

Models 2 and 3 examine group differences in the odds of employment in 2001 and 2011 respectively, after controlling for other social and demographic characteristics. In general, the relative position of each group largely remained unchanged during both periods. As such, the overall Chinese employment advantage in South Africa appears to have been in place for about a decade. Yet, this does not mean that the absolute size of their relative advantage remained unchanged. Indeed, the results indicate that the magnitude of the overall group differences was much smaller in 2011 than it was in 2001. For example, although the odds of being employed were five times higher among Chinese immigrants compared to native-born South Africans in 2001, the former were four times more likely to be employed than the latter in 2011.

The main explanation for the reduction of these differences in employment appears to be that there were more jobs available to native-born South Africans in 2011 than in 2001. Specifically, the census data indicates that while 51.7% of native-born South Africans were employed in 2001, by 2011 this percentage had increased to 58%. Between the two years, the percentage of Chinese immigrants employed remained stable at around 92%, while that for African immigrants slightly increased (i.e., from 73% to 75%), but at a slower rate compared to the increase among South African natives. Overall, these improvements in the job prospects of South Africans appeared to have reduced their relative disadvantage compared to Chinese immi-

Table 2: Results from logistic regression models showing the predictors of the odds of employment

	Model 1 Combined sample	Model 2 2001	Model 3 2011
Immigrant/nativity status			
Chinese immigrants	4.51***	5.16***	4.08***
Other Asian immigrants	3.83***	3.43***	3.72***
African immigrants	1.60***	1.86***	1.44***
Native-born South Africans (Ref)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.00)
Age group			
15 to 24 (ref)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.00)
25 to 34	2.04***	1.80***	2.23***
35 to 44	3.07***	2.84***	3.22***
45 to 54	3.79***	3.36***	4.12***
55 to 64	4.15***	3.65***	4.50***
Lived in residence for 5 years or less			
Yes	1.55***	1.40***	1.69***
No (Reference)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.00)
Gender			
Males	1.63***	1.62***	1.64***
Females (ref)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.00)
Marital status			
Married	1.10***	1.14***	1.07***
Single	0.62***	0.58***	0.65***
Other (ref)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.00)
Educational attainment			
No schooling (ref)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.00)
Primary	1.17***	1.27***	1.01
Secondary	2.06***	2.31***	1.70***
Post-secondary	9.92***	15.68***	7.50***
Family size	0.89***	0.89***	0.89***
Census year			
2001	0.92***	-	-
2011(ref)	(1.00)	-	-
Constant	0.46***	0.43***	0.51***
Log likelihood	-1924071	-866059.61	-1055950.7
N	3,256,910	1,445,896	1,811,014

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<001

grants between the two periods. Nevertheless, they still had the lowest prospects of being employed in the country throughout this period.

Apart from these group differences, Table 2 shows other important associations between the odds of employment and specific social and demographic characteristics of members of South Africa's active labor force. For example, it shows that older individuals generally had higher odds of being employed compared to individuals in the younger ages. In fact, in the two census periods, the likelihood of employment was about four times higher among individuals between ages 55 and 64 compared to that of their counterparts between the ages of 15 and 24. The results also show that individuals who lived in their current residences for five years or less had higher odds of employment compared to those who had not. Additionally, the odds of employment were about 60% higher among males than females, while married individuals had higher odds of employment compared to their counterparts who were either single or in other marital statuses. Finally, as expected, the results show a strong positive association between educational attainment and the odds of employment. Accordingly, individuals with post-secondary education had the highest odds of employment in both 2001 and 2011 (Model 2 and Model 3) and in the combined data sample (Model 1).

Next, the analysis turns attention to the question of how well Chinese immigrants fare compared to immigrants from other major Asian sending countries. As such, Table 3 presents odds ratios from logistic regression models comparing differences in the likelihood of employment among Chinese, Bangladeshi, Indian, and Pakistani immigrants. Other than having the indicators for these groups, all models control for the same set of social and demographic factors (e.g., age, education) accounted for in Table 2. For analytical simplicity, however, Table 3 only shows the odds ratios capturing the group differences. In Model 1, results from the combined sample indicate that Chinese immigrants still have the highest comparative odds of employment among the major Asian immigrant groups. In particular, they are 65% more likely to be employed than Asian immigrants in the reference category. While immigrants from Bangladesh are also shown to have comparatively higher odds of employment than the reference group, the difference between the two is not statistically significant.

More importantly, the results in Table 3 show that the overall inequalities observed among Asian immigrant groups are consequences of the more recent employment patterns observed in 2011. For example, Model 2 shows that as far back as 2001, Chinese immigrants and immigrants from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan had lower odds of employment compared to Asian immigrants who were not from these countries. Yet, these comparative differences were only statistically significant for the inequalities between Bangladeshi and Pakistani immigrants on one hand, and the reference group on the other. It was only in 2011 that the differences between Asian groups, specifically the Chinese advantage, became more substantial. In that year, the odds of employment among Chinese immigrants were 1.29 times

Table 3: Results from logistic regression models showing the odds of employment among Asian immigrants

	Model 1 Combined sample	Model 2 2001	Model 3 2011
Immigrant/nativity status			
Chinese immigrants	1.65**	0.87	2.29***
Bangladeshi	1.33	0.39*	1.56*
Indian	0.93	0.63	1.11
Pakistani	0.82	0.30***	1.29
Other Asian (Reference)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.00)
Constant	2.38*	4.61*	1.65
Log likelihood	-2073.0829	-509.3638	-1512.8729
N	7,290	1,764	5,526

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<001. All models also control for the same set of demographic and social characteristics used in the models presented in Table 2.

higher than those of the reference group, while immigrants from Bangladesh were 56% more likely to be employed compared to other Asian immigrants.

In summary, two findings concerning inequalities in the odds of employment among Asian immigrant groups are provided by the results so far. The first is that although Chinese immigrants generally have comparatively higher odds of employment compared to other major groups of Asian immigrants, this advantage is a relatively recent phenomenon. The second is that among Asian immigrants from countries other than China, recent immigrants from Bangladesh had the most favorable employment outcomes in the South African labor market. Overall, these findings stand in sharp contrast to research implying that Bangladeshi and Pakistani immigrants in South Africa are more successful than their counterparts from China (Park and Rugunanan, 2010).

There is no doubt that the main finding of Chinese immigrant success in the South African labor market is important. However, this success raises the question of where their favorable labor market experiences place them within the traditional social stratification system in South Africa. One attempt to address this question is shown in Table 4, which presents odds ratios from regression models comparing the outcomes of Chinese immigrants with those of South African-born workers from the country's major racial groups.

Table 4: Results from logistic regression models showing the odds of employment among Chinese immigrants and South African racial groups

	Model 1 Combined sample	Model 2 2001	Model 3 2011
Immigrant/nativity status			
Chinese immigrants§	6.06***	8.01***	5.16***
Native-born South Africans			
Whites	6.07***	9.47***	4.27***
Asians	3.71***	4.81***	2.93***
Coloreds	2.56***	3.35***	2.04***
Other	2.13***	(a)	2.05***
Blacks (Reference)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.00)
Constant	0.38***	0.31***	0.41***
Log likelihood	-1773550	-793155	-975767
N	3,111,216	1,403,793	1,707,423

§ Chinese immigrants are not found in racial categories in the model because the categories only include native-born South Africans.

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<001. All models also control for the same set of demographic and social characteristics used in the models presented in Table 2.

Model 1 provides a nuanced representation of the patterns of racial stratification found in the employment outcomes of native-born South Africans. Consistent with prior studies, Black South Africans are at the bottom of the system with the lowest odds of employment, while White South Africans are at the top. Strikingly, however, the results indicate that the outcomes of Chinese immigrants would place them at the top of this stratification system, given that their odds of employment are identical to those of White South Africans. As shown in Model 1, both groups are about six times more likely to be employed compared to native-born South Africans. Instructively, the fact that Chinese immigrants have similar outcomes as White South Africans does not imply that both groups hold a normatively similar rank in the country's racial stratification system. What this finding demonstrates is that, in terms of a measured outcome such as employment status, the outcomes of Chinese immigrants are indistinguishable from those of native-born South Africans at the top of the country's racial hierarchy. Also important is the fact that Model 1 indicates that, in comparative terms, Chinese immigrants have higher odds of employment compared to native-born South Africans who identify themselves as

Asians. In other words, recent immigrants from China also have more favorable labor market outcomes compared to the descendants of older Asian immigrants who arrived in the country in previous decades.

Racial and ethnic inequalities in employment in South Africa were, however, more constricted in 2011 than in 2001. In 2001, disparities in the odds of employment between all the major groups and Black South Africans were much higher than the respective disparities observed in 2011. Moreover, while Chinese immigrants had relatively higher odds of employment than Asian, Colored, and Black South Africans in 2001, it was only in 2011 that their outcomes exceeded those of all South African racial groups. Census data indicates that between this period, the percentage of White South Africans employed slightly declined from 92% to 89%, while the percentage employed among Chinese immigrants remained steady at around 92%. In contrast, the percentage employed among Black South Africans increased by about ten percentage points from 43% to 52%. This improvement in employment opportunities for Black South Africans seem to explain why there were smaller group-level differences observed in 2011 than in 2001. Despite these improvements, Black South Africans still had the least favorable odds of employment, even after other factors are controlled.

Conclusions

As the number of Chinese immigrants in African countries increases, the need systematic studies on their incorporation into African societies has become more pressing. In response, several studies have attempted to articulate the ways in which these immigrants contribute to the economic welfare of these societies (e.g., Park, 2009; Lin 2014), while others highlight the various ways in which African societies are themselves affected by the arrival of the Chinese (e.g., Esteban, 2010). Collectively, however, this emerging literature is quite small compared to the existing literature on the dynamics and consequences of migration in Africa. To make things worse, the limited availability of data on Chinese immigrant populations in Africa imposes significant constraints to the development of empirically sound conclusions on their social incorporation processes.

Against this backdrop, this study advances research by evaluating these migrations within a comparative context that assesses how the outcomes of Chinese migrants differ from those of other Asian migrants and African immigrants. More importantly, it advances research on the consequences of these migrations by highlighting the possible ways in which the economic activities of these migrants can result in social transformations within the continent. In order to do so, the analysis makes use of unique data collected in South Africa, a country at the heart of Africa's major international migration system. Using these data, the study makes at least three major contributions to the literature.

First, it presents one of the first nationally-representative profiles of the social and demographic characteristics of Chinese immigrants in an African country, in order to determine how they differ from those of other groups. Accordingly, the study demonstrates that the profile of Chinese immigrants is quite unlike that of low-skilled groups of migrant workers in Africa moving in search of opportunity. Accordingly, Chinese immigrants in South Africa are more highly-educated compared to other immigrant groups and have some of the highest levels of human-capital in the country. On the basis of these characteristics alone, we can conclude that they have the educational characteristics that allow them to better position themselves for economic success in the South African labor market.

Second, the study demonstrates that Chinese immigrants have more favorable employment outcomes compared to either native-born South Africans, other Asian immigrants, or African-born immigrants in the country. On average, they were four and a half times more likely to be employed compared to South African natives between 2001 and 2011, and their relative odds of employment were similarly higher than those of the other immigrant groups. Significantly, the study finds that the higher odds of employment of the Chinese were neither explained by their higher levels of education nor by their social and demographic attributes. In general, these findings are instructive for several reasons. They imply that Chinese immigrants surprisingly experience an employment advantage over African immigrants in a labor market located in Africa. Similarly, they demonstrate that Chinese immigrants are better able to successfully navigate this labor market than their counterparts from Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, or Pakistan. Whether or not this ability stems from their access to social networks tied to the long history of Chinese immigration to South Africa remains unclear. The data available in the 2001 and 2011 South African censuses do not allow us to test for the influence of these networks. As such, it will be important for future studies to identify the specific causal mechanisms that drive the employment successes of the Chinese.

Finally, the study indicates that the story of Chinese immigrant experiences in South Africa is not just one of economic successes. At least in terms of employment outcomes, their favorable job prospects have important implications for social stratification patterns in South Africa. In short, because their employment prospects are comparable to those of White South Africans, Chinese immigrants effectively have outcomes that match those found at the top of the country's racial order. When similar findings are reported in the U.S. context, they have been used by scholars to controversially label Chinese immigrants as model minorities (Qin et al., 2008), and to speculate on whether their success will increase their assimilation into Whiteness (Bonilla-Silva, 2004). It is not clear whether similar discourses have emerged within South African society. Based on this study, however, it seems clear that the experiences of recent Chinese immigrants are quite different from those of marginalized Chinese migrants who arrived in South Africa as convicts and slaves in the seventeenth century (Park, 2009; Yap, 1996). Compared to the latter, who were found near

the bottom of South Africa's social hierarchy, contemporary Chinese immigrants are not a disadvantaged group. In fact, they also have outcomes that surpass those of historically marginalized groups such as native-born Black, Colored, and Asian South Africans. This shift in economic attainment is unprecedented in the South African context. However, it may also signal the existence of other unknown fundamental social changes that are accompanying the arrival of recent Chinese immigrants living in the country.

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Map Africa



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Index of African Countries, Places, and Institutions

WORLD SOCIETY FOUNDATION

Is the impression of a new dynamism in African-Asian relations empirically correct? Is it a process that will once be accepted as one of the fundamental transformations of World Society in the 21st century? This volume addresses these questions in 14 chapters, from a look back to 2000 years of African-Asian contacts and exchange to the analysis of the origins of this new inter-regional dynamism. On the Asian side, the focus is on China, which has—with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with numerous infrastructure projects in Africa, development assistance, resource deals, and the support for the African Union—drawn most attention, but also recent initiatives by India and South Korea are described. On the African side, the recent developments in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Angola, Guinea, Tanzania, Ghana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa are analyzed in detail, with a special focus on the various impacts of the recent and ongoing projects and initiatives and the conditions under which they exert developmental or detrimental economic,social, and political effects in African societies. Do we witness the repetition of past mistakes of development policies at higher level, or is this time—under the auspices of South-South cooperation—everything different?

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